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The present thesis addresses the policy and technological aspects of national (and sub-national) greenhouse
gases (GHG) abatement strategies. Two of the three chapters of this thesis explore the former, respectively inves-
tigating (i) domestic political economy constraints and (ii) processes of policy diffusion across jurisdictions. One
chapter focuses on the latter, advancing methodologies for the identification of firm-level innovation in (GHG-
reducing) electricity supply technologies.
A key empirical contribution of this thesis, presented in the first chapter, is the construction and calculation
of an average (emissions-weighted) price of carbon for the jurisdictions under study, which shows, among other
insights, that the world average price remains extremely low, at about 1.5USD/tCO2e in 2018. In addition, the
analysis in this chapter suggests that (i) political economy factors primarily affected policy implementation and (ii)
policy stringency is a highly persistent process.
Our next chapter investigates policy diffusion processes and proposes that these are related to an alteration of
the net payoffs of domestic climate policy and an update on the information about the benefits (or costs) of policy
adoption derived from the adoption of a similar policy or the deployment of abatement technology in foreign juris-
dictions. The evidence suggests that technology demonstration and learning from past policy experience positively
affect (domestic) policy developments.
The last chapter focuses on the identification of (GHG-abating) electricity supply technologies using a machine
learning search strategy based on patents’ title and abstract. This approach highlighted the role of “lateral" innova-
tion in the development of some electricity generation technologies. In addition, by linking the identified patent set
to legal entities, we uncover the role of firms’ technological entry and exit in technology transition and shed light
on the business structure of technologically active entities.
The present work allowed me to address fundamental questions pertaining to the design of climate change
mitigation strategies. First, our results stress the importance of the sequence of introduction of the climate poli-
cies, suggesting that policies weakening incumbents’ political and economic influence might foster subsequent
implementation of more stringent policies. Second, given the weakness of most existing carbon pricing schemes,
a rationale for the development of climate mitigation strategies with multiple GHG abatement tools continues to
exist. Third, mechanisms of policy diffusion at play could prove highly valuable when seeking to introduce carbon-
pricing mechanisms in new jurisdictions. Finally, we point at the need to target public support to sustain the stream
of GHG-abating electricity supply technologies primarily at new (technological) entrants.
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The unprecedented accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere poses a mon-
umental challenge to humanity. As ever greater amounts of heat get trapped, global and re-
gional climate patterns change, affecting natural and human-created systems alike.
Past accumulation has already induced observable changes. In Western Europe, hotter and
dryer summer seasons have slowly had the best of some Alpine glaciers (European Environ-
ment Agency, 2016). In regions exposed to tropical cyclones, model-based projections suggest
they can expect more intense occurrences due to combined warming of sea and troposphere
temperatures (Knutson et al., 2019) while longer and more frequent droughts in Central and
Eastern Africa cause famine and make it harder to end extreme poverty (Roy et al., 2018).
Climate Change used to be thought of, at least in developed economies, as a geographically
and temporally distant problem. Failure to reduce world emissions, especially over the last
thirty years, has made it a “here" and “now" problem for most of the world’s population. And
because of the lag between the level of GHG in the atmosphere and the equilibrium response
of the climate system, there is always more than meets the eye: the present level locks us in
for further changes and further accumulation, possibly at increasing rates, will induce changes
that will only materialise later this century.
Yet, reducing emissions has so far proven difficult, not least because their main source, the
combustion of fossil fuels, is now at the heart of our techno-economic system. Decades of
development of industries based on their use as well as CO2-releasing processes have created
both technological and political path dependencies. From a technological standpoint, GHG-
emitting technologies benefit from a long history of improvement and deployment at scale that
makes them cheaper than newer, GHG-free ones. Politically, GHG-intensive sectors are the
source of much income and wealth accumulation, making it hard for policy-makers to enact
policies that would curb their activity, even temporarily.
These aspects would make the problem at hand hard enough to tackle if the world was a
single, autarkic entity. It gets compounded when heat-trapping gases are emitted by multi-
ple sovereign jurisdictions. When looking through that lens, one realises that GHG emissions
create significant national (marginal) benefits but that most of the (marginal) burden falls onto
areas and populations that lie beyond the borders of national policy makers’ constituencies.
Hence, in the absence of genuine care for the global environment, the sum of local emissions
levels far exceeds what would be globally optimal.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
In the absence of a World government, tackling climate change therefore requires coordi-
nated action. This is the raison d’être of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) which, in its second article, commits its Parties to achieve “stabilisation
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system". The available evidence suggests that the
multilateral climate change mitigation regime, developed over almost thirty years of existence
of the UNFCCC, has fallen short of this objective: the current atmospheric CO2 level, at about
408 ppm, is 1.45 time the value of a typical interglacial period (The Economist, Sept. 21-27,
2019).1 Moreover, the latest data on global GHG emissions released by the Potsdam Climate
Institute (Gutschow, Jeffery, and Gieseke, 2019) show that world yearly emissions have contin-
ued to rise steadily.2
The present situation can in part be attributed to the design of the Kyoto Protocol (KP),
whereby only Annex I countries were committed to legally binding emissions reductions. As
a result, emissions of Annex-I countries decreased by 12.4% between 1990 and 2017 while the
emissions of the ten largest non Annex I countries were multiplied by a factor of 2.8 over the
same period (Gutschow, Jeffery, and Gieseke, 2019).3
A compounding difficulty was that the KP offered a very static architecture with few pro-
visions for (i) dynamic updates to Annex I countries’ emissions reduction ambition or (ii) ex-
tension in participation by non-Annex I countries. Given the changes in technological and
economic feasibility of emissions reduction over the lifetime of the Protocol, such provisions
could have been extremely valuable. Moreover, this static nature combined with the fact that it
was agreed by countries’ respective international negotiations teams meant that it was brought
from the top, down to national level policy makers but that there was little room for them to
engage in (further) emissions reducing policy developments.
The latest iteration of formalised multilateral cooperation adopted under UNFCCC aus-
pices, the Paris Agreement, took a notably different approach. First, it sought to remove the
distinction made in the Kyoto Protocol and committed every Party – albeit in a non legally
binding manner – to the same objective: limiting the increase in “[. . . ] global average tempera-
ture to well below 2 C above pre-industrial levels and [pursue] efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 C above pre-industrial levels [. . . ]" (Paris Agreement, Art. 2-(a)).
Second, the Paris Agreement shifted the architecture of international climate negotiations
from a cooperative to a non-cooperative setting: under its provisions, Parties are invited to
1For as long as the records from the Vostok ice core can tell, atmospheric CO2 levels have fluctuated, usually
between below 200 ppm at the end of glacial periods to just under 300 ppm during or soon after interglacial periods.
2During the period 2011-2016, GHG emissions (excluding land use, land-use change and forestry) grew on
average at 0.52% per year, reaching 47Gt; in the five years prior to the 2008-2009 Great Recession, emissions grew
on average at 3.05% per year. This, however, hides a more mixed regional picture. In the European Union (28), GHG
emissions fell from 5.7Gt in 1990 to 4.4Gt in 2016, a 23% reduction. In the United States, unlike in the EU, yearly
GHG emissions rose between 1990 and 2007, from 6.5Gt to 7.5Gt, and decreased steadily since then, reaching 6.6Gt
in 2016. And yet another picture is observed in India and China: in India, yearly emissions rose steadily since 1990;
in China’s emissions had a similar growth rate until 2003, rose steeply in the run up to 2011, and have stabilised at
around 12.5Gt between 2012 and 2016.
3As of 2017, the ten largest non Annex I emitters (GHG emissions excluding LULUCF) were, in order: China,
India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, South Korea.
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submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the achievement of
the stated temperature warming objective. With such an institutional design, the key questions
no longer pertain to the formation of climate coalitions and the mechanisms to sustain them
but rather to the determinants of unilateral climate change mitigation policy ambition. In this
respect, the Agreement implicitly acknowledges that technological demonstration and policy
learning are such determinants. Indeed, parts of it rest on the premise that by offering to
Parties the flexibility to put forward strategies based on a variety of abatement policies and
technologies, it will foster their demonstration and diffusion across sectors and jurisdictions
(Paris Agreement, Art. 6-1, 6-8, 7-6, 7-7, 10) and, ultimately, trigger increased climate policy
ambition.
But given its non legally binding nature, whether or not the Paris Agreement triggers green-
house gas (GHG) emissions reduction in line with the temperature warming objective depends
on the Parties’ self-determined pledges – the so called Intended Nationally Determined Con-
tributions (INDCs) – and their commitment to implement them. Among the 60 NDCs assessed
by the Climate Action Tracker, all but 7 fall short of the 2 C target and all but 2 (Morocco, The
Gambia) fall short of the 1.5 C target (Hare and Höhne, 2019).
In other words, current world emissions level imply that we are fast depleting our 2 C
carbon budget, making the case to strengthen the existing climate change mitigation regime
clearer than it has ever been. This implies the need to break through both the political and
technological inertia which have so far prevented the strengthening of incentives to reduce
emissions as well as hindered the development and deployment of new GHG-free or GHG-
abating technologies.
In an ideal world, this effort would be fully coordinated, establishing both a regulatory
and technological level playing field. For instance, Parties to the Convention would agree on
a common carbon price and embark on a technology development program whose outcomes
would be openly accessible to all Parties.
Alas, reality is otherwise. Although some level of cooperation exists, national and sub-
national jurisdictions face strong incentives to deviate from fully cooperative frameworks. And
because jurisdictions have structurally different economies and are host to constituencies with
different preferences, these deviations have produced a patchwork of national and subnational
initiatives, each amounting to varying degrees of emissions reduction ambition and the devel-
opment of different abatement technology portfolios which, taken together, fall short of the
collective target. That is, while the architecture of the Paris Agreement adopts a bottom-up
approach and seeks to foster ambition by encouraging the exchange of policy and technical
experiences, it brings little fundamental change to the nature of interactions between the sig-
natory Parties and old hurdles to more ambitious national climate change mitigation strategies
remain.
The present thesis takes stock of that reality and seeks to build on the available evidence to
uncover systematic drivers of and obstacles to climate policy ambition as well as shed light on
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patterns of (abatement) technology development. This thesis is written with the explicit pur-
pose of informing future policy developments and strengthen the international climate change
mitigation regime.
With regard to ambition, this work will explore the dynamics of policy adoption and strin-
gency, with a specific emphasis on carbon pricing policies. In particular, it formulates hypothe-
ses about two groups of factors: (i) the domestic political economy – chapter 2; (ii) the interna-
tional technological and policy environment – chapter 3. In other words, the former considers
the role of local conditions (e.g. regulatory capture, political institutions) whereas the latter
argues that the development of new “seemingly" unilateral climate policies can be fostered by
a process of policy diffusion, supported by international technological spillovers and changes
in (foreign) climate policy choices. The former will draw on political economy theory (Olson,
1965; Stigler, 1971), its application to environmental policy making (Pearce, 2005; Congleton,
1992; Hahn, 1990) and more recent analysis focusing on carbon pricing mechanisms (Jenkins,
2014). The latter will build on the literature on policy diffusion (Simmons and Elkins, 2004;
Shipan and Volden, 2008; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter, 2008).
In chapter 2, the focus is specifically on the political economy of carbon pricing. Pricing
mechanisms have long been advocated by economists as a cost-effective way to abate GHG
emissions, yet they have only recently been adopted more widely, be it at the national or sub-
national level.4 This, together with the difficulty of comparing such mechanisms across juris-
dictions, means that an analysis of the factors affecting their adoption has so far eluded the
empirical researcher. We hold the firm belief, however, that these mechanisms ought to be part
of any successful strategy to reduce emissions in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement
and that, therefore, shedding light on these factors is of the essence.
Thus, taking a political economy perspective, this chapter investigates the effect of eco-
nomic structure and political institutions on the implementation and stringency of carbon pric-
ing policies in a panel of national and North-American sub-national jurisdictions over the pe-
riod 1990-2015. To that end, an index of carbon pricing stringency is created and calculated.
This index, an average (emissions-weighted) carbon price, is the first metric to allow for a
consistent comparison of carbon pricing mechanisms across time and space and is, in itself,
a contribution to the understanding of such policies. It allows us to show, for instance, that
the world average price remains extremely low, at about 1.5USD/tCO2e in 2018. In addition,
the analysis in this chapter suggests that (i) political economy factors primarily affected policy
implementation and (ii) policy stringency is a highly persistent process.
In chapter 3, we extend the scope of the analysis to non-price climate policies and investi-
gate how changes in a jurisdiction’s external environment might influence its domestic climate
change mitigation policy. Specifically, this chapter assumes a non-cooperative approach to
climate policy making and identifies three key factors (namely international competitiveness,
high cost (and availability) of GHG-abatement technologies, uncertainty about the political and
4Experience accumulated over the last 30 years (i.e. since the implementation of the first carbon pricing mech-
anism in Finland), and especially the recent experience gained when trying to strengthen existing climate change
mitigation regimes shows that these can quickly encounter points of resistance.
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economic implications of mitigation policies) that, until now, have contributed to keep climate
change mitigation ambition low. It argues that policy actions by “foreign" jurisdictions might
influence domestic climate policy choice via an alteration of the net payoffs of domestic climate
policy and an update on the information about the benefits (or costs) of policy adoption. These
key dimensions of climate policy making are incorporated in a stylised general equilibrium
model of international trade. We then proceed to test our theoretical predictions empirically
on a panel of 109 national jurisdictions over the period 1990-2014. The evidence suggests that
technology demonstration and learning from past policy experience positively affect (domes-
tic) policy developments.
A corollary of chapter 3 will be that, although the “policy initiative" rests with national
or subnational jurisdictions, multilateral frameworks provide an enabling environment for the
development and diffusion of climate change mitigation policies. In this respect, for all its
potential flaws, the framework created by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement might foster
the exchange of (i) abatement technologies, (ii) policy experience and ideas, thereby facilitating
the implementation of more ambitious domestic emissions abatement targets.5
However, for GHG-free technologies to play any role in the reduction of world GHG emis-
sions, said technologies actually have to be developed. Yet, despite entry of new actors, China
in particular, the R&D activities leading to the creation of new technologies remain concen-
trated in a few (groups of) countries. For this reason, innovation activity undertaken by medium
or large innovative countries play a prominent role in influencing the technological course of
the rest of the world. In particular, sustained innovation in GHG-abating technologies by these
countries is needed if we are to succeed in achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement. In our last
chapter, chapter 4, we shed light on the innovation activity of one such country, the UK, with
regard to electricity supply technologies. Further innovation in electricity supply technologies
is a necessary condition to reduce emissions from the power sector and achieve broader de-
carbonisation of the economy. The analysis builds on and extends Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011;
Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015.
This chapter provides both a methodological contribution – providing a strategy for the
identification of (GHG-abating) electricity supply technologies using a machine learning search
strategy based on patents’ title and abstract – and new insights regarding the firm-level pat-
terns of innovation in these technologies based on priority patents filed at the UK Intellectual
Property Office over the period 1955-2016. These renewed insights are important in light of
the recent history of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) of major western economies, which
was marked by a transition toward liberalised electricity markets and a policy-led push to de-
carbonise the electricity generation portfolio. Both of these changes not only affected the pace
and nature of innovation activity in the sector but also altered the set of innovative actors.
5Indeed, jurisdictions around the world have, at times very effectively, experimented with a range of policies
aiming at reducing emissions in a broad range of sectors of their economies. This policy experience is invaluable
when it comes to expanding carbon pricing schemes – and other climate policies – to new jurisdictions or strength-
ening existing ones.
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The analysis in this chapter provided us with three main insights. First, the innovation activ-
ity shifted away from large (integrated) generation, transmission and distribution utilities to
(smaller) equipment manufacturers or R&D firms. Second, the distribution of patent filings
over the sample period is heavily skewed, with a small number of actors constituting a large
proportion of filings. This is particularly true for OEMs. Third, on a related note, we uncovered
the predominant role played by lateral innovation in the development of fossil fuel electricity
generation technologies (FF).
The clear inconsistency between the stated objective of global average temperature increase
and the existing or pledged climate change mitigation policies provides a strong rationale to
strengthen them. This thesis allowed me to develop an improved understanding of the dynam-
ics underpinning policy and technological developments, which would help towards that goal.
First, our results stress the importance of the sequence of introduction of the climate policies,
suggesting that policies weakening incumbents’ political and economic influence might foster
subsequent implementation of more stringent policies. Second, given the weakness of most ex-
isting carbon pricing schemes, a rationale for the development of climate mitigation strategies
with multiple GHG abatement tools continues to exist. Third, mechanisms of policy diffusion
at play could prove highly valuable when seeking to introduce carbon-pricing mechanisms in
new jurisdictions. Finally, we point at the need to target public support to sustain the stream
of GHG-abating electricity supply technologies primarily at new (technological) entrants and
encourage within firm resource reallocation to ‘green’ innovation.
7
Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Carbon
Pricing: a Panel Analysis
The entirety of this chapter, including its appendix and associated data, was published online by Oxford
Economic Papers on July 10, 2019; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz042
2.1 Introduction
The agreement reached in Paris at the end of 2015 was a diplomatic success. Its environmental
benefits are, however, much less clear. If fully implemented, current INDCs submitted to the
UNFCCC Secretariat place the world on an emissions path that is incompatible with least-
cost 2 C scenarios, the goal stated in the Accord (United Nations/Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 2015).1
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group II ‘reasons for
concern’ make clear, this level bears significant risks for human development and is likely to
place unprecedented pressure on already stressed ecosystems (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, supple-
mentary commitments to reduce GHG emissions beyond existing INDCs are needed. This will,
in turn, require the setting up of new (or the strengthening of existing) environmental policy
tools. Historically, these tools took the form of ‘command-and-control’ regulations, production
quotas and subsidies for electricity from renewable energy sources and, more recently, car-
bon pricing instruments such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems (Bennear and Stavins,
2007).2 The focus of this chapter is on the latter category.
While the earliest occurrences of these tools can be traced back to the experiences of North-
ern European states (Finland - 1990, Sweden - 1991), their development has only gained mo-
mentum in the last few years. According to World Bank, 2018, thirty-eight new carbon pric-
ing mechanisms started operations between 2005 and 2018, including the California Cap-and-
Trade Program and 7 (sub-national) emissions trading schemes in China. These new schemes
1Compared with the emission levels under least-cost 2 C scenarios, aggregate GHG emission levels resulting
from the implementation of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions are expected to be higher by 8.7 (4.5
to 13.3) Gt CO2 eq (19 per cent, range 9-30 per cent) in 2025 and by 15.2 (10.1 to 21.1) Gt CO2 eq (36 per cent, range
24-60 per cent) in 2030 (United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016).
2Carbon per se is not a greenhouse gas but carbon dioxide (CO2) is. We refer to instruments putting a price on
CO2 emissions as carbon pricing instruments.
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added to a group of existing carbon pricing tools such as the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing System or a range of taxes explicitly based on the carbon content of fossil fuels.
Yet, the introduction of such tools is often faced with strong political economy constraints
(Jenkins, 2014) that influence their design and prevent their full (i.e. socially optimal) imple-
mentation (Del Rio and Labandeira, 2009). Their influence on the implementation of carbon
pricing policies is nonetheless currently under-researched. While substantial attention has
been paid to the political economy of energy or renewable energy support (RES) policies, a
relatively narrow set of studies have specifically focused on policies making use of carbon pric-
ing mechanisms, be it in a specific national or subnational context, or in an international panel
of countries. Furthermore, such studies often focus on policy outcomes as proxies for policy
developments but do not directly study the policy tool itself (see, e.g. Gassebner, Lamla, and
Sturm, 2011 or Cadoret and Padovano, 2016).
Our study is a contribution to filling this gap. It aims at shedding light on the nature and
working of political economy constraints on the development of carbon pricing policies. This
allows us to address two fundamental questions pertaining to the design of climate mitigation
strategies in the presence of such constraints. How should we adapt the policy design to a spe-
cific institutional and economic context? Do political economy constraints constitute a robust
rationale in favour of a policy mix as opposed to a single instrument?
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant strands of the literature.
Section 2.3 briefly discusses carbon pricing (in theory and practice). Section 2.4 introduces the
Emissions-weighted Carbon Price and presents the hypotheses while section 2.5 presents the
data and discusses the empirical methodology used in the analysis. Section 2.6 discusses the
results and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
More often than not, economic policies resulting from the legislative and political bargaining
process constitute sub-optimal social outcomes. Political economy theory provides a useful
analytical framework to rationalize them. Olson, 1965 highlights the role played by groups
with shared interests in shaping policy outcomes and the factors that drive their behaviour.
Building on Olson’s conjecture, Stigler, 1971 proposed the idea of regulatory capture, which
views the State as a provider of regulation and the industry as an active seeker of regulation
designed and operated for its own benefit.
The relevance of these theoretical insights has long been discussed in the context of envi-
ronmental policy making (Pearce, 2005). Congleton, 1992 takes an institutional perspective to
the issue; proposing that political institutions, rather than resource endowments, determine
a country’s environmental regulation. More precisely, he argues that due to their focus on
longer term outcomes, democratic institutions tend to deliver more stringent environmental
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regulations.3 At the same time, democratic systems allow a plurality of, sometimes diver-
gent, interests to be voiced. Hahn, 1990 attempted to identify rationales for the emergence of
incentive-based mechanisms and suggested that environmental policy is the result of a ‘strug-
gle’ between different interest groups.
In the context of carbon pricing, the introduction of (economy-wide) schemes may induce
profound changes in the magnitude and distribution of welfare. Therefore, even if the welfare
of the polity as a whole is greater in an economic system constrained by environmental poli-
cies, one may expect strong opposition on the part of both consumers and producers. On the
consumption side, some studies have shown that the willingness to pay for carbon emissions
is low (Jenkins, 2014). Moreover, carbon pricing schemes have been found to be regressive,
with varying degrees, in a wide range of institutional contexts (Wier et al., 2005; Grainger and
Kolstad, 2010), with only some of them designed to alleviate this effect (Bowen, 2015). On
the production side, sectors with assets whose value would be severely diminished in case of
carbon pricing are expected to strongly oppose policy change; a possibility that Joskow and
Schmalensee, 1998 discuss in the case of the U.S. SO2 market. It is therefore unsurprising that
the introduction of carbon pricing policies proved highly contentious in virtually all jurisdic-
tions where they have been considered.
In addition, carbon pricing policies have at times lacked bi-partisan/multi-party support
and been the source of deep partisan divides. Australia, where the policy debate has been
characterised by high political polarisation (O’Gorman and Jotzo, 2014) and the road to its
implementation has been “long and bruising" (Jotzo, 2012), provides a salient case in point.
The policy was implemented by a minority Labour government and was repealed as soon as
Conservatives returned to power after an election where one of the key issues was precisely
the carbon pricing policy. This suggests that carbon pricing policies can only be politically
sustained if they benefit from strong bi-partisan support.
Lastly, insights drawn from analyses of the liberalisation of energy markets are also relevant
to our investigation. Pollitt, 2012 takes stock of the energy market liberalisation processes to
draw lessons about the role of policy in energy transitions and argues that liberalisation per se
will have little impact on the shift toward a low carbon energy mix. Rather, the willingness of
societies to bear the cost of environmental policies will. Hence, liberalisation is not necessarily
neutral for carbon pricing policy formulation as it has made the cost of those policies increas-
ingly apparent to consumers (Pollitt, 2012). Evidence from the U.S. (Jenkins, 2014) suggests
that citizens are indeed quite sensitive to the direct costs induced by carbon pricing policies,
even if the net cost is brought (close) to zero via tax rebates or other fiscal mechanisms.
Our analysis seeks to uncover systematic patterns in the relationship between some of the
factors highlighted above and carbon pricing policy adoption in a panel of jurisdictions. Some
analyses taking advantage of the availability of panel data have shed light on political economy
dynamics of similar policies. Marques, Fuinhas, and Pires Manso, 2010 analyse the drivers of
3This argument runs against the standard view that political representatives are self-interested and focused on
short-term electoral cycles.
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the deployment of renewable energy in European countries. Using fixed effects (panel data)
regression and vector decomposition, they find evidence that the conventional energy sector
lobby and the level of CO2 emissions impede the deployment of renewable energy sources for
electricity production. Chang and Berdiev, 2011 focus on the electricity and gas industries and
seek to disentangle the effects of government ideology, political factors and globalisation on
energy regulation in 23 OECD countries over the period 1975-2007. They conclude that left-
wing governments promote regulation in gas and electricity sectors and that less fragmented
governments contribute to deregulation of gas and electricity industries. Beers and Strand,
2015, analysing data from 200 countries for the political determinants of fossil fuel pricing dur-
ing the period 1991-2010, found that higher GDP levels lead to higher fuel prices (higher taxes
or lower subsidy rates) and that a presidential system (unlike parliamentarian or proportional
representation systems) could lead to significantly lower gasoline and diesel prices.
However substantial the discussion of political economy factors in environmental policy
formulation has been, relatively less attention has been paid to the political feasibility of car-
bon pricing policies and, equivalently, to the variables that influence their implementation and
strength. To our knowledge, only Del Rio and Labandeira, 2009, Gawel, Strunz, and Lehmann,
2014 and Jenkins, 2014 bring the issue to the fore. Shedding further empirical light on these
dynamics is particularly important as we believe that they may differ in nature or in strength
from those of: (i) excise duties, which in most occurrences constitute an indirect way to tax
road transport; (ii) other climate policies, whose cost is less visible to the final consumer. In the
absence of more refined assessment, suggestions about a way forward for the implementation
of carbon pricing when faced with political economy constraints are, at best, incomplete. Before
turning to that analysis we briefly review the rationale and tools for a carbon price.
2.3 Carbon pricing policies: theory and practice
In theory, provided that the public authority can credibly commit to a state-contingent carbon
price path and in the absence of transaction costs, the carbon price signal should be economy-
wide (Tirole, 2012).4 Indeed, the externality associated with the release of GHG into the atmo-
sphere is the same regardless of its source (i.e. sector of origin) or type of use. Any departure
from this situation will inevitably introduce distortions between sectors and/or types of user.
Two market-based mechanisms (and hybrid combinations5) have emerged: carbon taxes
and Emissions Trading Schemes. The former places a set price on each unit of CO2 emitted
into the atmosphere, leaving an uncertainty about the resulting level of emissions; the latter
sets an emissions cap and leaves to the market the creation of the price signal. Even though
both mechanisms share the same underlying motivation and, under complete knowledge and
4If transaction costs (i.e. costs of monitoring and verification) are positive, then optimal coverage may not be
100%. Additional emissions should then only be included if the marginal benefit in terms of enhanced cost efficiency
outweighs the marginal cost of monitoring and verifying emissions.
5Hybrid schemes combine elements of price and quantity schemes by, e.g. setting floors and caps on the prices
delivered by quantity schemes (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978).
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perfect certainty, are theoretically equivalent and deliver the same environmental outcome,
they relate to two slightly different views about carbon pricing.6 The first view emphasizes the
use of carbon pricing mechanisms to internalize the externality associated with GHG emissions
and hence is more sympathetic to carbon taxes. In that case, the price of carbon should closely
track the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). The second stresses the achievement of a set carbon
budget over a given planning horizon in a cost-effective way, in which case the price will follow
the dynamically cost-effective price path (Rubin, 1996).
Importantly for us, these schemes differ also in their practical implementations. On the one
hand, most carbon taxes are based on the carbon content of fossil fuels. On the other hand, an
Emissions Trading Scheme is based on actual verified emissions at covered (stationary) plants.7
Therefore, an ETS can in theory include fugitive and industrial processes emissions in addition
to emissions from fuel combustion.
In 2015, the last year of our panel(s), 35 national and 21 subnational jurisdictions had an
operating Emissions Trading Scheme while 15 national and 1 subnational jurisdictions had
a carbon tax targeting at least one type of fossil fuel (i.e. coal, oil or natural gas). Among
jurisdictions operating an ETS at the time, 47 covered industry and 54 covered the power sector
while the same sectors were included in 14 and 12 carbon tax schemes, respectively. Table 2.1
provides a summary of sectoral coverage per type of pricing mechanism.
TABLE 2.1: Sectoral coverage (2015) – number of jurisdictions
Carbon tax schemes ETSs
(total: 16) (total: 57)
Industry 14 47
Power 12 54
(Road) Transport 12 5
Aviation (domestic) 4 31
Buildings (residential and commercial) 12 8
Agriculture or Forestry 11 2
Waste 12 1
Note: The figures presented in this table count each jurisdiction participating in the EU-ETS as a separate scheme. A
description of the sectoral nomenclature is available in appendix B and a complete list of the jurisdictions operating
a carbon pricing mechanism as of 2018 is available in appendix A.4.
Source: World Bank, 2018
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Following on the above discussion, we argue that introducing a carbon pricing mechanism in-
volves two decisions. First, a decision on whether or not to enact a pricing scheme, regardless
6Outcomes may differ when there is uncertainty about either the marginal cost or benefit of abatement and the
relative superiority of one instrument over the other depends on the relative slopes of the marginal abatement and
cost curves around the optimum (Weitzman, 1974). Weitzman’s original article considers only a static one-period
model and so is more relevant to flow rather than stock pollutants like CO2 but his conclusions were supported in
theoretical settings closer to that of stock pollutants (Pizer, 2002; Hoel and Karp, 2002).
7Emissions from the aviation sector, which have recently been included in some ETSs, are estimated based on
the fuel consumption of each aircraft, multiplied by the appropriate emissions factor (European Commission, 2012).
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of the price level or the coverage. Second, a decision about the appropriate – or politically feasi-
ble – stringency (i.e. average price). The implementation of a carbon pricing policy is recorded
by a dummy variable taking value 1 if it is in force in a given country-year, 0 otherwise. The
stringency is captured by the average (emissions-weighted) carbon price and is described in
section 2.4.1. The hypotheses formulated about the drivers of implementation and stringency
are presented in section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Carbon price and coverage: an Emissions-weighted Carbon Price
Following ‘first-best’ theoretical prescriptions, applied macroeconomic integrated assessment
models often assume a single, economy-wide (100% coverage) carbon price. Yet, experience
with carbon pricing policies suggests that their implementation has rarely, if at all, followed
such prescriptions. First, most of the schemes under consideration entailed low coverage at
time of introduction – due to, e.g., sectoral or fuel-based exemptions, or a combination of the
two – and their coverage remained partial over their lifetime. Therefore, the price tag alone
cannot appropriately reflect the stringency of a carbon pricing scheme. It has to be analysed
together with its coverage. Second, careful observation of policy developments shows little
consistency between the stated environmental goals (and implied GHG budgets) and imple-
mented carbon prices and, as will be shown in section 2.4.1.2, the carbon price is usually not
unique within jurisdictions, let alone across them.
In order to accurately account for these two dimensions of carbon pricing mechanisms
and reflect their stringency, we introduce the concept of an Emissions-weighted Carbon Price
(ECP).8 This price, computed on a yearly basis, is a weighted average of all carbon price sig-
nals present in an economy at a point in time where the weights are the quantity of emissions
covered as a share of that jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions. To our knowledge, this is the
first attempt at capturing the economy-wide stringency of carbon pricing policies in a consis-
tent and standardised way.9 Before turning to a discussion of the underlying methodology, we
review its two components: coverage and price.
2.4.1.1 Coverage
The coverage of carbon pricing schemes is usually defined at the sectoral level although car-
bon taxes can be defined per fuel type too. The main difference between emissions trading
schemes and carbon taxes lies in that the former sometimes cover multiple gases whereas the
8The methodology behind the computation of the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price is similar to that suggested
for the Effective Carbon Rate (OECD, 2015). However, the OECD methodology accounts for both explicit carbon
prices and energy duties that indirectly price carbon, which we believe is misleading since, as we have emphasized
and as the OECD itself acknowledges (OECD, 2015), the motivations behind their introduction are often unrelated
to climate change concerns.
9Measuring policy stringency is inherently difficult, even more so when the metric needs to be comparable
across jurisdictions. Most studies rely on indirect measures of policy stringency such as private-sector cost mea-
sures, measures based on pollutant emissions and environmental policy enforcement expenditures (Brunel and
Levinson, 2013). The OECD calculates an aggregated index of policy stringency at the country level based on infor-
mation primarily related to climate and air pollution (Botta and Kozluk, 2014).
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latter only apply to the carbon content of fossil fuels and, by extension, to CO2 emissions.
The present chapter focuses exclusively on CO2. Provided that accurate measurement of sec-
toral CO2 emissions is available, sectoral coverage of a scheme can easily be translated into
‘covered’ CO2 emissions as a share of total, CO2 equivalent, GHG emissions. Based on this
information, coverage figures were calculated for 135 national and 63 subnational (50 US States
and 13 Canadian Provinces and Territories) jurisdictions as well as a hypothetical ‘World’ ju-
risdiction between 1990 and 2015.10 Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the coverage of carbon
pricing mechanisms in selected jurisdictions.11 Panel (a) clearly shows that there is signifi-
cant variation in coverage of carbon tax schemes across jurisdictions. Between 1992 and 2005,
Denmark’s scheme covered roughly 70% of its GHG emissions, the highest share among all
jurisdictions considered, while Finland’s coverage was only 30%. It is also striking to see that
if those schemes imply a significant coverage in terms of respective national emissions, they
mean very little in terms of world GHG emissions, as illustrated by the ‘World’ coverage. Ex-
cept for the ‘structural break’ observed in 2005 for some countries, which reflects the fact that
they adapted their legislation to avoid an overlap with the EU-ETS, coverage of GHG emis-
sions by tax schemes is, for each country individually, relatively stable over time. Similarly,
the coverage induced by the ETS in the selected countries does not show significant variation
over time. Yet, one notes that all countries that are part of the EU-ETS exhibit different cover-
age figures, despite the ETS being harmonized across all countries. A potential explanation for
these cross-country differences is that they reflect the differences in economic structure across
participating countries.
In addition to the jurisdictions presented in Figure 2.1 several others have introduced car-
bon pricing policies. Switzerland introduced a carbon tax in 2008 covering about 28% of its
total emissions. The coverage remained relatively stable over time, with the scheme cover-
ing 27% of emissions in 2012. In that same year, Japan introduced a carbon tax covering 69%
of its emissions. Other jurisdictions opted for ETSs. This is the case of New Zealand, which
introduced its scheme in 2010 with a coverage of 43% (gradually increased to 54% following
inclusion of waste treatment activities in the scheme).
At the subnational level, another group of jurisdictions can be identified: US States partici-
pating in the Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiative (RGGI). This scheme is a regional initiative
gathering initially 10 (but now 9: the state of New Jersey pulled out of the scheme in 2012)
North-Eastern US States. Figure 2.2 shows the implied coverage of the scheme in the 10 partic-
ipating states over the period 2009 (start year)-2012. It is again striking to see that substantial
cross-state variation characterizes coverage. New Hampshire exhibits the highest coverage
10See appendix A for a description of the methodology. At the national level, although our initial intention
was to cover all jurisdictions, the cross-section dimension of our panel has been constrained by IEA emissions data
availability while the time dimension has been constrained by CAIT data availability. At the subnational level, our
focus on North America is driven by the fact that, up to 2015, that region concentrated most of the subnational
carbon pricing schemes and that we were unable to gather robust data on the Chinese ETS pilot schemes or the
Tokyo, Saitama, and Kyoto schemes.
11Besides the ‘World’ jurisdiction, the jurisdictions for which information is presented in Figures 2.1 to 2.4 are
among the earliest adopters of carbon pricing mechanisms – exclusive of the EU-ETS countries – and for which the
information is therefore available for a meaningful number of years.
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FIGURE 2.1: Carbon pricing coverage – selected (national) jurisdictions
over the entire period, oscillating between 36.41% in 2009 and 34.42% in 2014. The coverage in
all other participating states is between 13.19% (New Jersey - 2009) and 34.42% (New Hamp-
shire - 2012). Outside the RGGI initiative, British Columbia launched its own carbon tax scheme
in 2008, covering roughly 70% of its total GHG emissions while, in 2013, California introduced
a Cap-and-Trade (CaT) mechanism covering approximately 32% of its emissions.12
2.4.1.2 Price
Coverage is only one side of the coin. The other is the price level. Countries that have intro-
duced carbon pricing policies have experimented with different strengths of the price signal,
which varies mainly along three dimensions: time, jurisdiction, and sector(-fuel). In other
words, the price signal varies both across and within countries, introducing distortions be-
tween countries as well as between sectors of a given country. Importantly, however, distor-
tions introduced by Emissions Trading Schemes are only between covered and non-covered
sectors (since the price signal is the same across all covered sectors and fuels) whereas a carbon
tax scheme also introduces distortions at the sector-fuel level.
Figure 2.3 displays the total (i.e. the sum of the tax rate and the ETS allowance price, as
applicable) price of CO2 (in 2015 $US/tCO2e) in selected sectors of selected countries for coal.13
The carbon price does not vary much across fuels, suggesting that most tax schemes apply the
same tax rate to all fossil fuels. The most significant variations arise across countries and, hence,
12 As of January 1st, 2015, new activities were added to the California CaT, increasing coverage to about 85% of
California’s total GHG emissions.
13Figures A.1.1 and A.1.2, available in appendix A, show the total price for oil and natural gas, respectively.
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FIGURE 2.2: Carbon pricing coverage – US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
FIGURE 2.3: Total carbon price over time – coal/peat
across sectors within those countries. A look at panel (b) of Figure 2.3 shows that, among the
selected countries, the power sector in Sweden is confronted to the highest price signal whereas
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the sectors in the other countries face much lower carbon prices.
2.4.1.3 The Emissions-weighted Carbon Price (ECP)
Combining sector- or sector-fuel-level coverage and price information allows for the calcula-
tion of an economy-wide Emissions-weighted Carbon Price (ECP). To compute the ECP each
emitted tonne of GHGs is attributed the corresponding total price signal. That is, emissions
covered by either a tax or an ETS receive the associated tax rate or permit price as price tag
whereas emissions of a sector covered by both schemes receive the sum of the tax rate and the
permit price.14
The evolution of the ECP in selected countries over the period 1990-2015 is presented in
Figure 2.4. One observes that among all selected countries, only Sweden’s ECP has increased
steadily over time. All other countries exhibit either constant (e.g. Norway) or decreasing (e.g.
Denmark) ECPs. Moreover, contrary to what is generally understood, the ECP varies across
countries that are part of the EU-ETS. This is partly due to the presence of carbon taxes in some
– but not all – countries, which create an additional price signal for some emissions. It is also,
perhaps more importantly, due to differences in the relative size of sectors and their respective
CO2 intensity, as mentioned in section 2.4.1.1. This feature is particularly well illustrated by the
ECP of states participating in the US RGGI (Figure 2.5).
FIGURE 2.4: ECP – selected (national) jurisdictions
Lastly, note that some countries’ ECP exhibit more variability than others. For this specific
group of countries, this is due to the relative importance of emissions covered by the EU-ETS as
opposed to those covered by the respective national carbon taxes. Indeed, the (futures) price of
EUAs, i.e. EU-ETS emissions allowances, exhibited strong variability over the sample period.
14Note that the ECP can be computed using time-varying or fixed weights. In the former case, weights (i.e.
sector-fuel emissions share) are the year-specific emissions share; in the latter, we use 2013 emissions share. The
latter is used in the empirical analysis as it is not subject to changes in emissions shares (i.e. weights) that might
have been the result of the policy itself. See appendix A.3 for a formal presentation.
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FIGURE 2.5: ECP – US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
2.4.2 Hypotheses
We now formulate hypotheses about the determinants of policy implementation and strin-
gency. These are grouped as follows: (i) regulatory capture; (ii) political institutions; and (iii)
macroeconomic determinants. A summary is presented in Table 2.2.
2.4.2.1 Regulatory capture
Power sector Any form of carbon pricing that includes the power sector might impose costs
(e.g. reduced profits or capital losses) on those electricity producers that produce electricity
from fossil fuels. We expect these costs to be higher the larger the share of electricity produced
from fossil-fuelled power plants which, following Olson, 1965, would weaken the political fea-
sibility of carbon pricing regulation. This argument needs to be nuanced, however. First, the
extent to which carbon pricing policies affect the value of covered firms depends on their capac-
ity to pass the additional cost through to consumers. In aggregate, under perfect competition and
100% pass through, electricity producing firms’ profits will remain largely unaffected.15 With
less than 100% pass through the change in equilibrium market price will not entirely reflect
the increase in cost and firms’ profit will be affected. Second, one does not necessarily expect
the electricity generating sector to react in the same way to a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade
system. In the case of the former, the sector will, at best, remain unaffected whereas in the case
of an ETS, the possibility of capturing significant ‘windfall profits’ exists if emissions permits
are freely allocated. Such a possibility has probably played a significant role in dampening
the opposition of affected sectors to the introduction of such schemes. Several studies have
examined that possibility and the associated rent-seeking behaviour both theoretically (Rode,
15There is still, however, the possibility that the profits of coal fired power plants will fall relative to gas and
non-fossil generators. Hence carbon pricing policies will affect individual firms differently depending on the com-
position of their generation portfolio.
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2013) and empirically (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). The empirical evidence suggests that
powerful (and CO2-intensive) sectors were successful in influencing the design of GHG trading
systems. In fact, except for the US RGGI, all emissions trading schemes have been introduced
with close to 100% free allocation of emission permits (World Bank, 2014). It is difficult to ex-
plicitly account for such effects in an econometric investigation but we note at this stage that it
is likely to reduce the magnitude of the coefficients on the variables accounting for the role of
CO2-intensive sectors, including the power sector.
Industry Besides the power sector, other energy-intensive sectors, broadly defined as ‘indus-
try’ are likely to oppose a carbon pricing scheme on the grounds that it holds the potential to
increase production costs. There are two channels via which costs to industry could be pushed
upward by a carbon pricing policy. A direct channel whereby CO2-intensive industries that fall
within the scope of a carbon pricing scheme will have to pay for their own CO2 emissions; and
an indirect channel whereby the introduction of carbon pricing policies covering the electricity
generating sector leads to an increase in wholesale (and retail) electricity prices (as has been
observed after the introduction of the EU-ETS (Sijm et al., 2008)) which, in turn, might raise the
production cost of electricity-intensive industries. This argument closely follows Cadoret and
Padovano, 2016.
International competitiveness As emphasized by Aldy and Pizer, 2012, sectors of the econ-
omy that are export-oriented should be more resistant to the introduction of a carbon price as
it risks putting them at a competitive disadvantage in international markets. Care is usually
taken to design the schemes in ways that minimize the international competitive disadvantage
that domestic firms may suffer from but jurisdictions that are very exposed to international
markets may nonetheless be less inclined to implement carbon pricing policies.
2.4.2.2 Political institutions
Political regime Congleton, 1992 argues that autocrats’ time horizon is shorter than that of
democratic planners and they therefore set weaker environmental targets. Yet, Hahn, 1990
also argues that liberal democracies offer the possibility for different interest groups to express
their views and ‘weigh’ on the legislative process, in which case regulatory outcomes will be
a balancing act that reflects the relative bargaining power of the different interest groups. This
could work both in favour or against the introduction of carbon pricing policies, depending on
interest groups’ relative lobbying strengths.
Government ideology Prior studies have found left wing governments implement more strin-
gent environmental policies (Chang and Berdiev, 2011; Cadoret and Padovano, 2016). Fankhauser,
Gennaioli, and Collins, 2015, however, found the political orientation of the government to be
irrelevant to the number of climate laws passed in their sample of jurisdictions. We test whether
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the orientation of the executive branch of government with regard to economic policy affects
the implementation and/or stringency of carbon pricing schemes.
Institutional capacity A relatively high degree of institutional capacity is a prerequisite for
the introduction of any form of regulation and, a fortiori, to introduce a carbon pricing scheme.
We expect institutional capacity to be positively correlated with the presence of a carbon pricing
scheme but not necessarily with the level of the ECP. Indeed, the ‘institutional burden’ arises
from the creation of such a scheme, irrespective of the level of the price associated with it.
International dynamics Membership of international organisations (such as the OECD or
the EU) or international institutional frameworks (such as the Annex-I countries of the Kyoto
Protocol) plays a significant role in the presence and development of carbon pricing policies.
For example, the EU, a club of countries cooperating on a wide range of issues – including the
environment, has implemented an EU-wide emissions trading system. Several EU Member
countries currently part of the system were ‘dragged in’ and implemented it only because it
was part of the preexisting legislative acquis (Robinson and Stavins, 2015). This is the case, for
instance, of current EU Member States that joined the Union in 2004, i.e. a year before the start
of the EU-ETS but a few months after Directive 2003/87/EC, which implemented the EU-ETS,
was passed. Having committed to a reduction of their GHG emissions, these countries may
have had an additional incentive to develop climate mitigation strategies, including carbon
pricing policies.
2.4.2.3 Macro(economic) determinants of environmental policy
Finally, besides the sector-specific stance towards carbon pricing and the political institutions
of a jurisdiction, we note two further factors potentially affecting implementation and strin-
gency of a carbon pricing scheme. First, under the assumption that environmental quality is
a normal good, the willingness to pay for CO2 emissions abatement rises with income. There-
fore, we expect the income level (per capita) to be positively associated with the probability
of implementation of a carbon pricing policy as well as the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price.
Second, given the direct economic cost that pricing carbon entails, larger emitters (per capita)
may be less prone to introduce pricing policies.
2.5 Data and identification strategy
2.5.1 The dataset
The analysis is performed on three different panels: 124 national jurisdictions – panel A, 50
US States – panel B – and 13 Canadian Provinces – panel C.16 Panel A runs over the period
16Although the ECP is calculated for 135 national jurisdictions, data availability for some of our covariates con-
strains the panel dimension of our sample to 124 – models (I) and (III) – and 110 units – models (II) and (IV). For
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TABLE 2.2: Summary of hypotheses
Category Variable Expected sign Expected sign
Carbon Price (Y/N) Carbon Price (Level)




International competitiveness +/- +/-
Political institutions EU + +
Annex-I + +
Institutional capacity + n.a.
Level of democracy + n.a.
Left + +
Macro GDP per capita (WTP) + +
determinants CO2 emissions per capita - -
1990-2015; panel B starts in 2008 and ends in 2015; panel C covers the years 2005-2015. This
represents (a maximum of) 3224 country-year observations, 400 (US)State-year observations
and 143 (Canadian) Province-year observations. The actual emissions-weighted carbon price
is only observed for those jurisdictions that have selected into a pricing mechanism (either ETS
or tax, or both). In 2015, 35 national jurisdictions, 11 US States and 2 Canadian Provinces had
had a carbon pricing mechanism in force in at least one year. That is, the ECP is observed
for 420 country-year, 70 (US)State-year and 11 (Canadian) Province-year pairs. This particular
structure of the data has implications for our empirical analysis – see section 2.5.3.
2.5.2 Covariates
This section introduces the variables used to investigate the hypotheses presented in section
2.4.2. The corresponding summary statistics are presented in Table 2.3.
Regulatory capture Previous literature has proxied the strength of the lobbying exercized by
the power/energy sector in at least two ways. First, Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf,
2004 and Fredriksson and Vollebergh, 2009 use the share of value added of the energy industry
in total GDP. Second, Marques, Fuinhas, and Pires Manso, 2010 and Marques and Fuinhas,
2011 disentangled the specific role played by different fossil fuel sources using the contribution
of each of them to total electricity production. Since coal, gas and oil electricity generation
would not be similarly affected by the introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, we follow this
last approach and use their share in total electricity generation as proxies for their influence
on policy developments. To capture the lobbying activity of CO2/energy-intensive industries,
we follow Cadoret and Padovano, 2016 and use the value added of industry (as a share of
GDP). Finally, the effect of trade openness is captured by the sum of a jurisdiction’s exports
and imports (as a share of GDP).
panel A, each estimator is therefore presented for two alternative specifications because the Left variable is not
available for all panel units. In addition, panel A is unbalanced.
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Political institutions We introduce an institutional capacity indicator, constructed as the sim-
ple average of the World Bank’s ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Quality’ indica-
tors World Bank, 2016b. This follows Steves, Treisman, and Teytelboym, 2011.17 The first year
of these series is 1997 but they only became available on an annual basis in 2002. Therefore,
years 1998 and 2000 are filled using a linear interpolation method. Our main proxy for the
state of democracy (Dem) comes from the Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV project, 2015.
As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis with two variables taken from the Vari-
eties of Democracy Database. The first (Polyarchy) measures to what extent the ideal of elec-
toral democracy is achieved whereas the second (Libdem) measures performance regarding the
achievement of principles of liberal democracy Varieties of Democracy, 2018.18
To investigate the effect of the political orientation of the executive with respect to economic
policy in national jurisdictions we create, based on Cruz et al. (2018) in Varieties of Democracy,
2018, a variable (Left) which takes value 1 whenever the ruling party is identified as left wing
party and 0 otherwise. The ‘0’ therefore lumps together right-wing and centre parties as well
as parties whose political platform does not take a clear stance regarding economic policy. For
panel B, the variable used (Ideology) captures the median ideology in the state’s house of repre-
sentatives, as defined in Shor and McCarty, 2011. No such variable is available for subnational
Canadian jurisdictions. Finally, the effect of EU membership (EU) is tested with the use of a
dummy variable that takes value 1 whenever a country is a member of the EU, and 0 other-
wise.19
Macro determinants To control for general economic and environmental conditions, we use
GDP (PPP, $US 2011) and CO2 emissions (metric tonnes), both per capita.
2.5.3 Model and identification strategy
Our objective is to identify some of the determinants of carbon pricing policy implementation
as well as stringency. To that end we introduce two (sets of) models. One that relates our
covariates to a binary outcome variable recording the presence of a carbon pricing scheme for a
given jurisdiction-year entry, another relating some of these same covariates to the stringency
of the scheme. A general representation of each of them is
it = a + y
0Xit + g0Zit + h0Wit + dt + uit (2.1)
ECPit = h + dECPi,t 1 + y0Xit + g0Zit + h0Wit + dt + fi + eit (2.2)
where it is an indicator variable capturing the operation of a carbon pricing scheme, ECPit
is the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price, Xit is the vector of regulatory capture variables, Zit
17Correlation with the World Bank Control of Corruption estimate is also investigated, see section 2.6.3.
18Such variables are not available for subnational jurisdictions but their inclusion would most likely add little to
the model as there would be little cross-section and/or time variability.
19Earlier work tested the role of being listed in Annex-I and Annex-II of the Kyoto Protocol. Both institutional
features turned out to have negligible impact on our outcome variables.
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TABLE 2.3: Variables’ sources and summary statistics
Variable Jurisdiction Source Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pricing National Author (see appendix) 0.12 0.33 0 1 3510
US States Author (see appendix) 0.17 0.37 0 1 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Author (see appendix) 0.12 0.32 0 1 143
ECP† National Author (see appendix) 12.84 16.67 0.002 95.21 420
(time-invariant weights) US States Author (see appendix) 0.88 1.38 0.01 9.66 70
Can. Prov./Terr. Author (see appendix) 16.24 10.18 2.19 29.48 11
Elec. generation-coal, National World Bank, 2016a 16.78 25.87 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA, 2015 39.61 28.87 0 97.79 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016a 15.88 24.77 0 69.93 143
Elec. generation-gas, National World Bank, 2016a 22.63 30.12 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA, 2015 24.5 23.48 0 98.51 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016a 6.82 9.52 0 38.37 143
Elec. generation-oil, National World Bank, 2016a 19 27.96 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA, 2015 2.28 10.24 0 76.21 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016a 3.25 7.46 0 34.65 143
Industry VA, National UN data 32.11 11.67 6.3 84.55 3452
% of GDP US States US BEA, 2016 21.5 7.25 0 46.5 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016b 29.83 11.26 15.37 58.56 143
EU National Author-created 0.15 0.35 0 1 3510
Institutional capacity National World Bank, 2016b 0.1 0.98 -2.19 2.26 2538
Democracy National Polity IV project 3.7 6.74 -10 10 3247
Left National Varieties of Democracy, 2018 0.33 0.47 0 1 2894
Ideology US States Shor and McCarty, 2011 0.09 0.72 -1.47 1.23 346?
GDP per capita, National World Bank, 2016a 17810.61 19575.93 354.28 129349.9 3338
PPP $2011 USD US States US BEA, 2016 47576.53 9047.45 31565.52 74417.54 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016c 44510.85 13280 28806.69 95355.49 143
Trade openness, National World Bank, 2016a 83.14 49.01 0.02 441.60 3348
% of GDP US States U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 18.99 9.64 4.04 59.05 350⇤
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2016c 57.56 18.55 15.78 111.71 143
CO2 emissions, t/cap National World Bank, 2016a 5.62 7.24 0.017 70.14 3283
US States CAIT, 2015 23.6 19.35 8.47 130.7 350⇤
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada, 2018 20.14 13.23 6.47 52.81 143
Polyarchy National Varieties of Democracy, 2018 0.45 0.28 0.01 0.916 3176
Libdem National Varieties of Democracy, 2018 0.56 0.27 0.017 0.95 3176
Corruption National World Bank, 2016b 0.02 1.05 -2.06 2.59 3150
?The Ideology covariate is unavailable for the state of Nebraska and is not available for all years of each panel unit.
⇤The Trade openness and CO2 emissions are unavailable for 2015.
†Includes only jurisdiction-year observations for which a pricing scheme was in operation, i.e. excludes ‘0’ entries which reflect the
absence of a pricing scheme rather than a truly zero price.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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is the vector of political and institutional variables and Wit is the vector of macro(-economic)
variables. fi is the unobserved jurisdiction fixed-effect while dt is the vector of time dummy
variables; y0, g0 and h0 are vectors of dimensions m, n and p, respectively, each element of
which corresponds to the estimated parameter of the associated explanatory variable. uit and
eit are the observation specific error terms.
In estimating 2.1 and 2.2, two potential problems may arise. First, as much as economic
structure and electricity generation mix may affect policy implementation and stringency, the
latter can also affect the former, creating a reverse causality problem and causing standard
estimation approaches to fail. Second, there may be endogenous selection into the policy, which
would bias the coefficient estimates in equation 2.2.20
Reverse causality The potential presence of simultaneity bias prompts us to: (i) note the fea-
tures of the data that make our analysis less prone to it, (ii) describe the steps taken to minimize
and subsequently address this issue. First, note that it records implementation, not passage of
the legislation. In most cases, the year of implementation differs from the year the legislation
is passed, the former following the latter by a lag of 1 (in the case of the EU-ETS) to 3 years
(in the case of, for example, Chile’s carbon tax). This provides a rationale for the use of lagged
values of all the variables included as regressors in equation 2.1 – see Table 2.4 – and prevents
the possibility that its outcome variable would determine the covariates – at least in a contem-
poraneous manner. That is, some regressors may only be pre-determined.
Second, an endogeneity problem only arises if the policy, once implemented, works as in-
tended. Carbon pricing policies were primarily designed to affect jurisdictions’ CO2 emissions
through altered technological choices or structural changes in the composition of the economy.
While it cannot be ruled out that some of these policies (especially the most stringent ones)
did have the intended effects, it is worth noting that: (i) these policies affect the economy only
slowly, (ii) technological advances in abatement technology may reduce structural shifts in eco-
nomic composition, (iii) except for a few jurisdictions, most carbon pricing policies introduced
over the period covered in the sample have been relatively weak, (iv) several jurisdictions intro-
duced said schemes towards the end of our sample period. All this suggests that it is unlikely
that the value added of industry, which we use to proxy for the lobbying intensity of energy-
intensive sectors, will be determined by policy implementation or stringency. However, the
same argument does not hold as strongly for the electricity mix variables or CO2 emissions,
which tend to be more sensitive to carbon prices.
Selection We only observe the stringency for the jurisdictions that have a scheme in op-
eration in any given year. If there is correlation between the selection (participation) and
level/stringency decision, then the process is best modelled as a model with incidental trun-
cation (or selection) where both a level and a selection equation are specified and a correction
20Note, however, that a selection bias would only be present insofar as the population of interest is the entire set
of jurisdictions initially present in our panels.
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for the selection bias is applied (Gronau, 1974; Heckman, 1976). That is, equation 2.2 should be
complemented with the introduction of a latent variable (see e.g. Semykina and Wooldridge,
2010):
sit = 1[zitdt + fi2 + vit > 0] (2.3)
where 1[.] is an indicator function and sit is a selection indicator that equals 1 if ECPit is ob-
served and 0 otherwise.
Given the above, we implement the following econometric approach, applied to each panel
separately. First, we estimate 2.1 with random effect logit and probit models. All regressors in
estimations of equation 2.1 are introduced with a two-period lagged value to account for the lag
between passage of legislation and policy implementation. Second, we provide results of (FE)
OLS and system GMM estimations for equation 2.2. In addition to controlling for unobservable
time-invariant fixed effects, the GMM estimator allows us to account for potential endogeneity
of the regressors and model the persistence of the stringency variable. The GMM approach has
been taken in Marques and Fuinhas, 2011 to study the relationship between a very similar set
of covariates and renewable energy deployment.
We correct for the selection bias by introducing a sample selection correction term. This
term is calculated for each ECP observation using a Heckit approach adapted from Semykina
and Wooldridge, 2010. In a first step, a probability of occurrence of that observation is obtained
by estimating, for each t, equation 2.3 using a probit regression on the entire cross-section of
jurisdictions. In a second step, this term is then included in the estimation of equation 2.2
as a regressor. For panel A, the set of regressors for the selection equation includes the elec-
tricity generation mix variables, the value added of industry, CO2 emissions and GDP per
capita, trade openness, and EU.21 All variables are introduced with a two-year lag to reflect
our theoretical assumption that operation of a carbon pricing scheme (sit = 1) is dictated by
past economic and institutional structure. For panel B, the same variables are included, except
EU.22
2.6 Estimation results
We comment separately on the estimation of equations 2.1 and 2.2. The results are presented
for panels A, B and C. All estimations include year fixed-effects, and all estimations of equation
2.2 include country fixed-effects.
2.6.1 Implementation
Panel A – National jurisdictions Table 2.4 presents the results of both RE logit and RE probit
estimations, which lead to convergent conclusions about the effects of the covariates on the
21Institutional capacity and Left are not part of the selection equation since the former is not available until 1997
and the latter further reduces the panel dimension.
22Given the paucity of ECP observations for Canadian Provinces & Territories (2 panel units, for a total of 9
observations) no estimation is presented.
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decision to implement a carbon pricing scheme. First, estimates suggest that a larger share of
electricity generated from gas and oil fired power plants lowers the probability of subsequent
introduction of a carbon pricing scheme. This is in line with our expectation that jurisdictions
whose electricity generation system relies more heavily on fossil fuels would face greater op-
position to the introduction of such schemes. The estimates of the coefficient on the share of
coal in the electricity system, however, do not indicate a consistent pattern of influence on the
implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms, which runs against the understanding that ju-
risdictions with coal fired electricity systems would fiercely oppose the introduction of carbon
pricing policies. One potential explanation for this is that ‘dirty’ electricity producers have
been granted significant compensation in the schemes introduced so far. For example, in the
case of the EU-ETS, CO2-intensive electricity producers and heavy industries were ‘bought in’
by grandfathering emissions allowances in the first two phases of the operation of the system.
Second, within the sample of national jurisdictions, we find little evidence supporting the hy-
pothesis that larger industry or manufacturing sectors hindered the introduction of carbon pric-
ing policies. Although coefficient estimates are negative across all estimations, they are only
weakly statistically different from zero. One potential explanation for this observation is that
the set of panel units includes both strongly industrialized and less industrialized jurisdictions,
with most carbon pricing policies having been introduced within the former group. Lastly,
trade openness does not seem to have played a determining role in the introduction of car-
bon pricing policies. Again, one can plausibly suggest that it is related to the fact that existing
schemes have: (i) covered non-traded sectors; (ii) provided sectoral exemptions/compensation
for industries exposed to international competition. Third, the institutional environment does
play a role in the adoption of carbon pricing policies. Results suggest a consistent pattern of
introduction of carbon pricing policies among jurisdictions that rank higher on the Polity IV
democracy index and have a stronger institutional capacity as calculated in this chapter. This
partially supports the hypothesis formulated by Congleton, 1992 that democratic institutions
are conducive to more stringent environmental regulations (a carbon price, regardless of its
level, is a more stringent policy than no price at all) and lends support to Hahn (1990) ’s conclu-
sions that environmental regulation is a balancing act between a variety of interests (the actual
stringency is determined by the relative weight of each interest group and not by the ‘demo-
cratic’ nature of a political system). This might also suggest that the ‘green’ lobby is effectively
given some weight in the policy making process. The economic orientation of the executive
does not seem, on the contrary, to play a significant role in the adoption of carbon pricing poli-
cies, suggesting that, in the sample currently considered, such policies have received support
from parties across the political spectrum. This result is in line with Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and
Collins, 2015. The results also highlight the (international) institutional dynamics at play in the
development of carbon pricing policies as EU membership is found to strongly affect the prob-
ability of introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, an result that is likely to be mainly driven
by the introduction of the EU-ETS in 2005. The results also indicate that, all else equal, larger
emitters (per capita) have been more to likely introduce carbon pricing mechanisms, reflecting
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the fact that, until now, carbon pricing mechanisms have been introduced in more economi-
cally advanced jurisdictions with large CO2/capita emissions, possibly following international
commitments. Finally, GDP per capita has a positive effect on the introduction of a carbon
pricing mechanism (I and III), although the statistical significance of this effect vanishes when
institutional capacity is accounted for (II and IV). Its magnitude changes depending on the
econometric specification but the direction of the induced change is stable across all estimated
models, strongly suggesting that economic agents are more likely to support the introduction
of such policies if they are relatively better off.
TABLE 2.4: Implementation – Outcome:
Panel Category Variable RE Logit RE Probit
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
A - National Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt 2 -0.014 -0.016 0.01 0.043
(0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0165) (0.0184)
Power-Gast 2 -0.065⇤ -0.096 -0.029 -0.063⇤
(0.0467) (0.0616) (0.0207) (0.0359)
Power-Oilt 2 -0.286⇤⇤⇤ -0.188⇤⇤⇤ -0.109⇤⇤⇤ -0.132⇤⇤⇤
(0.0812) (0.0775) (0.0332) (0.0434)
Industry, VAt 2 -0.141 -0.114 -0.06 -0.054
(0.1319) (0.2163) (0.0706) (0.0943)
Trade Opennesst 2 0.023 0.008 0.01 0.01
(0.0198) (0.023) (0.0087) (0.0147)
Political Level of Democracyt 2 1.756⇤⇤⇤ 0.82⇤⇤⇤ 0.759⇤⇤⇤ 0.834⇤⇤⇤
institutions – Z (0.2229) (0.4216) (0.0972) (0.2363)
EUt 2 14.449⇤⇤⇤ 17.9⇤⇤⇤ 5.643⇤⇤⇤ 11.249⇤⇤⇤
(4.1656) (3.2755) (1.5721) 2.095
Leftt 2 -1.209 -0.564
(1.4653) (0.8598)
Institutional capacityt 2 7.423⇤⇤ 5.925⇤⇤⇤
(3.0055) (1.6916)
Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t 2 0.397⇤⇤⇤ 0.093 0.167⇤⇤⇤ 0.125⇤⇤
environment – W (0.0489) (0.1014) (0.0306) (0.0599)
CO2 Emt 2 0.153 0.199 0.045 0.036
(0.1575) (0.2003) (0.0812) (0.1103)
Constant -46.352⇤⇤⇤ -42.879⇤⇤⇤ -20.257⇤⇤⇤ -33.924⇤⇤⇤
(7.3768) (9.8192) (3.7665) (4.8143)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2726 1793 2726 1793
Standard errors in parentheses – ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Note: (i) The institutional capacity variable is observed for the first time in 1997, shortening the time dimension of models (II) and (IV).
Together with the lower number of panel units available for Left, it explains the lower number of observations; (ii) all time dummies from
2005 onwards were statistically significant at the 1% level in models (I) to (IV). We also took a different approach and introduced
a time trend. It did not, however, exhibit any significance. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Panels B & C – US States & Canadian Provinces The results for the subnational jurisdictions
(Table 2.5) considered are broadly consistent with those based on panel A, although we note
some interesting differences.23 In the US, results indicate that electricity generation from fos-
sil fuels negatively impacted the development of carbon pricing mechanisms, with the largest
23Panel B contains only Ideology as political variable and panel C contains no variable reflecting the state of
political institutions.
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absolute effect associated with electricity generation from oil. The results also suggest that car-
bon pricing mechanisms were less likely to be introduced in states with high CO2 emissions
per capita as well as states for which (CO2-intensive) industry represents a large share of total
economic activity – consistent across models (V) and (VI). Conversely, states with relatively
higher income per capita were more likely to introduce carbon pricing. The insights obtained
from panel C need to be interpreted with caution as only two Canadian Provinces introduced
a carbon pricing mechanism over our sample period. Nonetheless, results suggest that richer
(per capita) jurisdictions were more likely to introduce carbon pricing mechanisms whereas
larger CO2 emitters (per capita) or jurisdictions with relatively larger industry were less likely
to do so. In that regard, it is interesting to note the contrasted dynamics between national and
subnational jurisdictions. For example, national jurisdictions with large CO2 emissions (per
capita) seem to have taken the lead in pricing carbon (perhaps due to international commit-
ments) whereas large (per capita) subnational emitters have not.
2.6.2 Stringency
This section discusses the estimation results of equation 2.1. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the re-
sults for national jurisdictions and US States, respectively. Models VII and IX do not account for
potential sample selection bias whereas models VIII and X do. The results clearly demonstrate
a very high persistency of policy stringency. This effect is present across all panels, consistent
across estimators and of the order of 0.8-0.9, indicating that carbon pricing policy stringency
changes very slowly over time. The evidence regarding the role of the electricity generation
portfolio is mixed. In panel A, electricity generation from coal is found to have a negative im-
pact on the stringency of implemented schemes only in models IX and X. The associated esti-
mated coefficients suggest that an increase of 10% in the share of electricity generated from coal
would lead to a 0.6-1.2USD/tCO2e decrease in the average carbon price. Similar mechanisms
are identified for the share of gas in the electricity generation mix, which weighs negatively on
the stringency of the carbon pricing policy. A 10% increase in this share would reduce the aver-
age carbon price by between 0.9USD/tCO2e and 1.8USD/tCO2e. Next, coefficient estimates of
all models except model IX point at a negative effect of the relative strength of industry on the
policy stringency. The magnitude of this negative effect varies from -0.17USD/tCO2e in model
X to -0.04USD/tCO2e in model VIII for each 1% increase in the share of industry in total GDP.
Results do not support the existence of a clear relationship between trade openness and policy
stringency, most likely for the same reasons that it did not seem to decisively affect implemen-
tation. Interestingly, results indicate that being part of the EU had a positive yet not statistically
significant impact on stringency. The magnitude of the estimated effect varies greatly across
models VII-X, with the largest effect is estimated in model X, at about 10USD/tCO2e. Finally,
the effect of CO2 emissions per capita is not clearly identified, being negative in models VII and
VIII where estimates may suffer from simultaneity bias, and positive yet with weak statistical
significance in models IX and X.
28 Chapter 2. The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing: a Panel Analysis
TABLE 2.5: Implementation – Outcome: (cont.)
Panel Category Variable RE Logit RE Probit
(V) (VI)






Industry, VA t 2 -1.71⇤⇤ -1.111⇤
(0.7826) (0.6487)
Trade Opennesst 2 0.305 0.206
(0.1866) (0.1341)
Political Ideologyt 2 -0.031 0.004
institutions – Z (3.1119) (1.9761)
Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t 2 0.738⇤⇤ 0.386⇤⇤
environment – W (0.3176) (0.176)




Year dummies Yes Yes
Observationsa 255 255
C – Canadian Prov. Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt 2 0.544 0.208





Industry, VAt 2 -0.193 -0.092
(1.1889) (0.3729)
Trade Opennesst 2 -0.405 -0.159
(0.3713) (0.1843)
Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t 2 0.556 0.271
environment – W (0.748) (0.3140)




Year dummies Yes Yes
Observationsa 117 117
Standard errors in parentheses; ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
a Panel A: from a number of observations of 400, we lose 2x50 observations given that we use two-years lag.
Panel B: 2x13 observations are lost. Year dummies from 2012 onwards are significant in Panel B estimations.
None of the year dummies for panel C were significant. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Insights from panel B point to a similarly persistent stringency process, with a coefficient es-
timate for ECPt 1 of 0.90 in model XIV. Estimates in models XI and XII are most likely severely
biased due to the short time dimension of Panel B. The results also suggest that larger CO2
emitters and more industrious (CO2-intensive) US States had more stringent carbon pricing
mechanisms. These effects are, however, not statistically significant when estimated with the
GMM estimator.
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TABLE 2.6: Stringency – ECP (2015 $US/tCO2e)
Panel Category Variable FE OLS FE OLS, Heck Syst GMM Syst GMM, Heck
(VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
A – National ECPt 1 0.875⇤⇤⇤ 0.879⇤⇤⇤ 0.824⇤⇤⇤ 0.824⇤⇤⇤
(0.0438) (0.052) (0.1126) (0.1402)
Regulatory Power-Coalt 0.068⇤⇤ 0.064⇤ -0.0554 -0.123
capture – X (0.0261) (0.0324) (0.0773) (0.1106)
Power-Gast 0.022 0.03 -0.088⇤ -0.181⇤
(0.0274) (0.0268) (0.0508) (0.0911)
Power-Oilt -0.016 -0.013 0.095 0.061
(0.1084) (0.1089) (0.1265) (0.1609)
Industry, VAt -0.084 -0.041 0.068 -0.173
(0.1021) (0.0918) (0.2857) (0.4142)
Trade Opennesst -0.014 -0.021 0.02 0.028
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.026) (0.0427)
Political EUt 0.621 0.127 3.801 10.412
institutions – Z (1.0813) (0.8366) (6.101) (7.9493)
Macro(economic) CO2 Emt -0.533⇤⇤ -0.473⇤⇤ 0.458 0.453
environment – W (0.2058) (0.199) (0.5451) (0.6637)
Constant 6.186 7.861 5.499 9.1
(4.0966) (3.6756) (16.577) (20.9732)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample selection term No Yes No Yes
Instruments GMM-sys GMM-sys
Observations 349 349 349 349
AR(1) test -3.38⇤⇤⇤ -2.79⇤⇤⇤
AR(2) test 0.64 0.16
Sargan (c2) 10.12 3.95
Standard errors in parentheses ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Time dummies for years 2005 and 2007 to 2010 were significant in models (VII) and (VIII) but not in models (IX) and (X).
Including GDP in the stringency equation does not qualitatively nor quantitatively change the results.
The sample selection terms are significant in regressions (VIII) and (X). Source: Authors’ calculations.
2.6.3 Robustness checks and discussion
2.6.3.1 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our results, we perform a series of additional estimations. First, to
address concerns that the coefficient estimates of equation 2.1 may be biased due to correlation
between past residuals and current regressors, we repeat its estimation with a sample where,
for each panel unit, the time dimension is (right)-curtailed at the year of policy adoption. That
is, for each panel unit in which a carbon pricing scheme was introduced, we keep only one ob-
servation for which = 1. The results are qualitatively similar, although statistical significance
of the estimated coefficients decreases. Second, we note that for equation 2.1, i.e. regression
models I to VI, the results do not change qualitatively if we choose a different (meaningful) lag
structure. In particular, they are robust to the use of one-period lagged values of the regressors.
Third, it can be argued that, over the period considered, there exists a structural break in car-
bon pricing policy developments as many national jurisdictions introduced such policies after
2005. To test whether the dynamics presiding over these developments differ prior and after
2005, we re-estimate models II and IV over two different time periods: 1990-2004 and 2005-
2015. For the period 1990-2004, the share of electricity generated from gas and oil is negatively
associated with the probability of implementation of carbon pricing policies. Surprisingly, the
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TABLE 2.7: Stringency – ECP (2015 $US/tCO2e) (cont.)
Panel Category Variable FE OLS FE OLS, Heck Syst GMM Syst GMM, Heck
(XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV)
B – US States ECPt 1 1.042⇤⇤⇤ 1.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.88⇤⇤⇤ 0.903⇤⇤⇤
(0.0815) (0.0907) (0.0462) (0.0728)
Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt -0.014⇤ -0.014⇤ -0.004 -0.005
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0051) (0.0046)
Power-Gast -0.001 -0.0014 0 0.001
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0066)
Power-Oilt 0.025 0.027 0.142⇤⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤⇤
(0.0316) (0.0349) (0.045) (0.0488)
Industry, VAt 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤ 0.011 0.014
(0.0057) (0.006) (0.0072) (0.0149)
Trade Opennesst 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 0.011
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0132) (0.0177)
Macro(economic) CO2 Em(Mt)t -0.025 -0.024 0.074 0.079
environment – W (0.0254) (0.0265) (0.0585) (0.069)
Constant -0.573 -0.577 - -
(0.4375) (0.39)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample selection No Yes No Yes
Instruments GMM-sys GMM-sys
Observations 49 49 49 49
AR(1) test 1.51 0.09
AR(2) test 1.27 0.23
Sargan (c2) 39.47⇤⇤⇤ 18.62⇤⇤⇤
Standard errors in parentheses: ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
All year dummies are statistically significant at (at least) the 5% level in models (XI) and (XII). In models (XIII) and (XIV),
year dummies 2010 and 2011 are not significant; all others are. Source: Authors’ calculations.
share of electricity produced from coal seems to have a small positive – albeit statistically in-
significant – impact. This may be driven by the fact that Denmark, which was in 1990 heavily
reliant on coal for its electricity generation, managed to introduce a carbon pricing mechanism
in 1992 (albeit with substantial sectoral exemptions and rebates). The more general observa-
tion that electricity generation from fossil fuels weighted negatively on carbon pricing policy
developments may reflect the fact that until 2004, only northern European jurisdictions, which
have achieved a lower share of electricity generated from fossil fuel over time, had introduced
a carbon pricing scheme. In addition to this, the coefficient of EU is an order of magnitude
smaller than in the full sample models. This is likely explained by the fact that carbon pricing
activity took place in jurisdictions that were not EU members at the start of the scheme. Over
the period 2005-2015, the results for these models indicate that EU membership was a much
more significant determinant of the introduction of carbon pricing mechanisms. This echoes
the fact that a lot of these jurisdictions’ first carbon pricing mechanism was the EU-ETS. GDP
per capita, institutional capacity and the level of democracy are both found to positively af-
fect implementation over the period whereas the share of industry, CO2 emissions per capita
and the orientation of the executive with respect to economic policy have a negative impact on
implementation. All coefficient estimates except those associated with GDP and the level of
democracy exhibit, however, weak statistical significance.
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We also checked whether the results were robust to the use of different indicators of demo-
cratic institutions, namely Polyarchy and Libdem, as well as with another indicator of gover-
nance, Corruption. Estimations of models I to IV with these variables provided very similar
results, which is somewhat unsurprising given that these are highly positively correlated with
our main indicator of democratic institutions (r = 0.9 and r = 0.85, respectively). Estimations
with the (control of) corruption variable suggested that implementation of carbon pricing poli-
cies was more likely to occur in less corrupt jurisdictions. Finally, we repeated the estimation of
regressions VII to X with a different version of our outcome variable in equation 2.2, one where
the weights are varying year-to-year. The results are, for all models considered, qualitatively
similar.
Lastly, we note that neither the main estimations nor the robustness checks allow for het-
erogeneity in estimated parameters across (groups of) jurisdictions (beyond jurisdiction Fixed
Effects). Yet, the relationships estimated above might differ across (groups of) jurisdictions.
If differences in institutions or economic structure across (groups of) jurisdictions cannot be
reasonably accounted for in econometric specifications, then splitting the estimation sample
between specific groups might provide group-specific estimates. However, given that most ju-
risdictions with carbon pricing in our sample are industrialised countries, we have not, at this
stage, considered such heterogeneity. While this aspect is not explored in the present chap-
ter, it could add to our understanding of the dynamics at play, especially once the number of
jurisdictions with active carbon pricing policies has increased.
2.6.3.2 Discussion
Further to the robustness checks carried out and discussed above, we make three additional
observations based on the results of our analysis. First, we note that despite us taking great
care to reduce the risk of simultaneity bias, the nature of the question at hand, i.e. what de-
termines a jurisdiction’s adoption and stringency of carbon pricing policies, and the resulting
econometric specification render strong causal claims as to the relationships identified diffi-
cult, especially for the stringency equations. We note, however, that this does not jeopardise
the main conclusion drawn from our results on the stringency equations: that stringency is a
highly persistent AR(1) process.
Second, the present analysis focuses on jurisdiction-level policy adoption and does not seek
to distinguish between tax and emissions trading schemes. It constitutes a first attempt at iden-
tifying some systematic patterns of adoption of such policies. A more refined understanding
could be obtained by (i) looking at sector-level policy adoption and stringency across jurisdic-
tions and (ii) distinguishing between the dynamics of adoption of tax and emissions trading
schemes. It is indeed to be expected that the political economy of carbon pricing might differ
across sectors and/or types of instrument, not least because of different (distributional) impli-
cations of these instruments for the affected sectors and/or their ability to affect the design of
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either instruments in ways favourable to them.24
Finally, there have been several failed attempts at introducing carbon pricing schemes in
both national (e.g. Australia) and subnational (e.g. Washington State in the US) jurisdictions.
While the results presented in this study help shed some light on these failures, it is likely that
local/idiosyncratic factors would go a long way in explaining them further. As such, identify-
ing these factors would require more in-depth jurisdiction/scheme-specific case studies.
2.7 Conclusions
Carbon pricing policies have re-emerged in the policy making arena as potential tools to achieve
(some) reductions in GHG emissions. This renewed political appetite for carbon pricing mecha-
nisms is apparent in the number of new schemes brought online over the last decade. However
welcome these developments are, they should not be understood to mean that carbon pricing
policies are on track to expand quickly to new jurisdictions nor to reach the stringency that
achieving the Paris Agreement target requires. Indeed, this chapter shows that, when weighted
for the share of covered emissions, these policies are, in most jurisdictions, much weaker than
typically assumed. Moreover, because the jurisdictions with carbon pricing policies represent
a small share of world emissions, the world average price of emissions remains extremely low,
at about 1USD/tCO2e in 2015. In light of the statistical results discussed in this study, this is an
uncomfortable state of affairs. First, because structural political and economic forces continue
to hinder the introduction of new schemes beyond jurisdictions for which the political and eco-
nomic cost of pricing carbon is comparatively low. For example, carbon pricing is unlikely to
appeal to jurisdictions with low GDP per capita and/or, oil-fuelled electricity generation, for
which other domestic policies, possibly complemented by international technology and finan-
cial transfers would prove more palatable. Second, because all implemented schemes exhibit
strong persistency in their stringency, which is particularly problematic given that most of the
schemes introduced so far are associated with weak (average) price signals.
The present analysis does, however, also offer lessons – and cautious optimism – for fu-
ture policy developments. First, even if such developments are hindered by political economy
factors, their effect is not as strong as one might have initially expected and suitable policy
designs have been found to overcome them. Nonetheless, the difficulty with which carbon
pricing schemes can be introduced, together with the weakness of most existing ones contin-
ues to provide a rationale for the development of climate mitigation strategies with multiple
GHGs abatement tools and stresses the need to carefully consider the private and public cost
of (early) retirement of the existing capital stock. This also highlights the importance of the
sequence of introduction of the climate change mitigation policy package. One way to weaken
24Aldy and Stavins, 2012, argue, however, that one advantage of cap-and-trade programs over tax schemes is that
political pressures on the latter lead to sector and firm exemptions that decrease environmental effectiveness and
raise total costs of emissions reduction; whereas political pressure on the former lead to changes in the distribution
of the burden but do not raise total costs nor decrease environmental effectiveness.
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incumbents’ lobbying power is to weaken their relative influence prior to the introduction of
carbon pricing policies.
Second, even in the presence of other climate policies, this analysis suggests that there is
room for further strengthening of carbon pricing mechanisms. This can be done through ex-
tension of coverage or a price increase in currently covered sectors. But when considering
implementation or strengthening of carbon pricing schemes, jurisdictions ought to pay close
attention to the factors discussed here as it may save them from spending time and political




Climate policy diffusion: theory and
evidence
3.1 Introduction
Limiting the increase in Global Mean Temperature to 2 C above pre-industrial levels will re-
quire drastic reductions in GHG emissions. Since CO2 is a global pollutant, any environmen-
tally effective solution requires a reduction in ‘world’ emissions. However, no World Govern-
ment capable of enforcing worldwide reductions in GHG emissions exists. Instead, a multi-
tude of sovereign states interact within the Westphalian system of International Relations and
its founding principles (self-determination, legal equality of States and no third-party interfer-
ence in internal affairs) make cooperation the only available option to efficiently address global
public good problems like Climate Change (Barrett, 2003). It is precisely these principles – and
their implications – that shaped the UNFCCC, formally established in 1992.
In light of this observation, Parties to the Convention initially adopted a cooperative ap-
proach to emissions reduction and sought to design multilateral agreements that could sustain
the cooperative outcome. In line with these developments and following Carraro and Sinis-
calco, 1997, a substantial body of research explored the conditions for (stable) climate coalition
formation. However, notwithstanding mechanisms to improve the stability of such coalitions
(Nordhaus, 1989) and as predicted by standard game theoretical discussions of environmen-
tal agreement negotiation (Barrett, 1994), this top-down cooperative approach failed to deliver
emissions reductions consistent with stated objectives of global average temperature increase.1
In this context, jurisdictions at best offered to implement their Nash equilibrium strategy, com-
mitting to (very) low, globally sub-optimal, levels of emissions reductions, while others simply
did not commit to any reduction at all.2
1See Chapter 2.
2Incentives for unilateral provision of global environmental quality beyond the Nash equilibrium outcome have
so far proven relatively weak. These can be broadly grouped into altruistic (e.g. self-enforcing collective identity
(Olson, 1965), rule utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1977), different domestic preferences, or genuine care for the global
environment) and self-interested (e.g. strategic innovation,. . . ).
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Taking stock of this relative failure, the Paris Agreement shifted the architecture of inter-
national climate negotiations from a cooperative to a non-cooperative setting: under its provi-
sions, Parties are invited to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (IN-
DCs) to the achievement of the stated temperature warming objective. With such an institu-
tional design, the key questions no longer pertain to the formation of climate coalitions and
the mechanisms to sustain them but rather to the determinants of unilateral climate change
mitigation policy ambition. In this respect, the Agreement implicitly acknowledges that tech-
nological demonstration and policy learning are such determinants. Indeed, parts of it rest on
the premise that by offering to Parties the flexibility to put forward strategies based on a variety
of abatement policies and technologies, it will foster their demonstration and diffusion across
sectors and jurisdictions (Paris Agreement, Art. 6-1, 6-8, 7-6, 7-7, 10) and, ultimately, trigger
increased climate policy ambition.
Yet, even if there are good reasons to believe that such diffusion processes might be at play
– for example, the evidence accumulated since the implementation of the first carbon pricing
scheme in Finland in 1990 suggests that the adoption of such schemes is highly clustered both
temporally and spatially (see Figure 3.1)3, the precise mechanisms of diffusion, if at all present,
remain ill-understood. An improved understanding of these mechanisms would not only shed
a new light on past developments but also provide insights into the chances of success of the
Paris Agreement architecture.
To this end, we start by noting that, until now, jurisdictions looking to implement new cli-
mate change mitigation policies (or strengthen existing ones) have been primarily concerned
with (i) free riding and the international competitiveness of domestic GHG-intensive sectors,
(ii) the cost (and availability) of GHG-abatement technologies and (iii) the uncertainty sur-
rounding the political and economic implications of such policies. Each of these concerns have
contributed to keeping climate change mitigation ambition low. Yet, in recent years, the cost of
GHG-abating technologies plummeted as some jurisdictions embarked on their development
and deployment, while the adoption of (more stringent) climate change mitigation policies by
an increasing number of jurisdictions alleviated international competitiveness concerns and
provided additional information on (successful) policy designs. As detailed further through
this chapter, these developments could trigger increased policy ambition by individual juris-
dictions.
Following Simmons and Elkins, 2004, we hypothesise that the processes of policy diffusion
are related to two main mechanisms. First, an alteration of the net payoffs of domestic climate
policy, which takes place through (a) a technology channel – abatement technology develop-
ment, and subsequent diffusion, by foreign jurisdictions reduces the cost of emissions reduction
(see, e.g., Heal, 1993); and (b) a policy (adoption) channel – which alters the magnitude of free
riding and the international competitiveness cost of more stringent domestic environmental
3According to World Bank, 2018, 5 carbon pricing schemes were introduced between 1990 and 1992, 12 (includ-
ing the EU-ETS) were introduced over the period 2005-2011 and 26 were introduced between 2012 and 2018.
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policy.4 Second, an update on the information about the benefits (or costs) of policy adoption
derived from the adoption of a similar policy or the deployment of abatement technology in
foreign jurisdictions. This information could be communicated through different cultural or
institutional affiliation channels (e.g. EU, OECD,. . . ).5
In other words, alongside standard international trade considerations, this chapter relates
the adoption of new climate change mitigation policies – or raised climate change mitigation
policy ambition – to the (pre-)existence of technology and information diffusion networks via
which technology development and deployment as well as policy adoption by one jurisdiction
spills-over to other jurisdictions. Importantly, we note that the hypothesised mechanisms of
diffusion are not necessarily clear a priori but that the chapter is grounded in a static general
equilibrium model based on Copeland and Taylor, 2003 which explicitly accommodates them.
Using this framework as a guide for our empirical investigation, these hypotheses are then
tested on a comprehensive dataset containing information on climate and carbon pricing policy
developments over 25 years in a panel of national jurisdictions.
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
strands of literature. Section 3.3 introduces a formal framework to support our empirical dis-
cussion; section 3.4 builds on it to introduce the hypotheses. Section 3.5 presents the data and
the modelling strategy and section 3.6 presents the results. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The literature on policy diffusion offers a route to rationalise the latest carbon pricing and cli-
mate policy developments. In particular, unlike standard political economy studies of the de-
velopment of environmental – and other – policies which usually focus on domestic conditions
in their attempt to rationalise policy developments, this literature emphasises the importance of
foreign developments for domestic policy making, mainly through changes in the net payoffs
or updated informational signal that policy adoption implies (see Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and
Collins, 2015 and references therein). Given the global nature of the GHG externality and the
multi-dimensional interdependence of jurisdictions, it is indeed unlikely that domestic factors
alone will drive climate policy developments. We focus on three determinants that are likely to
shape domestic climate policy decision(s) and be influenced by international developments: (i)
other jurisdictions’ policies, especially those of (trade) partners; (ii) the techno-economic con-
text, in particular the cost and availability of abatement technology; (iii) the expected (political)
cost of policy implementation. We briefly review the literature associated with each of them.
Standard economic analysis of global pollutants regulation in an international (trade) con-
text points at the presence of both free riding and leakage effects (Copeland and Taylor, 2005),
4For example, the international competitiveness disadvantage created by more stringent carbon pricing policy
is alleviated when all members of a ‘closed’ trading club implement it. Such a club could be closed de facto – in case
a group of countries trade mostly among themselves – or de jure – in case a group of countries implements external
CO2 adjustment tariffs (see, e.g., Nordhaus, 1989).
5In addition, the strength of these mechanisms depends on the nature and intensity of the relationship between
bilateral partners (or, in other words, “distance").
38 Chapter 3. Climate policy diffusion: theory and evidence
FIGURE 3.1: Adoption of carbon pricing policies in national jurisdictions: 1990-
2015
Note: a light grey shade indicates the absence of any carbon pricing scheme;
The figure for Canada and US is the country-wide average price resulting from
carbon pricing schemes implemented at the Provincial or State level
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which have greatly concerned policy makers in jurisdictions that considered stringent climate
change mitigation policies. This literature proposes discussions based on considerations of rel-
ative input factor endowments, relative international prices, . . . (see, e.g. Antweiler, Copeland,
and Taylor, 2001) and suggests that domestic environmental regulation affect trade patterns.6
Next, the role played by abatement technology is the motivation behind discussions around
its institutionalised transfer between (groups of) jurisdictions (e.g. UNFCCC, Article 4.5) and
provides the rationale for a substantial body of work that seeks to shed light on channels of
(abatement) technology diffusion.7 This literature has mainly focused on bilateral transfers
of technology across jurisdictions and has noted three main market channels: (i) international
trade in intermediate goods (e.g., export and import of equipment) – Grossman and Helpman,
1991 have previously argued that knowledge varies according to the number of contacts be-
tween domestic and foreign agents and that these contacts are directly proportional to trade
flows; (ii) foreign direct investments – for example, multinational corporations can bring home
country clean production techniques to host countries; (iii) licensing.
Finally, governments often lack sufficient understanding of the consequences of a particular
policy innovation (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), in which case inaction may simply reflect a lack
of accurate information. Climate policy adoption by better informed jurisdictions may serve as
a signal about the (low) cost of the said policy, prompting a jurisdiction to “mimick" its (close)
neighbour.
The policy diffusion framework that we suggest accounts for factors that standard economic
analysis deems relevant to the shaping of domestic climate policy – such as factor endowments
and international prices – and the availability of abatement technology – as well as factors
usually put forward by the literature on policy diffusion – such as policy learning. In doing so,
it extends the policy diffusion literature, which usually focuses primarily on the altered payoff
or informational signal following from the adoption of the same policy in partner jurisdictions
and furthers our understanding of climate policy adoption. The theoretical framework used to
support our argument is presented in the next section.
3.3 Theoretical framework
We cast our discussion within a stylised multi-country (jurisdictions are indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n.)
two factors r = (r1 = K, r2 = L) - two goods t = (t1 = x, t2 = y) general equilibrium model of
6This latter literature formulates two main hypotheses. The pollution haven hypothesis which states that, insofar as
environmental regulation raises the cost of manufacturing goods, pollution-intensive economic activity will relocate
to jurisdictions with lower environmental standards, and the factor endowment hypothesis, which claims that standard
forces such as factor endowments and technology determine the pattern of trade, not (only) environmental policy
(Copeland and Taylor, 2003). Several empirical studies have provided evidence in support of the second hypothesis
and, de facto, cast serious doubt on the first (Tobey, 1990; Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Jaffe et al., 1995).
7The focus of this paper is on the role played by bilateral relationships and, in that respect, differs from ap-
proaches adopted, for example, by Vega and Mandel, 2018. Their approach “accounts for the impact of each country
not only on its direct connections, but also on the global diffusion process" (p.462).
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international trade with transboundary pollution, adapted from Copeland and Taylor, 2003.8
We distinguish between primary factors of production and consumption goods (Dixit and Nor-
man, 1980). Primary factors are non tradable while goods are. Labour is mobile across sectors
but not across countries.
We assume that n is large and that all countries have the same relative size so that each
country cannot, individually, influence its terms of trade (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).9 The
model is static, productive factors are in inelastic supply and environmental quality is a global
public good.10 Finally, factor endowments vary across countries and determine trade patterns.
3.3.1 Technology
We assume strictly concave, constant returns to scale technology (CRS) and linearly homoge-
nous production functions for both goods. That is, the set of technologically feasible (r, t), T, is
convex. The production of good x generates pollution, e, as a by-product while the production
of good y doesn’t.11 The production function of the clean good y is:
y = F(Ky, Ly) (3.1)
The presence of a clean good allows us to make a clear distinction between (i) sector-level and
(ii) economy-wide impacts of the diffusion mechanisms we consider in this paper. For instance,
as we discuss in more detail in section 3.4.2 and appendix B.3, an improvement in abatement
technology will affect the dirty sector directly as well as induce a reallocation of productive
resources between the dirty and the clean sector.
In industry X, abatement activity is considered to be costly to firms. That is, firms produce
potential output B(Kx, Lx) and can choose to redirect a fraction f 2 [0, 1] of inputs to the abate-
ment process, which will, in turn, reduce the net output of good x. In other words, the net
production of x is the difference between potential production and production foregone due
to the use of resources in abatement activity, (fKx, fLx). As a result, emission intensity in that
8The two main adjustments are (i) an explicit recognition of the role played by (improvements in) abatement
technology in the determination of domestic climate policy, and (ii) a reinterpretation of the regulatory threshold as
depending on expectations about the (economic and/or political) cost of policy intervention.
9While assuming away the influence of domestic environmental policy on world prices excludes the possibility
for policy makers to manipulate their terms of trade by their choice of climate policy, it allows us to keep the
argument focused on the mechanisms of interest. Strategic setting of environmental policy for the purpose of
manipulation of the terms of trade is not considered here.
10The mechanisms under consideration in this chapter are dynamic in nature (e.g. accumulation of knowledge
or abatement technology over time). However, so long as the policy decision is influenced by the accumulated stock
rather than flow variables and that there are no inter-temporal strategic interactions, a static model is sufficient to
capture the essence of the the problem at hand.
11This is without loss of generality and it can easily be extended to a context with m > 2 goods exhibiting
different emissions intensities. In other words, our framework and results would apply to a case where the pollution
intensity of the clean good production is strictly positive. See Levinson and Taylor, 2008 for a partial equilibrium
example and Copeland and Taylor, 1994 for a general equilibrium discussion.
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sector is a choice variable. The joint production of x and e is given by
x = B(Kx, Lx)  B(fKx, fLx)
= (1   f)B(Kx, Lx) (3.2)
e = c(f)WB(Kx, Lx) (3.3)
where the second line of equation 3.2 follows from the CRS assumption. c(f) is the abate-
ment function, with more abatement efforts leading to less emissions, i.e. dcdf < 0, and c(0) =
1; c(1) = 0.12
In the absence of abatement (f = 0, c(f) = 1), each unit of good x produces W units of pol-
lution; conversely, if all resources are devoted to abatement (f = 1, c(f) = 0), no production
(nor pollution) takes place. 0 < W  1 is therefore the unabated level of pollution attached to
each unit of the dirty good and can be interpreted as a technological parameter for the abate-
ment activity.13 A decrease in W then denotes an improvement in the abatement technology
(Brock and Taylor, 2010) and, for given levels of potential production and abatement effort, a
decrease in emissions.
As shown in section 3.4.2, this parameter plays a central role in the determination of a
jurisdiction’s equilibrium emissions (i.e. climate policy). As a result, mechanisms leading to
improvements in domestic abatement technology, which constitute one of the focal points of
our discussion are particularly important.
To keep the discussion as focused as possible on this parameter, we note that, given equa-
tion 3.3, constraining the number of pollution units that the sector is allowed to release in
the environment constrains its net production in the same way limited availability of an in-
put would. Therefore, following Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Copeland and Taylor, 2004 we
treat pollution as an input to the production process of good x and reformulate equation 3.2






which expresses the net production of x as a function of effective emissions, e/W, i.e. emissions
per emissions required for a unit of potential output, and potential output.
Proof. See appendix B.2.
Equation 3.4 allows us to make three observations with important implications for domes-
tic climate policy. First, it highlights once again the importance of the quality of the abate-
ment technology: as emissions per unit of potential output (W) decrease, net output increases.
This is because improvements in abatement technology free up resources that were previously
12As noted by Copeland and Taylor, 2003, adopting this specification is equivalent to assuming an explicit pol-
lution abatement function. See appendix B.1.
13Restricting W to values below or equal to 1 ensures that emission intensity is below or equal to 1 and avoids
unnecessary complexities in the firm’s profit maximisation problem. In Copeland and Taylor, 2003, W is constant
and, by choice of units, set equal to 1.
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devoted to abatement and makes them available for actual production – see discussion in ap-
pendix B.2. In other words, for a given e, as the abatement technology improves, the production
of the dirty good expands. Second, it can be shown that an improvement in abatement technol-
ogy decreases the emissions intensity of the economy.14 The third observation is summarised
in the following proposition.










Proof. The cost of tightening pollution policy in sector X is driven by the diversion of resources
from actual production to abatement activities. From equation 3.4 it is easy to see how net






B(Kx, Lx)1 a > 0 (3.6)
which increases as W decreases.
Although proposition 1 might appear counter-intuitive, it reflects the increased opportu-
nity cost of reducing emissions when the economy is very efficient at abating, i.e. when the
productivity of each unit of pollution (x/e) is high.
3.3.2 Production decision and pollution demand
Equipped with these technological priors, we now look at the production decision of firms.15
This decision determines the relative size of the dirty sector and, ultimately, determines the
pollution demand schedule, which will affect optimal climate policy.
Good y is the numeraire (with price py normalised to 1) and the relative price of good x in
terms of good y is denoted p. The optimal output vector t = (x, y) will depend on primary
input endowments, r = (K, L), output prices, p = (p, 1) and, for the pollution emitting sector,
emissions e. That is, the firms’ problem is
max
t
{p.t | (t, r, e/W) f easible}
Since input factors (K,L) are supplied inelastically, the firms’ decision determines the relative
allocation of inputs to each sector. In the dirty good sector, the firm faces the additional decision
14This observation uses a standard implication of Cobb-Douglas production functions, i.e. that the share of










where d is the price of emissions (see section 3.3.2) and p is the relative price of good x. Furthermore, equation 3.5
indicates that emission-intensity also depends on both policy (d) and technology (W) – appendix B.4 discusses that
relationship further.
15The detailed production decision problem of firms in sectors x and y is presented in appendix B.3.
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of how much of these resources to devote to abatement. The solution to this problem defines
the optimum (technologically feasible) vector of output
t̂ ⌘ t(p, r, e/W) (3.7)







= p.t(p, r, e/W) (3.8)
The revenue function is convex in p, 5ppg(p, r, e/W) > 0, but concave in r,
5rrg(p, r, e/W) < 0.16 In addition,
Proposition 2. The revenue function is increasing and concave in e
∂g(p, r, e/W)/∂e > 0; ∂g(p, r, e/W)/∂2e < 0 (a)
but decreasing and convex in W
∂g(p, r, e/W)/∂W < 0; ∂g(p, r, e/W)/∂2W < 0 (b)
That is, as the abatement technology deteriorates, revenue falls at a decreasing rate.
Proof. (a) The fact that the revenue function is increasing in e follows from Proposition 1 and
the concavity of the revenue function in e can be justified following the same argument as for r –
see Dixit and Norman, 1980, p.31. (b) With relative price p and total resources r held constant,
a deterioration of the abatement technology will (i) induce a reallocation of resources from
the dirty to the clean sector, as clean good production is now relatively more profitable – see
equation B.3.4 in appendix B.3 – and (ii) reduce net output in the dirty sector – see equation 3.4.
Similarly, convexity results from the the convexity in W of the production in the dirty sector.
If we further assume that profit-maximising firms maximise national income, this revenue
function can be interpreted as the national income function, G(p, K, L, eW ).















where I denotes the national income. The national income function preserves all the properties
of the revenue function.
At this stage, it is useful to note the relationship between the national income function and
the price of emissions. For given prices and factor endowments, the value of a pollution permit,
16For an informal justification of this statement, see Dixit and Norman, 1980, p.31.
17The assumption that profit-maximising firms in perfectly competitive environments maximise national income
is a standard result in microeconomic theory which has been used extensively in the international trade literature. It
holds as long as the negative environmental externality considered does not cause adverse production externalities.
See Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Copeland and Taylor, 1995.
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denoted d, is the marginal effect on national income of additional pollution:
d ⌘ ∂G(p, r, e/W)
∂e
(3.10)
Equation 3.10 gives the demand schedule of firms for pollution which, since G(.) is concave in
e, is decreasing. Hence, we also have
Proposition 3. For a given net output of the dirty good sector, an improvement in the abatement
technology reduces pollution demand. That is, ∂G(p,r,e/W)∂e∂W > 0
Proof. First, note from equation 3.5 that the demand for pollution can be expressed as the emis-
sions intensity times the production of good x, i.e. e = i(p, d, W) ⇥ x(p, d, K, L). Now, using
equation 3.5 again, it is easy to note that an improvement in abatement technology (i.e. a de-
crease in W) leads to a decrease in emissions intensity – a technique effect. Hence, for a given
level of production in the X sector, an improvement in abatement technology decreases de-
mand for pollution.
3.3.3 Consumers
Let us assume the existence of N identical consumers in each country. Consumers derive util-
ity from the consumption of both goods and incur disutility – i.e. damage (D) – from global
pollution E. The utility function is strongly separable with respect to consumption goods and
environmental quality. Each consumer of jurisdiction i has the following utility18
Ui ⌘ Ui(x, y, E) = ui(x, y)  D(E) (3.12)
where E = Âi ei and ei denotes the emissions of jurisdiction i. uix(x, y), uiy(x, y)   0, uixx(x, y), uiyy(x, y) <
0 and D0(E) > 0, D00(E) > 0. Note, in addition, that ui(x, y) is homothetic.19 Consumers max-
imise utility given goods prices – which determine the revenue function specified by (3.8) –
and (global) pollution levels. Using duality, we can write consumer i’s indirect utility function,
which gives the maximum utility attainable for given prices and income (I), as:
Vi ⌘ V(p, I, E) = v(p, I)  D(E) (3.13)
18Note that equation (3.12) assumes that the consumer does not derive any utility from global environmental
quality. One could take this form of altruism into account by attributing a strictly positive weight to the damage
that domestic emissions impose on other jurisdictions. That is, e.g.,
Ui ⌘ Ui(x, y, E) = ui(x, y)  [aD1(E)] + bD2(E)] (3.11)
where b = 1   a < 1 and D1 and D2 denote domestic and foreign (or world) environmental damage, respectively.
Care for the global environment will reduce equilibrium emissions level.
19With homotheticity, the analysis is simplified in two ways. First, the indirect utility function can be written
as an increasing function of real income. Second, it ensures that relative consumption patterns do not change with
income which, in turn, makes trade patterns dependent on factor endowments and relative costs only (Copeland
and Taylor, 2003).
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Consumers earn their revenue from their ownership of factors of production, capital and labour,
which are remunerated at the equilibrium market rate. In a perfectly competitive economy, the
total value of payments to all factors of production is equal to the maximum value of produc-
tion. It will thus depend on the composition of the economic production, the price at which
said production is sold and environmental policy. Eventually, using the homotheticity assump-
tion, function v(.) can be written as a function of real income – I/w(p), where w(p) is a price
index.
Vi(p, I, E) = v(p, I)  D(E) = v(1, I/w(p))  D(E)
Vi(R, E) ⌘ v(R)  D(E) (3.14)
3.3.4 Equilibrium pollution supply
As alluded to in the introduction, climate policies developed over the last three decades have
been so in an uncoordinated and non-cooperative fashion.We therefore consider a noncooper-
ative Nash Equilibrium where pollution policy is endogenous and decided by a self-interested
government, which maximises the utility of a representative consumer given world prices and
Rest Of the World (ROW) emissions. Government policy is cast in terms of pollution targets,








E = E i + ei (3.17)
where E i is the total aggregate emission of all jurisdictions bar the emissions of jurisdiction i.
The optimality condition of this maximisation problem is:
VRRE| {z }
(1)





Proof. To obtain equation 3.18 we acknowledge all the direct and indirect dependencies of Vi
on domestic emissions ei. First, domestic emissions affect the indirect utility via their impact
on the national (real) income. They can affect the national income in two ways: (1) directly, by
constraining the production of the dirty good – eiW ; (2) indirectly, by altering the relative price of
the dirty good on world markets – p(e). Second, domestic emissions affect the indirect utility
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) (3.19)
of which we take the total derivative with respect to ei (given the presence of indirect dependen-
cies of V on ei and composed functions, we must resort to the chain rule). The total derivative






















If the domestic economy takes other jurisdictions’ emissions as given, which is our default
assumption, then dE/dei = 1. Importantly, from the point of view of the domestic economy,
this term captures free-riding and leakage issues. Indeed, if an economy’s decision to reduce
domestic emissions leads to less absolute reduction in world emissions, dE/dei < 1, then do-
mestic incentives to reduce emissions will decrease.
Next, defining VR ⌘ ∂V∂R , Rp ⌘
∂R
∂p , VE ⌘
∂V
∂E , pe ⌘
∂p
∂e and VE ⌘
∂V
∂E yields the left hand side
of equation 3.18.
Finally, note that V is a concave function because of the structure imposed on u(.) earlier.
Hence, setting equation 3.20 to 0 defines a maximum.
That is, the government’s decision reflects the tradeoff between the direct effect of emissions
change on the nation’s real income (1), the effect of the induced change in the price of the
dirty good on real income (2), and the effect of emissions change on the consumer’s utility (3).
However, if world prices are exogenous to domestic policy changes, (2) is equal to zero because
there is no real income effect of a change in domestic prices. Hence,
RE =  VE/VR| {z }
⌘MD(R,E)
(3.21)
with VE < 0 and VR > 0. Equation 3.21 equates the marginal benefit of increased emissions (i.e.
the resulting increase in real income) to the domestic marginal damage of pollution and defines
the optimal level of emissions e⇤. Given that domestic consumers only account for domestic
benefits of emissions abatement, this outcome is suboptimal from a global planner’s perspec-
tive.
3.4 Diffusion mechanisms and (equilibrium) climate policy
We now return to our policy diffusion mechanisms to formally introduce them in the frame-
work set up above and state our (empirical) hypotheses.
3.4.1 National income, free-riding and trade partners’ climate policy
It emerges from the above non-cooperative framework that one of the primary concerns asso-
ciated with (unilateral) climate policy strengthening in an open economy (i.e. tighter cap on
emissions) relates to the associated loss in national income. In addition, if the economy is large
relative to the size of the world market, increased emissions reduction might lead to significant
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free-riding by non-committed economies as well as ‘carbon leakage’ if its action induces a rise
in the relative price of the dirty good (Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
3.4.1.1 National income
As mentioned earlier, we rule out the possibility that policy tightening by large net dirty good
exporters may lead to a positive terms-of-trade effect. Although it is possible that some juris-
dictions have indeed considered this effect, the record of climate policy development does not
suggest that it has been sufficiently strong to induce significant emissions reduction.20 Under
this assumption, pe ⌘ dpdei = 0 and the income effect of domestic environmental policy tighten-
ing boils down to (1) in equation 3.18. It is therefore strictly negative.
Proposition 4. For given world prices and ROW emissions, a marginal increase in domestic environ-
mental policy stringency leads to a loss of real domestic income, R, of d.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from equation 3.10 and results from the diversion of some
domestic resources to abatement activity in the dirty good sector, which in turn reduces the net
(optimal) supply by domestic producers and diverts some of the world demand to other world
suppliers.21
This result pertains to the domestic economic structure. Given that it is bears no relationship
with decisions made by other countries and that domestic factors are investigated in chapter 2,
it is not studied further, theoretically or empirically, in this chapter.
3.4.1.2 Free riding and carbon leakage
The income cost considered above would be the only concern of a single (small, relative to its
trade partners) economy with no influence on relative world prices and whose emissions (as a
share of the world total) would be too small to induce any significant free-riding.
A large economy (or a sufficiently large group of economies), however, would also account
for the fact that its own (unilateral) emissions reduction might: (i) induce free riding on the
part of other economies; (ii) lead to a change in the world price of the dirty good and induce















20Implications of the presence of international market power for pollution policy decision is considered by
Lovely and Popp, 2011, in the context of SO2 regulation. An extension of the present framework along similar
lines could shed further light on climate policy adoption.
21Moreover, given the concavity in p of the national income function, the marginal value (in terms of national
income) of a domestic unit of pollution increases with the price of the dirty good, which, under certain conditions,
would further reduce incentives for unilateral action. Yet, Copeland and Taylor, 2005 showed that, in addition to
the standard positive incentive to free-ride, a small economy’s reaction to other jurisdictions’ emissions reduction
would depend on the substitution and income effects induced by a change in the relative price of the dirty good.
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where (A) captures the pure free riding effect and (B) captures the leakage effect. The free-
riding effect is negative, i.e. domestic emission reductions induce non-committed foreign ju-
risdictions to increase theirs. This effect induces higher equilibrium emissions or, equivalently,
lower climate policy ambition. The leakage effect is typically assumed to be positive, i.e. a
rise in the price of the dirty good induces non-committed jurisdictions to expand their dirty
sector and to raise their own emissions.22 These effects are particularly acute if the number of
non-committed economies is large.
In practice, however, there is little ex-post evidence that carbon pricing and climate poli-
cies implemented so far have induced significant carbon leakage (see, e.g., Ward et al., 2015).
Hence, we set (B) equal to 0 and focus on free-riding as the main channel of impact of domestic
emissions on ROW emissions.
Proposition 5. Reduced free-riding tightens the domestic abatement equilibrium.





is, more stringent foreign climate policy strengthens the incentive for domestic policy strength-
ening.
Much of the discussion around strengthening climate policy in relatively richer (and larger)
economies has therefore focused on ways to avoid free riding (and carbon leakage), provid-
ing the motivation for calls to increase the number of economies committing to emissions re-
duction and, more specifically, increase the share of world GHG emissions covered by such
commitments.
Prediction 1 The introduction of (more stringent) carbon pricing and other climate change
mitigation policies by partner economies mitigates free-riding and induces more stringent do-
mestic policy.
Unlike leakage, the free-riding problem occurs even if countries do not engage in inter-
national trade. In that respect, the extent of free-riding is only a function of the share of un-
constrained world emissions. However, there is some evidence that countries care specifically
about the (free-riding) behaviour of specific partners, e.g. trade partners (Sauquet, 2014). In
particular, it suggests that commitment to reduce emissions by trade partners raises the prob-
ability of commitment by the domestic jurisdiction, i.e. that domestic and partner’s commit-
ment are strategic complements. Our empirical investigation in section 3.6 will test whether
commitments by trade partners induces more stringent domestic policy by reducing the risk of
free-riding.
3.4.2 Technological spillovers
As section 3.3.4 suggests – and as highlighted by integrated assessment modelling exercises
(e.g. Kriegler et al., 2014), abatement technology – W – is a key determinant of the economy’s
22Copeland and Taylor, 2005 show that leakage is not inevitable. See previous footnote.
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(equilibrium) level of emissions. In particular, under certain conditions, an improvement in
domestic abatement technology reduces equilibrium emissions. To see this, recall from the
proof of proposition 3 that an improvement in abatement technology induces a technique effect
and observe from appendix B.3 that it also induces a composition effect. For a given price of
emissions, the former lowers total emissions in the dirty sector ( ∂G(p,r,e/W)∂e∂W > 0, see proposition
3) whereas the latter raises them. Hence the effect on equilibrium emissions will depend on the
relative intensity of both effects.
Proposition 6. Assuming that the composition effect is smaller than the technique effect, an improve-
ment in abatement technology reduces equilibrium emissions as defined by equation 3.21.
Proof. Formally, the technique and composition effects are apparent in e = i(p, d, W)⇥ x(p, d, K, L).
Assuming that the decrease in emissions intensity (technique effect) more than outweighs the
rise in dirty good production arising from the diversion of resources from the clean to the dirty
sector (composition effect), an improvement in domestic abatement technology shifts the pol-
lution demand schedule to the left and reduces total (equilibrium) emissions.
Therefore, how this technology is developed and accumulated by a jurisdiction plays a
significant role in the evolution of its CO2 emissions and policy activity. One possibility for such
accumulation is the spillover of foreign technological development (i.e. foreign jurisdictions’
abatement technology stock) on domestic abatement technology (Bloom, Schankerman, and
Van Reenen, 2013; Dechezlepretre and Glachant, 2011). These jurisdiction-specific spillovers,
which we denote y are formally introduced in our model by assuming an explicit dependence
of domestic abatement technology on them: W(y) , with i.e. y > 0 and ∂W(.)∂y < 0.
Prediction 2 Higher access/exposure to foreign abatement technology improves domesti-
cally available abatement technology, and strengthens the domestic abatement equilibrium.
In our empirical analysis, we follow Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and assume that the
strength of the technology spillover effect is linked to bilateral trade relationships and that
both import and export flows can affect domestic technology differently (Falvey, Foster, and
Greenaway, 2004). Imports of intermediate goods embody foreign knowledge that is extracted
by the recipient country and contributes to the domestic stock of (abatement) technology. This
accumulation of technology might enhance home productivity, or prompt countries inside the
technological frontier to imitate the products of frontier countries. For example, Lanjouw and
Mody (1996) show that imported equipment is a major source of environmental technology for
some countries. Exports, on the other hand, emphasise “learning-by-doing" and the “pure idea
exchange and knowledge spillovers gained from formal and informal contacts"(Funk, 2001),
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which can encourage more efficient employment of resources or stimulate new indigenous
technologies.23
3.4.3 Updated information
The third channel through which domestic policy ambition can be altered and considered in
this paper is via an update on information about the cost of policy adoption. Substantial ev-
idence indicates that governments often lack sufficient information to understand the politi-
cal/societal cost of economic policy innovation (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) and/or expect the
economic cost of implementation to be significant. In terms of climate policy this can represent
the cost associated with the reallocation of resources from one industrial sector to another or
the political cost of sustaining abatement policies (Mideksa, 2016).
Such perceived costs is likely to delay implementation of (more stringent) environmental
policy. Therefore, a reduction in the expected (fixed) political or economic cost of regulation is
likely to prompt more policy activity or increase policy stringency. In that respect, we under-
stand policy makers as drawing information from two main sources: 1. past (foreign) policy
experience; 2. (abatement) technology deployment and demonstration. First, early policy ex-
perience reveals information about the actual cost of implementation as well as institutional
design features which can reduce them. For instance, at the international level, one can think
of the EU-ETS as playing such role; at the sub-national level, California’s ETS might be thought
of playing a similar role with respect to other US States. Second, the proven availability (i.e. de-
ployment and demonstration) of a (major) abatement technology provides information about
the feasibility of deployment of specific technologies in the home jurisdiction.
To see this in a more formal way, we start by noting that the government’s first decision
(prior to choosing the emissions level) is whether or not to regulate and it will choose the
option that maximises the representative consumer’s utility. In the presence of regulation, pol-
lution is chosen according to equation 3.21 and utility rises monotonically with income. In the
no regulation case, the consumer faces ever increasing pollution which, assuming decreasing
marginal utility of consumption and constant marginal disutility of pollution, implies that util-
ity initially rises and ultimately declines with income – see appendix B.5. If the regulation is
expected to require a fixed amount of primary inputs (K̄, L̄), regulatory activity will not oc-
cur until a threshold level of income, Ī, above which the consumer’s utility under regulation
surpasses her utility under no regulation, is reached. Equivalently, a decrease in the expected
regulatory cost reduces the income threshold at which policy activity is triggered. We define
the expected regulatory cost as E(K̄, L̄) ⌘ F and formalise the above in the following proposi-
tion
23Competition in international markets might drive domestic exporters to acquire and adapt foreign technolo-
gies. Evidence of a ‘trading up’ effect, i.e. the fact that greater exports to jurisdictions with more stringent (environ-
mental) regulations leads to a strengthening of domestic regulations, has been provided by Perkins and Neumayer,
2012 for the automotive industry.
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Proposition 7. A decrease in the expected fixed cost of regulation lowers the policy activity income
threshold. That is, ∂ Ī/∂F > 0.
Proof. See appendix B.5.
This expectation, in turn, depends on accumulated foreign policy experience (ai) as well
as deployment and demonstration of abatement technologies (si). Thus, we write F(ai, si),
with ∂F(ai ,si)∂ai < 0,
∂F(ai ,si)
∂si
< 0. That is, as policy experience is accumulated and/or abatement
technology is deployed, the expected fixed regulatory cost decreases.
Prediction 3 Policy implementation and technology deployment by (partner) jurisdictions
reduces the expected fixed cost of regulation for the domestic economy which, in turn, in-
creases both the probability of implementation and the stringency of (domestic) carbon pricing
schemes.
While the altered payoffs mechanisms are intrinsically related to the relative strength of
bilateral trade or financial flows (e.g. lump sum international transfers), the transmission of in-
formation across jurisdictions is tied to (potentially numerous) communication channels. With
regard to these communication channels, previous literature considered (1) bilateral data (e.g.
trade, number of telephone calls,. . . ) and (2) affiliation data, e.g. membership of organisation,
party to regional agreements,. . . (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) whereas cultural proximity is usu-
ally proxied by language or religious affiliations. This paper considers two channels. First, the
policies of trade partners, as there is evidence that the strength of communication networks is
correlated with bilateral trade relationships (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Second, given that
the EU as an organisation acts as a strong “coordination device" among its member states in
several areas of public policy, involving repeated contacts between their respective civil ser-
vants, we suggest that information about climate policies may have been transmitted more
easily between EU member states.24
3.4.4 Other (economic) channels
In addition to these mechanisms, policy stringency can also diffuse via non-economic channels.
For example, Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins, 2015 suggest that peer pressure can play a
role in the international diffusion of policy (stringency); Frankel and Rose, 2005 further note
that one may observe the international ratcheting of environmental standards: when a “sig-
nificant" jurisdiction introduces more stringent environmental standards, others might follow
suit. The legal literature on environmental policy refers to this effect as the ‘California’ effect
(see, e.g., Vogel, 1995; Perkins and Neumayer, 2012). Though providing a different rationale for
policy diffusion, these effects also relate closely to economic integration (the more integrated
two economies are, the more likely they are to adopt each other’s standards) and relative size
(the relatively larger economy is more likely to be able to impose its standard).
24Note that such investigation could be repeated for other multilateral organisations such as the OECD.
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It is plausible that other forms of (economic) relationships influence the international trans-
fer of policy stringency. One possibility is Official Development Assistance; there is evidence,
if only anecdotal, that several jurisdictions (e.g. Norway, the European Union) are taking
relatively stringent emissions reductions commitment at home and are actively encouraging
other jurisdictions to take steps towards climate change mitigation. Given the importance of
extending climate policy regimes to all national jurisdictions in the world, especially nations
whose emissions are currently growing under the combined effect of population and economic
growth, it would be of significant interest to determine whether donor countries’ policy strin-
gency influence recipients’ policy stringency.
TABLE 3.1: Main hypotheses
Category Mechanism Theoretical Channel(s) Data Source Policy Policy
representation adoption stringency
Altered payoffs Foreign abatement tech. yi IM,EX IMF, 2017 + +
Foreign policy stringency hi IM,EX IMF, 2017 n.a. +
ODA OECD, 2016b n.a. +
Updated information Policy demonstration ai Cult. proximity IMF, 2017 +/- n.a.
EU Authors +/- n.a.
Technology deployment si Cult. proximity IMF, 2017 + +
EU Authors + +
3.5 Data and identification strategy
The empirical challenge ahead of us is now to (1) find appropriate proxies for the outcomes
of interest (carbon pricing and other climate policies) as well as for the altered payoffs and
informational update mechanisms that we identified; (2) evaluate their effect on policy devel-
opments, both adoption and stringency.
3.5.1 Policy developments
We analyse the adoption of both price and non-price climate change mitigation policies.25 Since
we investigate the dynamics of both policy adoption and stringency, policy developments
within each jurisdiction are captured in two ways. First, a binary variable ( ) taking value
1 if a jurisdiction has adopted a given policy (in any sector of its economy) in a particular year,
0 otherwise.26 Second, a variable capturing the stringency of the adopted policy. For carbon
pricing policies, we use the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price (ECP) introduced in chapter 2 –
see Figure 3.2a.27 The proxy for non price climate change mitigation policies, constructed based
on The GLOBE database, 2015, is the cumulative number of policies passed – see Figure 3.2b
25Looking at the latter group of policies is motivated by the fact that carbon pricing schemes are not the only
policy tools that have been implemented to abate GHG emissions. In fact, these policies, however important, are
still relatively marginal when considered in the context of all climate change mitigation policies adopted.
26This assumes that there are only two “policy states" possible and the “policy event", i.e. introduction of a
climate change mitigation policy, occurs once.
27See appendix A for a description of the data collected and the methodology.
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– in the following categories: Energy Demand, Energy Supply, Research and Development,
Transport.
(A) Emissions-weighted carbon price – selected jurisdictions
(B) Cumulative climate laws – selected jurisdictions
FIGURE 3.2: Climate change mitigation policy stringency
3.5.2 Covariates
Now, identifying the source and strength of policy diffusion mechanisms requires that: (i) we
construct variables (L) that capture changing payoff structures and new sources of relevant
information; (ii) we identify the channels of diffusion, along with relevant proxies for the “dis-
tance" between (spatial) units. To account for (ii), we construct diffusion regressors that are
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where Qi,t is the set of all partner jurisdictions of jurisdiction i in year t, Gi,j,t is the partner-
specific bilateral weight in year t, and xj is the partner-specific value of variable x in that same
year. The choice of the bilateral weights matrix depends on whether they constitute a proxy for
a channel relevant to either the alteration of material payoffs or the transmission of information.
The diffusion regressors are presented below.
Foreign climate policy stringency (hCL, hECP) To account for (foreign) climate policy strin-
gency, we use the ECP and the cumulative number of climate laws passed in partner jurisdic-
tions. As noted in the formal discussion, the price of polluting emissions (whether explicit or
not) relates directly to abatement efforts, i.e. the share of resources devoted to abatement. Since
the response to more stringent foreign climate policy might differ depending on whether that
stringency is raised by import or export partners, we distinguish between import and export
channels.




























Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present this metric for selected jurisdictions. This sheds light on the
external effect of CO2 pricing and the significant role played by the EU-ETS for non EU-ETS
jurisdictions.
(A) (B)
FIGURE 3.3: CO2 pricing schemes of import and export partners
Abatement technology spillovers (y) The stock of abatement technology (in partner jurisdic-
tions) is captured by the cumulative count of climate change mitigation technology patents since
1985 (k̄). This approach builds on the literature suggesting the use of patent data as proxy for
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(A) (B)
FIGURE 3.4: Cumulative climate policies of import and export partners
the output of the innovation process (Griliches, 1990) and has been used in recent studies look-
ing at the diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies (e.g. Dechezlepretre, Glachant,
and Meniere, 2013).
In line with our theoretical discussion in section 3.4.2, the technology diffusion regressor is
then defined, for each country-year, as the import- or export-weighted aggregate of all abate-
ment technology stock from trading partners – Figure 3.5.28 The import-weighted measure
captures the embodied technology assumption whereas the export-weighted metrics empha-















Policy learning (aCL, aP) The informational signal that each jurisdiction sends by implement-
ing climate policies is captured by two variables: the number of partner jurisdictions having
adopted at least one non-price climate policy or adopted a carbon pricing scheme (either a
carbon tax or trading system).29 The proxy for the aggregate signal received from all partner
jurisdictions is then:
• the weighted average of all partner specific signals received where the weights are the
share of each partner j’s total trade with jurisdiction i in that jurisdiction’s total trade
28This assumes that technology diffusion is not only a trade-related phenomenon but is also local in nature.
It might be argued that what matters is a global technological pool, in which case technology development data
aggregated at the world level would be sufficient. In addition, note that this proxy relies on the assumption that a
positive correlation exists between aggregate trade flows and those for climate change mitigation technologies.
29Policy adoption is interpreted as a sign of successful implementation.
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(A) (B)
FIGURE 3.5: Climate change mitigation technological stock of import and export
partners
flows














In weighting the received signal by total bilateral (trade) relationship, we assume that the
strength of the signal is related to the total bilateral relationship, which follows earlier
literature (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). As can be observed on Figure 3.6, little climate-
related legislative activity takes place before the late 1990s. Moreover, it is interesting to
note that even countries that did not implement carbon pricing or other climate change
mitigation policies domestically are “exposed" to it (see, for example, Canada and the
United States).
• the sum count across partners affiliated to the same organisation, in this case the EU. To
this end, we construct dyadic matrix recording affiliation to the same organisation (the
EU) for each pair of countries in the sample in any given year between 1990 and 2014.










where EUi,j,t takes value 1 if both countries i and j are part of the EU in year t.
Technology demonstration (s) Finally, our proxy for foreign abatement technology deploy-
ment and demonstration is the cumulative installed electricity generation capacity from wind
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(A) (B)
FIGURE 3.6: Climate policies of trade partners (total bilateral trade)
and solar energy (RE).30 Increased cumulative installed capacity provides evidence of an ex-
isting (and proven) alternative to fossil-fuel based electricity generation capacity.31 As for the
policy learning effect, the signal derived from technology demonstration is modelled as relat-
ing to either
• the strength of the total bilateral (trade) relationship







FIGURE 3.7: Installed renewable electricity generation capacity of trade partners
30This de facto restricts our attention to the power sector. However, given that it is one of the first economic to have
been subject to decarbonisation efforts across almost all jurisdictions, it is safe to consider that it is representative of
the technologies relevant to climate policy making so far.
31Increased cumulative installed capacity also has implications for technology learning. In terms of develop-
ment/diffusion, additional installed capacity increases the stock of technology from which other jurisdictions can
learn and contributes to the reduction of the (unit) cost of the technology through ‘learning by doing’ (Arrow, 1962b).
In the case of solar photovoltaics, for example, IRENA, 2012 finds that costs decline by 22% for every doubling of
capacity.
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Official Development Assistance To gauge whether bilateral development assistance is used
to prompt recipient jurisdictions to introduce climate change mitigation legislation, we con-
struct a proxy for partner jurisdictions’ policy stringency where the bilateral weights are the
bilateral shares of Official Development Assistance (ODA) between recipient and donor coun-
tries. The effect of this variable is tested on the stringency of non price climate change mit-
igation policies rather than carbon pricing legislation because carbon pricing schemes have
been introduced mainly among OECD countries. As before, this stringency is proxied as the
cumulative number of climate laws passed.
FIGURE 3.8: Climate policies of Official Development Assistance donors
Control mechanisms In discussing the diffusion of policies across jurisdictions, it is impor-
tant to control for domestic (political and economic) conditions that could influence a juris-
diction’s adoption of policies (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter, 2008). This, because the observed
adoption outcome(s) could also reflect the fact that similar jurisdictions respond similarly – yet
independently – to the same issue. To control for these we use GDP per capita (PPP, thousand
constant 2011 USD), an indicator of Democracy, and the degree of openness as proxied by the
ratio of total trade over GDP. GDP per capita captures the standard income effect and, assum-
ing that environmental quality is a normal good, should have a positive impact on both policy
adoption and stringency.
3.5.3 Modelling approach
The analysis is performed on a dataset covering 109 national jurisdictions over the period 1990-
2014.32 We thus have (a maximum of) 2725 country-year observations. The modelling approach
32The panel dimension of our dataset is limited by the data on the level of democracy whereas the time dimen-
sion is constrained by the availability of patent data from the OECD.
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TABLE 3.2: Variables’ sources and summary statistics
Category Variable Source Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Outcome - adoption Pricing Author created - 0.12 0.33 0 1 2725
Climate Law Author created - 0.46 0.5 0 1 2725
Outcome - stringency ECP(2013) Author calculations - 1.68 7.65 0 95.21 2725
Cum. Climate Law Author calculations - 2.39 3.67 0 21 2725
Technology stock Patent stock OECD, 2019 IM 79.14 58.2 2.45 439.34 2635
– thousands EX 93.255 81.93 0.05 630.45 2635
Foreign stringency Carbon Price Author’s data IM 2.44 3.36 0.002 26.2 2635
EX 2.25 3.24 0.002 26.06 2635
Climate Laws Author’s data IM 3.69 3.39 0.03 14.1 2635
EX 3.76 3.55 0 14.21 2635
ODA 4.88 4.66 0 17.62 1263
Policy learning Foreign Pricing Author’s data IM+EX 0.16 0.22 0 0.83 2635
EU 1.97 6.39 0 25 2700
Climate Law GLOBE database, 2018 IM+EX 0.64 0.25 0.02 1 2635
EU 1.79 5.01 0 19 2700
Tech. demonstration RE capacity United Nations, 2018 IM+EX 6.44 9.89 0 82.79 2635
– GW EU 8.97 33.36 0 217.08 2700
Control Democracy Varieties of Democracy, 2018 - 0.46 0.28 0.014 0.903 2715
GDP per cap. World Bank, 2016a - 16.46 17.04 0.35 111.07 2687
Trade openness World Bank, 2016a - 78.37 44.68 0.02 441.6 2645
adopted is different for the policy adoption decision and the policy stringency.
Adoption The literature on policy adoption usually investigates such questions with event
history or hazard models. Berry and Berry, 1990 use a panel probit approach, observing the
evolution of lottery adoption over the period 1964-1986 in 48 US States. Simmons and Elkins,
2004 model the adoption of liberal economic policies as a transition between two (mutually
exclusive) states using a Weibull survival model. In these latter analyses, all units “enter" the
sample in a – somewhat arbitrarily – determined year from which jurisdictions are “at risk" of
adopting the policy and “leave" as soon as a failure (i.e. policy adoption) occurs. When looking
at the adoption of domestic environmental policies, several international agreements in which
these jurisdictions have taken binding commitments could be used as starting year. This is
the approach taken in Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000 to analyse the ratification of the UNFCCC
by national jurisdictions following its signature in 1992. However, since the first carbon pric-
ing scheme was adopted before any international legally binding agreement, we follow Berry
and Berry, 1990 and take the year of introduction of the first carbon pricing scheme, 1990, as
our starting point. That is, every country enters the dataset in 1990 and the last observation
recorded for each unit is the year in which the adoption of a given policy (either carbon pricing
or the first ‘non pricing’ policy) occurred. Formally, we have:
i,t = bXi,t 1 + lWi,t 1 + gCi,t + dt + ei,t (3.1)
where i,t denotes the presence (1) or absence (0) of a carbon pricing scheme in any sector of
jurisdiction i in year t, X is the set of variables capturing the changes in net payoffs, W includes
the variables capturing policy learning, C is the set of ‘control’ variables; dt is the vector of time
dummy variables; b, l and g are vectors of dimensions m, n and p, respectively, each element
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of which corresponds to the estimated parameter of the associated explanatory variable. eit is
the observation specific error term.
Stringency Because the stringency of carbon pricing policies is not measured in the same
way as that of other climate policies – the former is a continuous variable whereas the latter is
a non-negative discrete variable – we model these two outcome variables differently. The ECP
is modelled as a standard linear process
ECPi,t = bXi,t 1 + lWi,t 1 + gCi,t + fi + dt + ui,t (3.2)
where ECPi,t is the emissions-weighted average carbon price in jurisdiction i at time t and
fi is the unobserved jurisdiction fixed-effect; uit is the observation specific error term. The
modelling approach used for non pricing climate policies follows that adopted in Fankhauser,
Gennaioli, and Collins, 2015, i.e. a negative binomial fixed-effects model.
CLi,t = bXi,t 1 + lWi,t 1 + gCi,t + fi + dt + ui,t (3.3)
Unlike the adoption equation, equations (3.2) and (3.3) are estimated on the full data sample,
running from 1990 to 2014. In all equations, all covariates except the ‘control’ variables enter
the model with a one year lag to reflect the fact that it takes time for policy and/or technol-
ogy developments in partner jurisdictions to “diffuse" to the domestic jurisdiction and then
translate into policy decisions.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Adoption
The results in table 3.3 show that policy adoption, either carbon pricing or other, is related
to past adoption of the same policy in geographically and/or culturally close partner juris-
dictions. This is consistent with our third hypothesis and suggests that free riding on other
jurisdictions’ climate change mitigation policy initiatives is not a strong driver of domestic cli-
mate policy activity. This effect seems to be of a larger magnitude for carbon pricing schemes
– estimations (1) and (2) – than for non price climate policies – estimations (3) and (4). In-
terestingly, the effect of an EU-related information transmission channel is only confirmed for
carbon pricing policies, not for non price climate policies. Overall, this provides some support
for our policy learning hypothesis and emphasises the potential for (a group of) jurisdictions
to demonstrate the feasibility of specific policy innovations but casts doubt on the idea that
the EU served as a key information transmission channel, especially for non price climate poli-
cies. Similarly, the deployment of renewable electricity generation capacity, which we assumed
carries information about the availability of an abatement technology, relates positively to the
adoption of carbon pricing and other climate policies when weighted by the total bilateral trade
relationship but not when weighted by the EU. The magnitude of the associated coefficient is
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larger for non price policies than for carbon pricing policies – except in estimation (2), where
it is an order of magnitude larger for pricing policies. It must also be noted that, although the
estimated coefficient might seem quite small, trade-weighted installed RE capacity is measured
in GW and the maximum is 165.57 GW. Finally, the results for our proxy of the stock of climate
change mitigation technologies does not allow us to confirm that an increase in the stock of
such technologies in partner jurisdictions fosters policy adoption. Hypothesis 1 remains there-
fore unverified and would require further investigation.
GDP per capita and the level of democracy both affect positively the probability of adoption
of price and non price policies, although the effect of the former is found to be meaningfully
positive in estimation (1) only. It is unsurprising that these characteristics are found to have
a stronger impact on the implementation of carbon pricing policies since these policies have
been introduced among richer countries whereas other climate change mitigation policies have
been introduced by relatively less well off jurisdictions. Lastly, we note the negative values of
the estimated intercept parameter across all estimations, indicating that in the absence of the
(positive) effect of our covariates, the probability of adoption of the policies under investigation
is very low.
TABLE 3.3: Policy adoption
Category Variable Carbon Pricing Climate Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Technology diffusion y(IM)t 1  6.59e 7  1.98e 5 7.71e 7 1.85e 6
(1.72e 6) (1.69 5) (1.24 6) (2.49 6)
y(EX)t 1 6.59e 8 4.47e 6 2.32 7 5.51 7
(1.15e 6) (1.01 5) (6.73 7) (1.36 6)








Tech demonstration s (IM+EX)t 1 1.27e 2⇤ 1.92e 1⇤⇤ 3.27e 2⇤⇤⇤ 6.61e 2⇤⇤⇤
(6.84e 3) (7.55e 2) (1.1e 2) (2.21e 2)
s (EU)t 1 2.66e 2  1.9e 2
(5.86e 2) (2.17e 2)
Control(s) GDP per cap. 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.08 0.0002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.054) (0.005) (0.005)
Trade openness 0.002 0.01 0.003⇤ 0.003
(0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002)
Democracy 2.99⇤⇤⇤ 12.72⇤⇤ 0.44⇤ 0.35
(0.68) (5.014) (0.242) (0.257)
Constant -5⇤⇤⇤ -20.98⇤⇤⇤ -2.52⇤⇤⇤ -2.49⇤⇤⇤
( 0.59) (5.995) (0.236) (0.244)
Year FE No No No No
Observations 2165 2141 1200 1197
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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3.6.2 Stringency
The results in table 3.4 – estimation (5) – indicate that the stringency of carbon pricing policies
was, over the sample period, mainly driven by the past average price in other jurisdictions.
This effect is present regardless of whether the variable is weighted by imports or exports, sug-
gesting that countries with a carbon price are closely integrated through trade. We nonetheless
note that the magnitude of this effect is about 1.5 times larger for imports than exports, More
precisely, an increase of $1/tCO2e in the import-weighted (export-weighted) average price of
emissions is associated with an increase of $0.29/tCO2e ($0.21/tCO2e) in the domestic average
price of carbon. This effect is most likely driven by EU jurisdictions, which have implemented
a common carbon pricing scheme in 2005 but were, and still are, closely (trade-)integrated.
Interestingly, the stringency of foreign carbon pricing schemes seems to affect both the strin-
gency of domestic price and non-price climate change mitigation policies. However, as far as
the stringency of non price climate policies is concerned, the direction of the previous effect de-
pends on whether stringency is increased in import partners (-) or export partners (+), giving
some grounds to the existence of a potential free riding on other jurisdictions’ mitigation efforts
effect. However, the stringency of non price climate policies (whether weighted by imports or
exports) does relate positively to domestic non price climate policy stringency.
The deployment of renewable energy electricity generation capacity, which we interpreted
as providing information about the availability and feasibility of domestic deployment of an
abatement technology relates positively to the stringency of carbon pricing policies, be it weighted
by the strength of the bilateral relationship or by affiliation to the European Union. For ex-
ample, a 100GW increase in the weighted stock of RE installed capacity would, on average,
induce a $7.6/tCO2e increase in the stringency of carbon pricing policies – estimation (5). The
development of abatement technology (as measured by the patent stock) does, however, relate
negatively to the stringency of both price and non-price climate policies, although the esti-
mated effect is only statistically significant in estimation (6) and only for the import-weighted
variable.
The results also suggest that Official Development Assistance and the associated relation-
ships constitute a significant driver of domestic policy stringency for recipients of ODA – es-
timation (7). Indeed, results indicate that an increase in the cumulated legislative activity in
donor countries results in increased stringency in receiving countries. Given the way the proxy
is constructed it is not possible to say whether this effect is driven by particular donor countries
but it could constitute an interesting extension of the present work. Moreover, the coefficient
on the import-weighted foreign non-price climate policy stringency suggests that recipients of
ODA would, on average, lower the stringency of their own non price climate policy regime in
response to an increase in the stringency in their import markets.
Finally, income per capita and trade openness increase the price of carbon by, on average,
$0.14/tCO2e and $0.004/tCO2e respectively. No effect of these variables is detected on the
stringency of non price climate policies, except in the case of receivers of ODA. For these coun-
tries, GDP per capita and trade openness positively affect the domestic stringency of non price
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climate policies.
TABLE 3.4: Policy stringency
Category Variable ECP Climate policies
(5) (6) (7)




Foreign policy hECP(IM)t 1 0.29⇤⇤⇤ -0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.05
stringency (0.079) (0.018) (0.047)
hECP(EX)t 1 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤ -0.03
(0.079) (0.018) (0.034)
hCL(IM)t 1 0.17 0.05⇤ -0.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.15) (0.032) (0.042)








Control(s) GDP per cap. 0.14⇤⇤⇤ -0.01 0.05⇤
(0.025) (0.001) (0.029)
Trade openness 0.004 -0.0004 0.006⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
Democracy -0.25 0.32 0.83
(1.045) (0.351) (0.6)
Constant -1.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.46 11.98
(0.736) (0.479) (292.221)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2438 2390 1068
R2 0.23 - -
3.6.3 Summary and discussion
The analysis conducted above sought to shed light on potential channels of climate policy dif-
fusion and assess their empirical relevance. The results presented provide support for some of
the suggested channels. In particular, we find evidence that policy adoption by foreign juris-
dictions positively affects domestic policy adoption. This is in line with Fankhauser, Gennaioli,
and Collins, 2015. However, we confirm that this diffusion effect may be more subtle than one
might have assumed so far. The analysis indeed shows that two diffusion channels were par-
ticularly important. First, in our sample, climate policies diffused primarily to culturally close
neighbours (as proxied by total bilateral trade). Second, while carbon pricing policies have
clearly diffused among a very specific group of countries, i.e. EU member states, it is not clear
that this has been the case for non price climate policies.
Second, our results also suggest that technology demonstration played a role in policy
adoption. This effect, which has not been discussed in earlier literature, bears particularly
strong implications for the adoption of future (potentially sector-specific) climate policies. In-
deed, it indicates that the demonstration of particular abatement technologies at scale can not
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only foster their adoption directly but also favour the adoption of (more stringent) climate poli-
cies which, in turn, could trigger a higher uptake of the technology. A clearer understanding of
such effects could be gained by extending the analysis to specific technologies and associated
policies. In a world that is seeking to avoid dangerous climate change, this seems a legitimate
avenue to explore.
Third, the analysis provides interesting insights for the diffusion of (non-price) climate poli-
cies to recipients of Official Development Aid. Indeed, it seems that there is a positive relation-
ship between donors and recipients’ respective policy stringency. At this stage, we are only
establishing the potential existence of such a relationship but are not making any claim as to
the exact nature of the channel, a question which deserves further attention. On the other hand,
the analysis did not confirm the role of foreign technology development for either domestic cli-
mate policy adoption or stringency. Such a result may be due to: (i) the genuine absence of such
a relationship; (ii) inadequacy of our empirical proxy. Indeed, the proxy we constructed relies
on the assumption that foreign technological development spills over to the domestic jurisdic-
tion and contributes to the improvement of its own abatement technology stock. As we alluded
to earlier, it may be the case that the transfer of climate change mitigation technologies follows
different channels than bilateral trade networks. If this is the case, investigating the issue with
the proxy used in Dechezlepretre, Glachant, and Meniere, 2013, i.e. the number of patents filed
in country j by inventors from country i, and constructed based on EPO Worldwide Patent
Statistical database could provide a better proxy.
TABLE 3.5: Results summary
Category Mechanism Theoretical Channel(s) Policy Policy
representation adoption stringency
Altered payoffs Foreign abatement tech. yi IM / /
EX / /
Foreign stringency hi IM n.a. +
EX n.a. +
ODA n.a. +
Updated information Policy demonstration ai Cult. proximity + n.a.
EU + n.a.
Technology deployment si Cult. proximity + +
EU + +
Fourth, it is worth recalling that the theoretical analysis and empirical discussions here are
conducted under the assumption of constant returns to scale in both abatement and production.
In the context of our model, constant returns to scale in abatement imply that emissions will
only fall if climate policy is tightened. Assuming increasing returns to scale would introduce
efficiencies related to the scale of operation, which would make abatement more profitable even
with unchanged policy (Copeland and Taylor, 2003). Such effects are currently not accounted
for in our theoretical framework and not tested empirically.
In addition, it is clear that our focus on constant returns to scale in both the dirty and clean
productive sectors prevents us from considering cases where these sectors are monopolistically
competitive. Considering a departure from constant returns to scale in production would un-
cover additional insights with regard to the sectors’ response to both tighter climate policy and
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changes in the international environment. Ultimately, this could lead to more detailed under-
standing of optimal policy formation and policy diffusion mechanisms.
Finally, the specifications presented above only include GDP per capita and a proxy for
Democracy (Polity IV) as covariates capturing the level of development and the quality of in-
stitutions. Yet, the sample includes countries with very heterogeneous levels of development
and institutional quality, and which vary along dimensions that are not necessarily captured by
(or correlated with) GDP per capita and the Polity IV index. Hence, inclusion of such variables
could provide more subtle evidence as to the role played by institutions.
3.7 Conclusion
The last quarter century has witnessed the development of a significant number of carbon pric-
ing and climate change mitigation policies. This chapter holds that these developments are
partly the result of a process of policy diffusion, which rests on (i) the transfer of abatement
technology; (ii) technology and policy demonstration effects. It emphasises the importance of
bilateral relationships for the implementation of domestic environmental policies, providing
a new perspective on the emergence of bottom-up climate “coalitions" and the role that inter-
national institutional ‘architecture’ may play in it. Relatedly, it also suggests that we might
have to revisit our assessment of the multilateral approach to climate change mitigation. In-
deed, although we must be disappointed when international environmental agreements set
lenient targets, there is a possibility that their very existence and architecture fosters the bilat-
eral exchange of policy ideas and/or abatement technologies which, in turn, would increase the
“unilateral" ambition of jurisdictions. In that respect, we believe that the European experience
holds particularly strong insights for future carbon pricing developments. Indeed, integration,
be it through trade or broader institutional arrangements, seems to foster policy diffusion by
enhancing access to technological advances within the integrated group and strengthening the
policy signal.
From a policy perspective, these results are particularly important as they cast a new light
on the external effects of (unilateral) domestic carbon pricing – and climate change mitigation
– policy developments. In particular, in contrast to some of the results in the top down envi-
ronmental coalition formation literature, they suggest that convincing “key" countries to adopt
tighter climate change mitigation policy frameworks might matter for the (simultaneous or se-
quential) policy strengthening by other jurisdictions. For example, the implications (in terms
of policy diffusion and strengthening) of China adopting a more stringent policy regime may
well be much more significant than that of a similar action by, e.g. Vietnam.
In a world where globally coordinated action has failed to deliver environmentally efficient





Identifying innovative actors in the
Electricity Supply Industry using
machine learning: an application to UK
patent data
4.1 Introduction
Over the course of the last thirty years, the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) of several OECD
economies experienced significant structural changes (International Energy Agency, 2000; Nicolli
and Vona, 2019). These changes occurred against the backdrop – and under the impulse – of
two pivotal policy developments. First, the liberalisation of their respective electricity sector,
which initiated a transition from vertical integration to unbundling of electricity supply ac-
tivities (generation, transmission and distribution) and the introduction of wholesale competi-
tion.1 Second, the development of increasingly stringent power sector decarbonisation policies,
which at times came to co-exist with liberalisation agendas.
Liberalisation – and ensuing structural reorganisation of the ESI – had a significant impact
on the innovation activity of its actors for several reasons. First, liberalisation of downstream
stages of the ESI affected incentives to innovate of both downstream actors and upstream Orig-
inal Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).2 Second, liberalisation changed the identity of down-
stream actors, from government-owned vertically integrated entities (and associated research
centres) to private competitive firms, and hence altered the nature of the incentives their inno-
vation activity is sensitive to. Third, these changes were often accompanied by a restructuring
of public energy R&D institutions and a reduction in associated spending. In the UK, public
spending on energy R&D (all technologies) decreased consistently between 1985 and 1999, only
recovering from 2003 onward with increased funding directed at renewable electricity gener-
ation technologies. Finally, these regulatory changes occurred during – and allowed for – a
1This process was first initiated in the UK (Electricity Act 1989) and the US (1992 Energy Policy Act), and
subsequently in the European Union (Directives 96/92/EC, 2003/54/EC, 2009/72/EC).
2Evidence based on US data suggest that downstream liberalisation led to a decrease in patenting activity of
upstream actors (Sanyal and Ghosh, 2013).
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period of increased internationalisation of ownership at every stage of the electricity supply
chain, which affected the location of R&D activities. Indeed, while OEMs were already operat-
ing across borders, supplying parts to non-domestic markets, ownership of firms operating in
the downstream stages of the electricity supply chain which had, for the most part, retained a
domestic focus, was transferred to foreign entities, potentially inducing the relocation of R&D
activities (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011).
With regard to changes in environmental policy stringency, jurisdictions around the world
strengthened direct support for the development and deployment of renewable electricity gen-
eration technologies while at the same time increasing the (implicit or explicit) price on green-
house gas emissions. In the US, while there was little policy initiative on the part of the federal
government, several State legislatures introduced Renewable Portfolio Standards (see North
Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, 2019, for detailed State-level information). In the
EU, and hence in the UK, the first such policy was the directive on the promotion of elec-
tricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market (Directive
2001/77/EC). The transformation of the UK generation portfolio is now well under way, with
the share of electricity produced from renewable sources having risen from 3.5% in 2000 to
24.6% in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018) and 35.8% in the first quarter of 2019 (BEIS, 2019), allowing it to
reduce the CO2-intensity of the said portfolio from 480g CO2/kWh in 2000 to 246g CO2/kWh
in 2017 (IEA, 2018).3
This chapter sheds a descriptive light on the evolution of the characteristics of UK-based
innovative actors in the ESI in the face of these structural changes, based on patent filings at
the UK IPO over the period 1955-2016.4 The focus on UK actors is motivated by both historical
institutional developments and methodological constraints. Regarding the former, the UK has
been at the forefront of key technological and policy developments, making it a particularly
salient case-study for the purpose of our research. With respect to the latter, the scope of our
study is limited by two factors. First, our patent selection approach involves the use of natural
language processing techniques on patents’ title and abstract and therefore requires to work in
a single language (English in this case). Since patents have to be written in one of the official
languages of the patent office at which they’re filed, which may or may not include English,
an extension of this approach to patents filed at other patent offices is non-trivial. In addition,
the linking with business structure database, which we perform in section 4.4.3, introduces an
additional hurdle to cross-jurisdiction analysis in the sense that the universe of firms that such
databases cover varies across jurisdictions.
We make the following contributions. First, we provide a patent search methodology that
uses a supervised learning classification algorithm (random forest) to identify patents pertain-
ing to electricity supply technologies. The classification is based on n-grams derived from the
3Although the UK was slightly below the 2016 EU average (29.6%), this transition represents the 6th largest
increase among all EU member states over that period (Eurostat, 2018).
4At this stage, it should be noted that not all innovations are patented nor patentable (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011)
and hence patent filing counts should not be interpreted as providing an exhaustive account of innovation taking
place with regard to specific technologies. However, to the extent that patent filings follow the trends in innovation
activity, they provide an accurate proxy to capture them (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011).
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patents’ title and abstract.5 This approach allows us to address a standard shortcoming of
keywords-based search, i.e. that the list of keywords is a subjective construction which might
only partially account for the semantic field used by applicants to describe relevant inventions.
In addition, it is flexible enough to allow identification of “lateral" innovation. Second, in con-
trast to a number of earlier studies – see section 4.2 – which focus on the impact of liberalisation
and decarbonisation policies on aggregate innovation trends, we provide an in-depth discus-
sion of the characteristics – and heterogeneity6 – of (UK-based) actors carrying out innovation
along the entire electricity supply chain, from OEMs to distribution companies. Third, com-
pared to previous studies which tend to concentrate on generation technologies, it provides an
industry-oriented perspective and broadens the technological focus so as to include all electric-
ity supply technologies.
The approach taken in this chapter provided us with important insights. First, the inno-
vation activity shifted away from large (integrated) generation, transmission and distribution
utilities to (smaller) equipment manufacturers or R&D firms. Patent filings by universities, al-
though increasing as a share of total patent filings over time, remain marginal. Second, the
distribution of patent filings over the sample period is heavily skewed, with a small number of
actors constituting a large proportion of filings. This is particularly true for OEMs. Third, on
a related note, we uncovered the predominant role played by lateral innovation in the devel-
opment of fossil fuel electricity generation technologies (FF). Fourth, innovation in these tech-
nologies still represents a large proportion of yearly filings. Finally, with regard to UK-based
OEMs specifically, the chapter highlights a number of firm-level (technological) dynamics: (a) a
majority of patents are filed by firms that are active in both fossil fuel and renewable electricity
generation technologies (REN), (b) but ‘mixed’ firms have filed significantly more FF patents
than REN patents; and only during the period 2007-2013 have these firms filed more REN than
FF patents, (c) the increase in REN patent filings observed between 2005 and 2011 went hand
in hand with an increase in the number of (small) technological entrants (i.e. firms patenting
for the first time).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature
and formulates hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents the construction of the dataset and section 4.4
analyses the dataset by (main) actors and technologies. Section 4.5 discusses policy implica-
tions. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Innovation in the ESI – actors, technologies and incentives
Studying innovation activity at the sector level based on patent data presents a number of chal-
lenges. First, it calls for the identification of the intersection of relevant actors and technologies
5An n-gram is a sub-sequence of n-elements constructed from a given sequence. In the case at hand in this
chapter, the sequence is a single string of (stems of) words (comprised of a patent’s title and abstract) and the
elements are the (stems of) words. Hence, for instance, a bi-gram is a string comprised of two (stems of) words.
6To our knowledge, only Noailly and Smeets, 2015 discuss the role of firm heterogeneity in the context of
electricity supply technologies.
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in order to construct the relevant set of patents – section 4.2.1. Second, given the diversity of
innovative actors in the ESI, rationalising the observed patenting trends then requires a distinct
discussion for each of them – section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 ESI actors and technologies
From an institutional perspective, innovative actors in the ESI – just like in any other sector –
can be seen as belonging to one of the following categories: private corporations, government-
owned non profit entities (e.g. vertically integrated utilities such as those existing prior to
liberalisation), universities and research centres, individuals. This classification, introduced by
the Centre for Research & Development Monitoring, 2017, is used in section 4.4.1.
From an industry perspective, the ESI is usually understood as comprising an upstream
stage (OEMs) and downstream stage (generation, transmission and distribution operators). In
its investigation of innovation activity in the sector, prior literature followed this dichotomy
and studied innovation by upstream equipment manufacturers and downstream generation,
transmission and distribution entities separately. This is in part a reflection of the difference in
the nature of incentives to innovate faced by actors in each stage of the ESI. The overwhelming
majority of earlier studies focus on generation technologies and, as a result, mostly discuss
innovation by upstream equipment manufacturers. Relatively fewer studies have investigated
innovation by downstream actors; notable exceptions are Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011; Jamasb and
Pollitt, 2015 in the UK context.
One difference between upstream and downstream actors is that the latter are likely to have
a narrower technological focus (i.e. on electricity supply technologies) whereas equipment
manufacturers may have a more diversified innovation portfolio. Hence, unless these actors
focus solely on electricity supply technologies, one cannot consider all patent filings by OEMs
as pertaining to electricity supply technologies. Identifying filings specific to these technologies
requires us to filter by specific keywords or (IPC/CPC) technological codes.
This is why prior literature examining the innovation activity in the ESI has mainly worked
based on the identification of key technologies and associated technological codes.7 Earlier
studies relying on the identification of specific electricity supply technologies focused primar-
ily – if not exclusively – on electricity generation technologies, a focus justified by the fact
that early policy changes aimed at inducing innovation primarily in generation technologies.
Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010 identifies IPC codes pertaining to renewable electricity gen-
eration technologies whereas Lanzi, 2010 develops a methodology whereby IPC codes for both
general and efficiency-enhancing fossil fuel generation technologies are uncovered. Taken to-
gether, these studies provide a comprehensive list of IPC codes pertaining to electricity gen-
eration technologies, both renewable and fossil-fuel. The present study contributes to a more
complete identification of electricity supply technologies by singling out IPC codes related to
transmission and distribution technologies as well as other ESI-relevant technologies.
7Although the construction of patent datasets based on such an approach would in theory allow for a discussion
around the actors by which they are filed, most studies do not include such a discussion.
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4.2.2 Innovative actors and innovation incentives
Over the period under study in this chapter, innovation in electricity supply technologies was
primarily carried out by three distinct groups of actors: public R&D institutions, integrated
utilities and private firms. Each faced different constraints and incentives and played a differ-
ent role in the development of electricity supply technologies, which we briefly review in this
section.
4.2.2.1 Public R&D institutions and integrated utilities’ energy research
The development of electricity supply technologies over the second half of the XXst century
owes much to the innovation activities carried out by integrated utilities and public R&D
institutions. Indeed, some electricity generation technologies (e.g. nuclear) were developed
through dedicated institutions, which aroused from a commitment by public authorities to de-
velop them. Such was the case, for instance, of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UK AEA).
The Authority, which initially oversaw the entire UK nuclear program, retained responsibility
of solely research activities after a restructuring in 1971 (Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971).
As highlighted by earlier literature (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011) and as
evidenced by our patent filing sample – see section 4.4.1 – the UK AEA played a prominent
role in developing civil nuclear energy technologies as well as other related technologies. Fur-
thermore, Jamasb, Nuttall, and Pollitt, 2008 noted that the decision break-up the energy labora-
tories previously operated by the UK AEA disregarded energy research policy considerations
and was mostly a “side-effect" of competition policy. This had unfortunate consequences for
the UK energy research activity, both public and private, since such large research bodies were
also triggering innovation by private (smaller) entities.
4.2.2.2 Firms
Theoretical and empirical research into the drivers of innovation at the firm level suggest that
(a) the competitive environment affects innovation incentives (Arrow, 1962a; Gilbert and New-
bery, 1982), but the relationship is non-monotonic (Aghion et al., 2005);8 (b) relative input prices
and the policy environment can affect the direction and pace of innovation (Hicks, 1932; Ace-
moglu, 2002); (c) firms’ innovation patterns (i.e. intensity and quality) are heterogenous and
depend on structural industry or firm-level factors (Schumpeter, 1942; Mansfield, 1962; Kamien
and Schwartz, 1975).
8Schumpeter, 1942 initially argued that (near-)monopoly firms in highly concentrated industries would have
higher incentives and be better able to provide innovation than small competitive firms whereas Arrow, 1962a
pointed out that, owing to several market failures, the private provision of knowledge would fall short of the
(socially) efficient level, regardless of the market structure. A later investigation of the competition-innovation
relationship suggested that this issue would be partly alleviated if the monopoly faced credible entry pressures
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Moreover, Aghion et al., 2005 highlighted that competition could have a different
effect on innovation depending on the composition of the industry – if it is mostly populated by neck-and-neck firms,
then increased competition will induce more innovation whereas if it is mostly comprised of leaders-followers then
increased competition might reduce the incentives for followers to innovate and reduce overall innovation.
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Several studies investigated these propositions in the context of the (UK) ESI. Regarding
the liberalisation process, most of them investigated the impact of such reform on the actors
directly affected, i.e. generation, transmission and distribution operators. In the UK, Jamasb
and Pollitt, 2008; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015 note a substantial decline
in R&D in the electricity sector following liberalisation, which they attribute mainly to: (i) the
positive correlation between public and private R&D spending in the UK electricity sector and
the fall in public R&D over the liberalisation period; (ii) the fact that intensity of innovation
activity is related to the (expected) payoff of innovation (Nemet, 2009) – by inducing compe-
tition among actors with low(er) market share, it reduced the market share of each individual
electricity generator, thereby reducing the incentive to innovate.9
As Sanyal and Ghosh, 2013 showed, the introduction of competition in the downstream
generation sector also affected the innovation activity of (upstream) equipment manufactur-
ers. They show that following the Energy Policy Act, patent applications by OEMs at the US
PTO declined substantially. Building on the theoretical framework provided by Aghion et al.,
2005, they propose that this net decline is the result of “a negative pure competition effect out-
weighing the positive escape competition effect arising out of competition among the upstream
EEMs, and the positive appropriation effect arising out of IPP entry downstream" (Jamasb and
Pollitt, 2011, p. 314). The existence of a relationship between the structure of the downstream
generation market and innovation by upstream equipment manufacturers is to be expected
given that power suppliers (i.e. utilities) purchase innovation from upstream equipment man-
ufacturers.
Next to the market structure, earlier literature also showed that market incentives and envi-
ronmental policies affect the direction and pace of technical change. Popp, 2002 finds evidence
that higher energy prices induce innovation in “clean" and energy-saving technologies whereas
Porter and Linde, 1995 were the first to suggest that environmental regulation can stimulate the
firms’ green innovation activity, with Jaffe and Palmer, 1997 providing supporting empirical
evidence to this claim.
The role of environmental and climate policies in shaping technological development was
subsequently discussed in the more general framework provided by the literatures on endoge-
nous growth and directed technical change, with the attention shifting towards the role of
these policies in initiating and/or sustaining innovation in climate-friendly technologies (Jaffe,
Newell, and Stavins, 2002; Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins, 2006; Popp, 2010). We learn from these
literatures that innovation in the dirty or green product depends on the relative strength of the
9However, the development of new abatement technologies is linked to the existence of a demand for such
technologies. The introduction of climate policies supporting such a demand might have counter-acted the nega-
tive effect of liberalisation. In that respect, Fischer (2008) develops a theoretical model showing that government
support for emissions control R&D is only effective if there is at least moderate environmental policy in place to
encourage adoption of the resulting technologies, suggesting that it is the combination of environmental and tech-
nology policies that leads most effectively to a technological transition.
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market size and price effects.10 It also suggests that whether – and to what extent – initiat-
ing such innovation processes requires government intervention depends on the assumptions
made about the degree of substitutability between dirty and clean inputs.11 Empirical evidence
regarding these mechanisms was provided by Aghion et al., 2016 and Calel and Dechezlepretre,
2016, both using firm-level data. The former study highlights two interesting features: (i) that
firms tend to innovate more in clean (and less in dirty) technologies when they face higher tax-
inclusive fuel prices; (ii) that there is path dependence in the type of innovation (clean/dirty)
both from aggregate spillovers and from the firm’s own innovation history.
Finally, other advances in this strand of literature shed light on the heterogeneity of innova-
tors and as a result provided more precise indications about the nature of innovation dynamics.
Klette and Kortum, 2004 suggest that technological transitions can occur both through a shift
of innovation activities within existing firms and through innovation entry and exit; Noailly
and Smeets, 2015 point out that the empirical literature in this line of research documents sev-
eral key stylised facts about innovating firms. Among them are the observations that: (i) the
distribution of R&D intensity among firms is highly skewed, (ii) large established firms are
very active innovators but tend to focus on improving existing technologies, (iii) more radical
innovations are the preserve of small and new entrants.
4.2.3 Framework and hypotheses
The above literature provides valuable guidance for the analysis of innovation patterns by UK
actors. First, innovation by private and public entities is correlated with levels of public R&D
spending. Second, the set of actors performing innovation in the ESI and the relative weight of
each type of actor is likely to have changed as a result of both liberalisation and environmental
policy changes.
With the liberalisation of the ESI and the quasi-disappearance of public research institu-
tions, most of the innovation activity – at all stages of the electricity supply chain – is carried
out by private entities which, in turn, strengthens the need to understand the dynamics driving
the innovation activity of such entities.
Therefore, after reviewing innovation by all actors identified in our sample we further char-
acterise innovation by UK-based OEMs. By linking patent information with business structure
data at the firm-level, we relate innovation activity to the firms’ own knowledge stock, age and
size. Furthermore, following Noailly and Smeets, 2015, we provide a discussion of firms’ tech-
nological heterogeneity, making a distinction between technologically mixed and specialised
10The former encourages innovation in the larger market, the latter encourages innovation for the market with
the highest price. Since the market for the dirty good is currently the relatively larger one, there is a risk that the
market size effect drives the economy towards innovation in the dirty sector.
11If it is low, then permanent intervention is needed. Note that there are several views about this: on the one
hand, the advocates of permanent intervention (e.g. William Nordhaus, Nicholas Stern) and, on the other hand, the
supporters of a middle way, e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2012. Importantly, all views provide a rationale for intervention -
the difference lies in the magnitude and temporality. Note, however, that Mattauch, Creutzig, and Edenhofer, 2015
find that, under certain conditions, a permanent carbon tax is the optimal policy even in the case of high elasticity
of substitution between brown and green technologies.
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firms, i.e. firms specialising in a single (generation) technology or in multiple (generation)
technologies. We expect mixed firms to be larger and older and the bulk of climate change mit-
igation technologies innovation to be provided by smaller, younger new entrants (since higher
energy prices and environmental policy, which became more stringent more recently, should
trigger ‘technological entry’).
4.3 Patent data selection: Identifying ESI-specific patenting activity
The discussion in the present chapter is based on a sample of priority patent applications filed
at the UK Intellectual Property Office over the period 1955-2016.12 This choice is motivated
by the focus of our study, which is (primarily) to identify UK-based innovation. Information
related to these filings is extracted from the European Patent Office, 2018 Worldwide Statistical
Patent Database (version Spring 2018) via PATSTAT online.13
4.3.1 Patent search methodologies
Using patent filings for our purposes presents two challenges. The first pertains to the stan-
dard limitations of patent data (Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2016), which only capture part of
the innovation activity (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011), and hence require that the observed trends
be discussed with due regard to the nature of the technologies at hand as well as the broader
patenting context.14 That is, we need to: (i) understand whether the trend observed at the in-
dustry level simply follows an aggregate trend in patenting or if there is indeed some industry-
specific pattern; (ii) make sure that these filings continue to capture some of the firms’ innova-
tion activity, given that filing at the UK IPO is not the only route available to seek protection in
the UK.15 To see the former, Figure 4.1 shows both the absolute and relative (i.e. as a share of
total UK IPO patent applications) count of patent filings. Over the studied period, both the ab-
solute and relative count follow the same pattern, suggesting that the absolute count of patent
filings at the UK IPO does indeed reflect some industry-specific pattern. As for the latter, there
continues to be a “home-bias" which induces inventors to file the first (priority) patent to the
intellectual property office that is closest to “home" (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). In addition,
given that filing at a national office is cheaper than filing at a regional office, the former allows
12This follows Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011, except for the fact that their sample also includes patents whose priority
country is the UK filed at the EPO and WIPO. However, these latter filings are bound to be ‘duplicates’ and hence
provide little additional information with regard to our objective of identifying UK-based innovative actors.
13The SQL queries used to query the PATSTAT database are provided in appendix C.2.1.
14The first comprehensive account of the economic relevance and availability for research of patent data was
given by Griliches, 1990 but their use, which has grown dramatically over time as both the quality of patent statis-
tics and their availability have increased, dates back to Bound et al., 1984. Furthermore, output measures of the
innovation process are generally preferable to input measures such as R&D spending (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011).
15Patenting at the UK IPO reached an all time high in 1969 (63614 filings) and decreased steadily until today
(22072 filings in 2017). This includes direct and PCT applications. Yet, since the opening of the European Patent
Office (EPO) in 1978, protection in the UK can be obtained via this route too. Total filings at the EPO were initially
marginal (3598 in 1978) and became increasingly popular, especially since the early 1990s (60754 in 1990; 166585 in
2017).
4.3. Patent data selection: Identifying ESI-specific patenting activity 75
inventors to swiftly acquire a filing of which they can claim the priority when they file a patent
at the latter.
FIGURE 4.1: UK ESI patent applications, absolute count and share of total UK
IPO filings
The second challenge arises because of a mismatch between the nature of our study – which
investigates innovation trends at the sector level – and the structure of the patent classification
system – which is based on technical features rather than sector of origin or “destination"(Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). As a result, identifying the galaxy of
patents “relevant" to a particular sector of the economy must continue to rely on ad hoc search
strategies. These usually take one of three forms – actor-based, keyword-based and technology-
based – or combinations thereof (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). In the first approach, the patent
search is based on the name of relevant actors (e.g. utilities, equipment manufacturers, re-
search institutes,. . . ). This, however, must either rely on the researcher’s prior knowledge of
the actors’ names or on international classifications nomenclature (such as ISIC – or its Euro-
pean equivalent, NACE) to identify the firms belonging to specific sectors – see, e.g., Bound
et al., 1984. The former might leave out patents submitted by smaller (and less likely to be
known) actors while the latter might leave out actors whose primary affiliation is not the sec-
tor under scrutiny. Furthermore, while the number of downstream actors is relatively limited
and the UK Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) maintains a list of licensed gen-
eration, transmission and distribution companies, the number of equipment manufacturers is
potentially much larger, which makes a search based on their names impractical.16
The second approach relies on a list of keywords (and combinations thereof) and can be
used for sector and technology oriented patent search. This addresses some of the limitations
16In the US, the Energy Information Administration maintains a list of equipment manufacturers – see Sanyal
and Ghosh, 2013 – but no such list exist for the UK and, even if it did, it might not be exhaustive.
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of the actor-based search but introduces new ones (e.g. subjectivity in the choice of keywords,
inability to cope with strategic ‘naming’ behaviour on the part of applicants).
Finally, a third approach consists in identifying the patents using their International Patent
Classification (IPC) or Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) technology codes. This ap-
proach has been adopted in Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011; Dechezleprêtre and Glachant, 2014;
Lanzi, 2010 and has been the approach taken to establish the EPO-CPC climate change mitiga-
tion technologies classes.17 It relies on identifying the codes associated with the technology(ies)
under scrutiny (i.e. electricity supply), which in itself is not immune to errors and the accuracy
of which is likely to be higher for well-established technologies than for nascent ones.
4.3.2 Our patent search strategy
We develop a patent selection strategy that addresses some of the limitations highlighted above,
minimises the measurement error, i.e. inclusion of irrelevant patents and exclusion of relevant
ones (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011), and is suited to our objectives of (i) identifying UK-based
innovative actors along the electricity supply chain, (ii) identifying their innovation activity,
(iii) supplement IPC classes list with codes relevant to transmission and distribution, and other
relevant technologies. Our strategy, which combines supervised machine learning (ML) classi-
fication and actors-based patent searches, is described below.
We start with an initial dataset containing 346797 patent applications covering the innova-
tion activity in the UK between 1955 and 2017.18 This core patent dataset contains all patents
with associated technology field(s) belonging to IPC categories ‘B’,‘F’,‘G’,‘H’, with application
authority GB and priority country GB over that period. Within that set, our patent selection
starts with a keywords-based search on the patent title using keywords queries presented in
Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011 and aimed at covering electricity generation, transmission and distri-
bution technologies. This search identifies 3072 distinct patent applications.
However, one drawback of such an approach is that it depends on a subjective keywords
list, which may not be representative of the semantic field describing all the relevant technolo-
gies; it therefore may only partially capture the set of relevant patents. To address this concern,
we resort to identifying relevant patents using a random forest classifier on a subset of our core
patent dataset. This subset is the set of patents with IPC classification codes associated with the
patents identified by our initial keywords-based search. In doing so, we hope to include patents
that may be relevant to the ESI but that have been missed due to the use of words not included
in our list to describe the patented invention. The rationale behind this approach being that the
relevant patents that may not use the same keywords should still have been assigned the same
IPC class. The patent applications identified by the keywords-based search are associated with
17See https://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/classification/classification.html for more information about
this classification.
18This is the total number of patents with an abstract AND a title. Our initial patent search, which was truncated
to return only patent applications with an abstract, returned 354760 patents, 7963 of which did not have a title and
were excluded from the sample. In addition, note that we downloaded filings up to 2017 but later truncated our
sample to 2016 to account for a lag between filing and actual recording in the database.
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1936 distinct IPC codes, out of 50711 distinct IPC codes contained in our core dataset. This step
produces a sample of 59757 patent applications, which is bound to include some patents that
do not pertain to electricity supply technologies. Therefore, the last step of our ML approach is
to distinguish between the patents relevant to electricity supply technologies and those that are
not using a random forest classifier. The construction and training of the classifier is described
in appendix C.1. It identified 3498 patent applications, 1811 of which had also been identified
by the initial keywords-search.
This first search is complemented with an actors-based search, which targets only down-
stream ESI actors and relies on Ofgem’s list of licensed electricity generators, transmission
companies and distributors.19 This list is complemented with entities identified in Jamasb and
Pollitt, 2011.20 The search proceeds as follows. First, we search the PatStat Standardized Names
in our original set for matches with entities in our list. Second, we perform a manual check and
remove incorrectly identified patentees.21 This leaves us with 24 actors and identifies 3731 dis-
tinct patent filings. The list of actors for which at least one filing was found is presented in
appendix C.1.
Table 4.1 summarises the results of our patent search strategy, broken down by main cat-
egory of applicants, and offers a comparison between the two search approaches. As it turns
out, most of the patent filings identified by the ML-based search are by original equipment
manufacturers (77%), followed by filings by individuals (15%), the Electricity Council (EC) and
the UK Atomic Energy Authority (2%) – UK AEA, universities (0.5%) and integrated utilities.
The actor-based search, on the other hand, focused on downstream ESI actors together with
some actors known to have played a significant role in the technological development of the
UK ESI (e.g. the Electricity Council and the Atomic Energy Authority).22 The overwhelming
majority of patents identified by this search was filed by the UK AEA (85%), the remainder
of the filings being distributed between generation companies (6%), integrated utilities (5%),
and transmission and distribution companies (0.5%). Taken together, the ML search and the
actors-based search provide us with a dataset containing 8389 patents, of which the largest
proportion was filed by OEMs (44%), followed by the EC and the UK AEA (38%), individu-
als (8%), generation companies (3%), integrated utilities (2.5%). The table also highlights the
complementarity of the ML and actors-based searches as there is few patents that are identified
by both of them. This suggests that the patents filed by the actors identified in this chapter
19This list is publicly available through the Electronic Public Register, accessible at
https://epr.ofgem.gov.uk/Document and contains all documents related to licenses granted under the Gas
Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989.
20Note that we also performed a search based on the names of the Global Ultimate Owners of the entities present
in Ofgem’s list but that few – if any – of these patents were associated with electricity supply technologies. Global
Ultimate Owners were therefore excluded from our “actors"’ list.
21For instance, patent applications filed by ‘BP CHEMICALS’ are removed from the dataset as they are not
related to electricity supply technologies.
22The UK AEA was created in 1954 and was at the time responsible for the UK’s civil and military nuclear
programme, contributing very significantly to innovation in nuclear electricity generation technologies. Following
the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971, only research activities remained with the Authority. The Electricity Council,
on the other hand, was set up in 1957 and tasked to oversee the electricity supply industry in England and Wales.
It maintained research activities throughout its lifetime, especially in fossil-fuel based generation technologies.
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may make use of a (slightly) different semantic field than that used in the keywords-based
queries and that constructed by our random-forest classifier.23 In addition, we note that there
is a significant difference in the filing activity of companies (especially OEMs and generation
operators) and individuals. The former do, on average, file 5.9 patents over the period cov-
ered whereas the latter filed only 1.2 patents on average; suggesting that companies have more
systematic and organised innovation activities leading to sustained patent filings.
TABLE 4.1: Patent searches summary (1955-2016)
Actor type ESI stage KW ML Actors ML \ Actors Total
N. Patents Companies OEM 2364 3677 - 0 3677
Generation 2 3 279 3 279
Transmission - 0 3 0 3
Distribution - 0 13 0 13
Integrated utilities 10 11 222 11 222
Universities 19 26 - - 26
Individuals 496 696 - - 696
EC & UK AEA 20 87 3189 87 3189
Other 160 258 24 0 282
All actors 3072 4759 3731 101 8389
N. applicants/ Companies OEM 456 658 - - 658
assignees Generation 2 2 10 2 13
Transmission 0 0 2 0 2
Distribution 0 0 4 1 4
Integrated utilities 1 1 3 0 4
Universities 14 18 - - 18
Individuals 428 571 - - 571
EC & UK AEA 1 1 2 1 2
Other 88 128 3 0 131
All actors 990 1379 24 3 1400
The number of applicants in the table above is based on an author-created unique entity identifier. It differs from the number of distinct ‘psn_id”s associated with the
identified patents since, at times, several of them refer to a single legal entity. Some patents that have been manually removed (e.g. motor vehicle internal combustion
engine)
Finally, the sample of identified entities spans a wide range of NACE classes.24 34% of the
patents identified by our search strategy are associated with companies whose primary affil-
iation is the NACE “28.1 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery" or “28.11 Manufacture
of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines" class (and not the “32 Elec-
tricity, Gas, and Steam" class), followed by class “25.3 Manufacture of steam generators, except
central heating hot water boilers" – , and class “26.5 Manufacture of instruments and appliances
for measuring, testing, and navigation". This is a reflection of innovation activity taking place
at the level of equipment manufacturers and illustrates the challenges that relying on NACE
classes might pose for the definition of an industry.
23Arguably, it would be possible to design the ML search and train the classifier on a different sample so as to
increase the overlap. This would make sense if the researcher was interested in relying on a single type of search; it
was not the avenue pursued in this chapter.
24Graphical evidence is presented in figure C.1.2 in appendix C.1.
4.4. Whose – and what – innovation? 79
4.4 Whose – and what – innovation?
Equipped with the patent sample presented above we review the patent filing activity in the UK
ESI over the period 1955-2016.25 After a brief review of the general trend in patent application
filings over this period, we first shed light on the actors – or actor categories – from which they
originate; with the view of identifying the evolution of patent filings across all industry actors
– section 4.4.1. Next, we analyse the (technological) nature of these filings, shedding light on
the technological transition that occurred – section 4.4.2. Finally, for a subset of actors, i.e.
UK-based OEMs, we relate patent filings to firm-level business structure data – section 4.4.3.
FIGURE 4.2: Patent applications at the UK Intellectual Property Office, 1955-2016
Aggregate trends are apparent in Figure 4.2, where we observe a clear decrease in to-
tal patent filing activity until the late 1990s, at which point an increase in filings relating to
climate change mitigation technologies (as classified by the European Patent Office, 2013),
brought about a revival in patenting. Put differently, yearly filings at the UK IPO averaged
244 patents/year between 1955 and 1976, and just 74 patents/year in the subsequent period.
4.4.1 Origin of patent filings
The aggregate trends observed above can be broken down according to the actors from which
the filings originate. First, we distinguish between the main categories of patent applicants,
as identified in section 4.2.1. Figure 4.3 presents the yearly patent filings introduced by each
type of applicant, as a share of total applications in our sample. It clearly highlights the im-
portance of three categories of actors: ‘Company’, ‘Government non-profit’ and ‘Individual’.
25Given the existence of a lag between the reporting of patent filings by national patent offices and their inclusion
in the PATSTAT database, we exclude the most recent year in the sample, 2017.
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These categories account for 47%, 41%, and 8% of filings in our sample, respectively. In ad-
dition, the implications of the liberalisation and dismantling of vertically integrated utilities
is indicated clearly by the change in the relative importance of patents filed by ‘companies’
and those identified as ‘government non-profit’ organisations at the start of the 1990s.26 It also
makes apparent the rise in importance of patent filings by ‘individual’ applicants which have
mostly filed patents pertaining to REN technologies.
FIGURE 4.3: UK ESI patent applications, by type of applicant
Our second categorisation distinguishes between actors along the electricity supply chain.
As alluded to earlier, we identify upstream OEMs and downstream generation, transmission,
and distribution companies as well as vertically integrated entities (e.g. Central Electricity
Generating Board) and two key actors of the UK ESI, the Electricity Council and the Atomic
Energy Authority – see Figure 4.4. A striking feature of the picture painted by this figure is the
predominant role played by OEMs. They were responsible for a significant share of total yearly
filings (on average, 105.6/year between 1955 and 1977, 20.7/year between 1978 and 2000 and
52.9 between 2001 and 2016), the rest of it originating primarily from the UK Atomic Energy
Authority and the Electricity Council.
From 1978 onward, patent filings by OEMs decrease slightly faster than those of down-
stream actors, altering the relative importance of each type of actors’ contribution to total patent
filings. Patent applications by generation, transmission and distribution actors at the UK IPO
remained strong until the late 1990s – which corresponds to the full roll out of the provisions
of the UK Electricity Act, while innovation activity by equipment manufacturers started dwin-
dling as soon as the early 1970s. Interestingly, the patenting activity of OEMs remained stable
throughout the liberalisation period and started increasing again towards the late 1990s. By
26This relative change in the origin of patent is somewhat “mechanical" and likely reflects the transfer of assets
previously owned by vertically integrated utilities to private corporations.
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the mid-1990s, OEMs represented again about half of total patent filings and, as patent filings
by downstream actors almost vanished from 2002 onward, it represented an ever larger share
of filings, accounting for most of the recovery in patent filings. Overall, insights provided by
Figure 4.4 suggest that (i) original equipment manufacturers have always played a significant
role in patenting activity, (ii) the relative importance of this activity has grown in recent years
as patent filings by downstream actors dwindled to extremely low levels.
FIGURE 4.4: Annual patent filings in the UK ESI, by type of actor
This aggregate picture, however, hides a more subtle feature: the distribution of patent fil-
ings (among actors) is heavily skewed. This observation matches a well known trait of patent
applications: they are concentrated within the hands of a few key actors, both at the country –
most patents are filed in a small number of offices27 – and sector level – within each sector, a
few key players concentrate most R&D activity and patent filings. This is apparent in Figures
4.5 and 4.6, which present patent applicants over the period 1955-1990 (prior to liberalisation)
and 1991-2017 (post-liberalisation), ranked in decreasing order of number of patent applica-
tions filed. We make a number of observations. First, quite unsurprisingly, the UK AEA tops
the ranking over the period 1955-1990. Second, more interesting is the fact that Rolls-Royce has
filed the second largest number of patents over the period 1955-1990 and the first largest over
the period 1990-2016.28 Over the entire period covered in our sample, it accounted for 41%
27The so-called IP5 group, comprised of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent
Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), and the National Intel-
lectual Property Administration (CNIPA formerly SIPO) in China.
28All of Rolls Royce’s activities were part of a single entity until 1971, at which point its motor car activities were
split from its aerospace, power systems and defence activities. The latter became part of a new entity, Rolls Royce
plc. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the filings of the latter.
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of patents filed by OEMs and 18% of all filings identified over the period. This observation is
particularly interesting given that a number of Rolls-Royce’s patent filings pertain to jet engine
turbines rather than turbines specifically destined to be used in electricity generating power
plants – see next section for further discussion. These filings nonetheless do bear relevance to
electricity generation technologies to the extent that, as noted by Joskow, 1998, pivotal “inno-
vations in CCGT technologies [drew] on complementary research on the development of jet
engines for commercial aircrafts". This also explains the presence of entities like Power Jets
(R&D) and Bristol Siddeley Engines among entities with the largest number of patent filing in
this sample.
Turning to the post-liberalisation period, we observe the effect of both the dismantling of
integrated utilities and the emergence of their privatised successors as innovative actors – with
patents filed by National Power, Drax Power – and, among OEMs, the emergence of actors
focusing on renewable technologies, especially wind – with about a hundred patents filed by
the Danish company Vestas.
FIGURE 4.5: Patent filings, by assignee – 1955-1990
Finally, given the existence of a “home-bias", i.e. “the propensity for the priority country to
be the same as the applicant’s or inventor’s country" (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011), one would
expect most patent filings in a dataset constructed based on priority filings at the UK IPO to
have been made by UK-based applicants. While this is indeed the case, we note that some of
the patent filings in our sample originated from non-UK actors, as observed in Figure 4.7.
This is mostly the case among OEMs, which have historically operated across national mar-
kets and sought protection for their innovation in their non-domestic/ export markets; whereas
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FIGURE 4.6: Patent filings, by assignee – 1991-2016
FIGURE 4.7: Share of patent filings by UK and foreign OEMs
downstream actors remained focus on their domestic markets, especially until the liberalisation
of the sector. For this category of actors, in all years between 1955 and 2000 (excepted 1993),
the proportion of priority patents filed at the UK IPO by UK applicants was above 80%. This
proportion declined steadily between 2000 and 2010, and recovered thereafter. This suggests
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that the increase in filings by OEMs observed between 2008 and 2011 was partly due to the
activity of entities based outside the UK.
4.4.2 Nature of patent filings
The discussion in the previous section sheds light on the (main) actors which have filed patents
over the period under study. We now look at the type of (electricity supply) technologies to
which they pertain. We make two main distinctions. First, between generation, transmission
and distribution technologies. Second, within generation technologies, between renewables
(REN), fossil-fuel (FF) and efficiency-enhancing fossil-fuel technologies (FF-E), and nuclear
(NUC).
In order to allocate patents to specific technological categories, we rely on (IPC and CPC)
technological codes. Depending on the technology at hand, these codes are identified either
based on earlier literature or on our own research. Earlier literature provides the IPC or CPC
codes related to REN (Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010; European Patent Office, 2013), FF &
FF-E (Lanzi, 2010), and NUC generation technologies (European Patent Office, 2013). On the
contrary, technology codes pertaining to transmission and distribution technologies or other
ESI-related technologies have been less documented. To identify these codes, we proceed as
follows. First, we read and review some of the patents in our sample and assign them to spe-
cific technological categories (generation, transmission & distribution, energy storage, other)
and sub-categories (e.g. type of generation technology, core technology vs. manufacturing
processes). Second, we identify, for each technological group, all associated IPC/CPC 4-digit
classes, ranked in descending order of attribution (i.e. the class with the highest number of
occurrences is listed first). Finally, we check the first classes to determine whether or not they
relate to the technology at hand. This leaves us with a set of technology codes pertaining to
our technologies of interest. Table C.3.3 in appendix C.3 provides a complete list of IPC/CPC
codes used to classify technologies in this chapter.
This investigation confirms that not all patents in our sample are, strictly speaking, related
to electricity supply technologies as identified by previous literature. In particular, the sam-
ple contains patents related to jet propulsion engines (and mounting thereof), instruments of
measurement (e.g. radioactivity detection, utility metering,. . . ), manufacturing processes of
engines and turbines, general engineering and pollution control equipment. This is the case
for two reasons. First, the actor-based search identifies patents by their applicant’s name and
therefore disregard their technological aspect. Second, the ML search was designed in such
way that some closely related technologies would be identified.
In our sample, 3731 (44.5%) of patents relate to generation technologies and 248 (3%) to
transmission and distribution. Within generation technologies, 936 (25%) patent filings per-
tained to renewables, 1464 (39%) to fossil fuel generation technologies, 264 (7%) to efficiency
enhancing fossil-fuel generation technologies, and 1067 (29%) to nuclear energy.
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Figure 4.8 presents the evolution of such filings and confirms that the majority of filings was
directed at generation technologies, with very few filings pertaining to transmission and dis-
tribution technologies, except in the periods 1955-1965 and 2005-2015. Somewhat surprisingly,
filings for efficiency-enhancing fossil fuel technologies remained low throughout the period
under study. One also notes that the decline in patent filings relating to nuclear power since
the mid-1960s only partly explains the decrease in total filings, especially since patent filings
for renewable technologies remained fairly stable over that period.
Note that the paucity of filings for innovations pertaining to transmission and distribution
of technologies might not accurately reflect the innovation activity in those technologies as
most of it has been incentivised through Ofgem’s Electricity Network Innovation Competition,
which includes a requirement that innovation outcomes be disseminated and made available
to other parties (Ofgem, 2017).
FIGURE 4.8: Annual patent filings in the UK ESI, by type of technology
In addition to the flow of filings presented above, we can also analyse the evolution of the
industry knowledge stock over time, giving and indication of the knowledge base present in the
UK ESI with regard to specific technologies. We focus on generation technologies. Figure 4.9
presents the discounted cumulative knowledge stock (proxied by the cumulative number of
granted patents) of the UK ESI, using a 15% discount rate across all technologies (Hall and
Mairesse, 1995).29 We note that there is a steep increase in the industry’s patent stock between
1960 and the early 1970s, primarily due to the increase in the stock of patents related to (i)
29Given that our dataset starts in 1955 and that we don’t hold any information about the stock of patent fil-
ings prior to that year, we truncate the time series and disregard the first five years of our sample, presenting the
evolution of the stock from 1960 onward.
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fossil-fuel (ii) nuclear generation technologies. The stock of REN patents initially only rose
very slowly, with the pace of increase rising slightly only toward the late 1970s. Interestingly,
the value of the REN stock does not overtake that of NUC before the early 2000s (1990s if we
include patenting by individuals) and not at all that of FF.
FIGURE 4.9: UK ESI discounted cumulative stock of granted patents, 1960-2016
4.4.3 Actors’ characteristics and innovative output
Identifying trends in patenting activity provides valuable insights into the direction and pace
of technological change but falls short of shedding light on their micro-foundations and, in
particular, the heterogeneity of actors driving these developments. Building on the discus-
sion in section 4.4.1, we analyse further these developments by matching patent filings with
their corresponding legal entity using the patentee information associated with each applica-
tion (provided in the PATSTAT database). The patent filing activity is then analysed in relation
to filing history and firm business structure data such as age (using the date of incorporation)
and size (number of employees and/or turnover). Information relating to the filing history is
based on the patent sample identified above while business structure information is taken from
the Bureau van Dijk, 2018 FAME database.30
4.4.3.1 Matching
Matching patent data with financial data requires that the patents be associated with the correct
legal/financial entity. As highlighted by previous literature, this matching is rendered difficult
by the fact that the recorded patent applicants differ from business entities. Indeed, a given
30Note that the patent applications data cover the period 1955-2016 whereas the business structure data only
cover the period 1997-2016. In addition, our database contains the date of incorporation of each legal entity.
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patenting entity may: (i) file applications under slightly different names (sometimes because of
legal name change), (ii) apply under a name different to the corresponding legal entity, (iii) be
a subsidiary (or plant) of a mother firm.
Regarding these issues, the OECD led an effort to (i) harmonise patent assignee names
(Magerman, Van Looy, and Song, 2006) and (ii) link patent assignees with business entities.
The former resulted in the creation of harmonised names for patent assignees (HAN) – PatStat
Standardised Name (PSN) and associated ID – while the latter led to the creation a commer-
cially available database – ORBIS-IP, Bureau van Dijk– containing both accounting and patent
data. The harmonisation of patent assignee names did not, however, remove all duplicate en-
tries (in some cases, multiple PSN’s continue to refer to a single legal entity). Moreover, the
standardised names do not necessarily correspond to the latest legally recorded name of the
corresponding legal entity. Hence, in the absence of a common identifier linking patenting and
legal entities (Bound et al., 1984; Torrisi et al., 2010), matching patent and business structure
databases remains, despite recent advances, a non-trivial problem.
The researcher is thus faced with the following choice regarding their overall matching
strategy: adopt and automated matching procedure based on secondary identifying features
such as company names and postcodes present in both databases or manually assign an iden-
tifying number to the patentees that is also present in the business structure database (e.g.
company registry number).31 In both cases, the aim is to match all identified patentees with (at
most) one legal entity identifier.
Given that we do not have (bulk) access to the FAME database data, we resort to a version of
the latter option. First, using table tls207_pers_appln of the PatStat database, we associate the
patent filings in our dataset with their patenting assignee, corresponding standardised names
and id number as well as postal addresse(s). Next, we associate (each of) them with their cor-
responding Company Registration Number (CRN), retrieved from the UK Companies House’s
website. The assignment makes use of information on entity name and postcode obtained from
the Centre for Research & Development Monitoring, 2017 Person Augmented Table. However,
since the address information contained in the table did not record the latest address of some
of the legal entities, it was necessary to update that information using Companies House’s reg-
ister information. This allowed to find correspondences between past and current business
register addresses and, given that, a patentee’s harmonised name and a company’s registration
number.32
31The former approach is possible when working with a database like FAME (or ORBIS), which contains current
and past names of legal entities but is not appropriate for Business Structure Databases (business registers) of
National Statistics Offices, which usually contain an anonymised identifier rather than an entity’s name. See earlier
literature, e.g. OST, 2014 execute a fuzzy matching between the EPO patent standardised names and Bureau van
Dijk firm-level datasets (European Patent Office, 2018; Bureau van Dijk, 2018) on a key combining both of the above
features.
32As alluded to earlier, some of the standardised name entries identified at this stage refer to the same legal
entity and are therefore associated with the same CRN. We aggregate at the firm (i.e. legal entity)-level, retaining
the CRN and the entity’s most recent name and each entry is then associated with its patent portfolio and business
structure variables. The matching results in a mapping file which records a legal entity’s psn_id, psn_name, Com-
pany Registration Number. It also records the type of ESI actor (OEM, Generation, Transmission, Distribution) and
whether it was identified by the keywords- or actors-based search.
88 Chapter 4. Identifying innovative actors in the Electricity Supply Industry
Table 4.2 summarises the matching for applicants identified as ‘companies’, leaving out
individual applicants and government non-profit organisations. From Table 4.1, we recall that
there were 677 such applicants. Among those, 428 were identified as UK-based applicants, 180
as foreign applicants, and 69 remain unidentified. In terms of patent filings, this means that
we were able to match 2925 (95%) of the patents filed by UK OEMs,33 all of the patents filed by
UK electricity generation (279) and transmission (3) companies, and 12 out of 13 of the patents
filed by UK distribution companies. Finally, note that 604 (16%) patents filed by OEMs were so
by foreign entities, and 148 patents were filed by applicants that could not be identified either
as a UK or a foreign company.
TABLE 4.2: UK patents/applicants matching summary
ESI Category Matched patents Matched applicants




All actors 3241 428




All actors 0.88 0.63
⇤ Share of total number of ‘COMPANY’ applications or applicants.
4.4.3.2 Innovation by UK OEMs & business structure
In section 4.4.1, we established that the relative importance of OEMs in filing activity had
grown over time, and especially so since 2002. We therefore seek a further understanding of
the characteristics and innovation dynamics of these actors, focusing on those whose activities
are located in the UK.34 In particular, we investigate the patterns of technological entry and exit
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1999), the “technological inertia" (path dependence) that characterises
patent filings at the firm-level, and their relationship with two key firm structure characteris-
tics, age and size.
Following Noailly and Smeets, 2015, we distinguish between technologically mixed firms –
which innovate in at least two types of electricity generation technologies – and specific firms
– which innovate in only one of them. This latter classification is based on the composition of
the cumulative patent portfolio of the firm in the last year of the sample (2016). Technologically
heterogeneous firms are labelled ‘mixed’ whereas technologically specialised firms are labelled
‘green’, ‘brown’ or ’nuclear’, depending on whether their cumulative patent portfolio contains
only REN, FF or FF_E, NUC patents, respectively. Firms that do not file patents in generation
33This represents 80% of patents filed by all OEMs.
34We leave out downstream actors as their innovation activity has been the focus of prior studies, e.g. Jamasb
and Pollitt, 2011; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015.
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technologies but do patent in other technologies are labelled as ‘other’. Within our set of UK
OEMs, 36% of the firms that have patented are ‘green’ firms, 12% are ‘brown’ firms, 4% are
‘nuclear’ firms, 4% are mixed firms. The remaining firms (46%) filed patents only in non-
generation technologies.
Figure 4.10 shows the number of patent filings by each type of firm. Filings by technologi-
cally mixed firms have consistently outstripped filings by either their brown or green counter-
parts (except in 2007-2010 and 2012-2013). Given that these constitute only 3% of the firms in
our sample, it suggests that, on average, they have a larger patent portfolio than technologi-
cally specialised ones. Moreover, Figure 4.11 suggests that this portfolio is skewed towards FF
and FF-E electricity generation technologies: REN filings by mixed firms remained below the
number of filings for FF and FF-E generation technologies in every single year in the sample
and are extremely few. Interestingly, these filings exhibit an extremely strong correlation with
patent filings pertaining to jet engine turbines, which further supports our claim that the tech-
nological development of FF technologies was ‘complementary’ to an existing knowledge base
in the UK industry.
FIGURE 4.10: Patent applications by UK OEMs, by firm type
In light of the total number of REN patents filed by OEMs over the period, and especially in
the years 2000-2010, the above observations suggest that the notable increase in patent filings
for these technologies has been driven mostly by new (technological) entrants focusing specif-
ically on them rather than by (older) mixed firms. This warrants a closer look at entry and exit
dynamics.
The technological entry of a firm is defined as the first year in which it files a patent in the
technological categories under consideration in our sample, regardless of its patenting history
with respect to other technologies. Exit, on the other hand, is defined with respect to its dis-
counted cumulative stock of patents: a firm is considered to exit the technological innovation
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FIGURE 4.11: Patent applications by mixed UK OEMs
market if the said stock reaches 0. It is calculated in the same way as at the industry-level us-
ing to the perpetual inventory method with a discount rate of 15% (Hall and Mairesse, 1995).
Figure 4.12 presents the evolution of technologically active OEMs over the period 1955-2016.
FIGURE 4.12: Technologically active firms, by firm type
The trends depicted indicate a rapidly increasing number of firms active in FF technologies
until the early 1970s, corresponding to the development of fossil fuel fired power plants post
WWII and public R&D funding for fossil fuel technologies – see figure 4.13. This increase is
sustained – albeit more moderately – through the late 1980s, at which point the number of ac-
tive brown firms starts decreasing steadily until it stabilises just above 20 in the late 2000s. The
number of active mixed and nuclear firms follow a similar upward trend until 1980, at which
point they both stabilise at 16 active firms. In the early 2000s, the number of active nuclear
firms starts decreasing steadily. Finally, the number of active green firms grew steadily but
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slowly between 1958 and the mid-1990s, before experiencing an almost exponential increase
from 1995 onward.
This is reflected in (technological) entry rates, which were significantly higher than the av-
erage during the years 2005-2011 for green firms than during the rest of the period. The av-
erage entry rate over the period 1960-2016 is 4.4% whereas it was 11.1% between 2005 and
2011. Given the large number of green OEMs filing patent applications since 2002 – above 5
in every single year – this implies that several of these applicants were new entrants, each fil-
ing on average a small number of patents. Table 4.3 provides further precision with regard
to that observation. In every single year of our sample, green firms have indeed, on average,
filed less patents than brown firms. In addition, there also seems to be a difference between
firm type as mixed firms filed, on average, a higher number of both REN and FF patents than
technologically specialised firms.
TABLE 4.3: Firm patenting activity: summary
Variable Firm type Mean Median

























Finally, we relate these observations to some of the firms’ own characteristics. First, the
literature on directed technical change reviewed above suggests the existence of a path depen-
dency in innovative activity – see also (Crespi and Scellato, 2015). Using firm-specific (dis-
counted) knowledge stocks based on their patents filing history since 1955 (calculated, as in
section 4.4.2, with the perpetual inventory method and a 15% discount rate), we investigate
the correlation between a firm’s knowledge stock and it’s patenting activity. This correlation
is positive across all firm types, and is highest for technologically mixed firms (0.84), followed
by that for brown (0.66) and green (0.57) firms. The lower correlation observed for green firms
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is somewhat unsurprising given that most of them are recent innovators and have not been
found to be the source of sustained innovation thus far.
Second, we investigate the relationship between innovation and firm age and size in our
sample. While age (based on the date of incorporation) and innovation history are available
for all years in our sample, our proxies for firm size (employees/turnover) are only available
for the period 1997-2016. Even if a discussion of causal links between these variables and the
probability of patenting in one or the other technological category is beyond the scope of this
study, we can nonetheless provide some empirical evidence. In particular, we look at the value
of these variables at the time of technological entry, broken down by firm type.
The evidence provided in Table 4.4 suggest that green and mixed firms were on average 9
years old at the time of their first patent filing whereas brown firms were significantly older,
14 years old on average. However, on average, green firms were smaller than brown firms but
larger than mixed firms at the time of their first patent filing.
TABLE 4.4: Firm characteristics at time of first patent filing, by firm type
Variable Firm type Count Mean Std. dev. Median Min. Max.
Firm age Green 106.0 9.72 13.62 4.0 0.0 92.0
Brown 14.0 18.57 18.5 8.0 0.0 50.0
Mixed 3.0 34.0 3.61 33.0 31.0 38.0
Nuclear 1.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Other 78.0 15.923 20.82 8.0 0.0 117.0
Employees Green 20.0 715.25 2214.48 64.5 3.0 9989.0
Brown 7.0 13156.29 29535 1633.00 55.0 80000.0
Mixed 3.0 37633.33 2136.2 38500.0 35200.0 39200.0
Nuclear 1.0 2614 2614 2614.0 2614.0
Other 37.0 2134.16 5548.41 534 3.0 32479.0
Turnover (GBP) Green 24.0 60310.5 187918.85 6105.0 1.0 924700.0
Brown 7.0 2597907.0 6292723.56 241300.0 6425.0 16864000.0
Mixed 3.0 7380333.33 2628317.02 5939000.0 5788000.0 10414000.0
Nuclear 1.0 785200.0 785200.0 785200.0 785200.0
Other 37.0 965798.11 3323126.41 71663.0 70.0 19079000.0
4.4.3.3 Innovation by UK OEMs & external drivers
This section discusses the trends highlighted in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3 in light of some of policy
and market factors that could affect them. First, we note that the pattern of patent filing, both
in aggregate and at the technology-level, continues to exhibit co-movement with public energy
R&D spending. This is in line with, e.g.,Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010; Dechezleprêtre and
Glachant, 2014, which find a positive effect of publicly funded R&D on patenting, and with the
evidence of spillovers between academic research and some types of government R&D and the
private sector.
In addition, as noted by (Popp, 2017), governments around the world continue to use en-
ergy R&D budgets as a key policy tools, not least as part of their climate change mitigation
strategies. This line of work reminds us that, however central R&D by private institutions is
to knowledge accumulation, innovation by and the role of other energy “research institutions"
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FIGURE 4.13: Public energy R&D spending and patent filings, by technology
(e.g. national laboratories,. . . ) in sustaining the industry’s aggregate innovating activity can-
not be ignored. In fact, “research not only funded but also performed by the government does
appear to play an important translational role linking basic and applied research." (Popp, 2017)
Second, our review of the literature also pointed at the importance of the market environ-
ment for firms’ innovation activity. In particular, we highlighted the relevance of (i) market
incentives (e.g. oil prices) (ii) public policies (e.g. climate policy). Figure 4.14 shows patent
filings in REN technologies together with a fossil fuel price index for the UK and the nominal
EU ETS allowance price (in EUR/tCO2e) taken from chapter 2. The co-movement is apparent.
4.5 Discussion and policy implications
The analysis presented above discussed the trends in patent filings in the UK Electricity Supply
Industry over the period 1955-2016. This analysis identified the set of UK-based actors from
which these filings originate and, in particular, shed a more precise light on innovation activity
by upstream original equipment manufacturers. The trends identified in the sample of patents
used in this study confirms the decline of innovation by downstream UK ESI actors and the
shift of this activity toward upstream OEMs. The shift out of the UK of innovation by down-
stream actors following liberalisation and their passage into foreign ownership was already
documented (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011) but this study presents a further confirmation of this
observation.
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FIGURE 4.14: UK OEMs REN patent applications and fossil fuel & carbon prices
(1978-2016)
Second, the first part of the analysis also highlights the role of a few large public (e.g. UK
AEA) or private (Rolls-Royce Plc) actors in the development of specific technologies. The
UK AEA was instrumental in the development of nuclear electricity generation technologies
whereas Rolls-Royce, building on its expertise in the design of jet engine turbines, played a
crucial role in the development of fossil-fuel based electricity generation technologies. This
highlights that large institutions have the potential to trigger innovation activity among a large
set of actors across the industry, strengthening the case for (public) support for these institu-
tions. Further evidence of this observation could be obtained by looking at the co-patenting
activity of these actors.
Next, we observed that a conjunction of increased UK energy R&D spending, strengthened
climate policy and high fossil fuel prices might have induced an acceleration of innovation
activity between 2006 and 2010, especially by generating a high number of small new (tech-
nological) entrants in REN technologies. Indeed, a notable observation of this analysis was
that innovation in renewable generation technologies has been brought about by new, small
and technologically specialised firms; which might have been helped by the lower sunk cost
to R&D in such technologies compared to FF or NUC electricity generation technologies. The
immediate policy implications of these observations is that in order to sustain innovation in
these technologies, governments ought to (i) tailor policies in ways that specifically support
(the growth of) young, small firms, (ii) keep barriers to entry low.
However, the revival in priority patent filings pertaining to these technologies does not
seem to have been sustained, questioning whether the UK policy environment was appropri-
ate to turn these firms into sources of sustained innovation.35 Moreover, while a significant
35We note, however, that part of this decrease in filing activity might be related the maturity of technologies,
which in itself might lead to a decrease in the propensity to patent and hence to lower patent filing activity (Haupt,
Kloyer, and Lange, 2007; IEA, 2019).
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proportion of recent innovation activity was directed at REN technologies, filing in FF tech-
nologies has continued, suggesting that little reallocation of R&D resources has taken place
within firms. This should concern policy makers looking to make the power sector quickly
transition to REN technologies. Hence, improving our understanding of how to incentivise
within firm resource (re)allocation constitutes an important research theme.
Finally, we reemphasise the scope of the study and point to additonal avenues for further
research. First, the analysis was based on a sample of priority patent filings at the UK Intel-
lectual Property Office. While this is in line with the objective of the study, it is important to
note that these filings might not represent all filings by UK-based actors. Indeed, these entities
may have filed (priority) patents either at other national patent offices, at the European Patent
Office or at the World Intellectual Property Office. In that respect, searching for all priority
patent filings by the actors identified in this study (based on their PATSTAT psnid) could shed
further light of the results discussed here. Second, we note that the set of patenting actors
was identified based on a sample of patents retrieved through an ML and actors-based search.
This approach implies that we have identified actors that have filed at least one patent over
the period 1955-2016 but that we do not observe actors relevant to the ESI but that have not
filed any patent over the period. In other words, our sample provides information about the
intensive margin rather than the extensive patenting margin. Third, the discussion presented
in this chapter pertains specifically to the filing dynamics. As such, this study can’t shed light
on the value of the decline of institutions like the UK AEA or Electricity Council.
4.6 Conclusion
The world’s commitment to keeping global average temperature increase below 2 C makes the
further reduction of GHG emissions by the electricity supply industry in developed and de-
veloping economies alike an absolute necessity; even more so if the decarbonisation of other
sector of the economy is to be achieved by their ‘electrification’. This will require further de-
ployment of existing CO2-abating technologies and the development of new ones. However,
the latest patent filing data available suggests that innovation by UK-based actors has slowed.
Moreover, among these declining filings, those related to FF technologies have picked up again.
These trends must be reversed.
Given the predominant role that OEMs seem to have recently acquired, understanding the
innovation patterns of these entities is of the essence. In this respect, the above analysis high-
lighted a few salient observations: (a) a majority of patents are filed by firms that are active in
both fossil fuel and renewable electricity generation technologies (REN), (b) but ‘mixed’ firms
have filed significantly more FF patents than REN patents; and only during the period 2007-
2013 have these firms filed more REN than FF patents (c) the increase in REN patent filings
observed between 2005 and 2011 led to an increase in the number of technological entrants (i.e.
firms patenting for the first time).
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The evidence available so far shows that while prior policies have been successful at trigger-
ing technological entry, it has failed to create a (self-)sustained stream of innovation in “green"
electricity supply technologies. Hence, the analysis suggests that any successful policy aiming
at reversing the above trends ought to focus on supporting young, new entrants and turn them
into sources of sustained innovation. This is especially important given that, at present, there
is no large (UK-based) innovation actor in such technologies that could play a similar role as
Rolls-Royce did for fossil fuel-based technologies.
Finally, we note that, historically, in the UK and other OECD economies, this innovation
activity has originated from a variety of actors, ranging from government-owned vertically
integrated utilities or research bodies to private entities, especially original equipment man-
ufacturers and that innovation activity across this range of actors has been closely related to
public authorities’ strategic technological choices and energy R&D funding.
Given that other electricity supply systems may, now or later, find themselves at a similar
stage of their transition to a decarbonised electricity generation portfolio as the UK, its experi-




Anthropogenous climate change represents an unprecedented threat – both in scale and nature
– to the well-being of Humanity. Unabated accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere will lead to changes in global and regional climate patterns that are likely to put extreme
pressure on human populations and threaten the viability of many natural life-supporting sys-
tems (IPCC, 2014). In December 2015, the international community agreed to limit the increase
in global average temperature to well below 2 C in an attempt to increase the chances of avoid-
ing the most adverse effects of climate change. The results of this thesis suggest that the current
mitigation regime, comprised of a mesh of international multilateral environmental agreements
and national policies, is inconsistent with that objective.
This, together with insufficient technological advances in GHG-abating technologies, means
that the world is still without an insurance policy to hedge against the possibility of catas-
trophic climate change. To achieve the objective of the Paris Agreement, and the UNFCCC
more broadly, further policy and technology developments are needed.
This thesis was started out of an acknowledgement of this observation and the strong desire
to understand how to (i) strengthen climate policy ambition and (ii) accelerate the technological
transition to GHG-free technologies. With regard to the former, we explored the role of two
sets of factors, the domestic political economy and the international environment, which the
available evidence suggested had played a prominent role in shaping policy developments
over the last 30 years. Regarding the latter, we investigated the role of firm-level innovation
dynamics in electricity supply technologies, which are key to the achievement of economy-
wide decarbonisation, in the United Kingdom.
As our discussion draws to a close, it is time to review the insights gained throughout.
5.1 Assessing climate policy ambition: carbon pricing
In pursuing our objectives, something became clear very quickly: that an improved under-
standing of the dynamics we were trying to uncover could only be built on the footing of a
more robust assessment of the policies that are to be part of jurisdictions’ climate change miti-
gation policy toolbox.
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We undertook to build such an assessment for one type of climate policy: carbon pricing.1
This resulted in the creation of an economy-wide emissions-weighted price and its calculation
for 135 national jurisdictions and 63 North American sub-national jurisdictions. Given that a
growing number of national and sub-national jurisdictions are adopting carbon pricing mech-
anisms, this standardised approach to their assessment constitutes a significant step forward
in the understanding of climate policy developments.
This standardised metric allowed us to uncover a prime instance of the inconsistency be-
tween the world’s stated global average temperature warming objective and currently imple-
mented policies. Indeed, as of 2018, the world’s average carbon price remains extremely low, at
about 1.5USD/tCO2e. This evidence provides a striking summary of the difficulty with which
jurisdictions around the world have moved forward with the introduction of policies putting
an explicit (and easily observable) price tag on GHG emissions.
The discussion in chapter 2 found that this weakness is rooted in two main sources. First,
relatively high “flagship" nominal carbon prices in some jurisdictions are weakened by both
sectoral price and coverage exemptions. Indeed, the move towards carbon pricing or the
strengthening of existing schemes has been characterised by significant inertia and the pas-
sage of the required legislation has encountered substantial political economy hurdles, which
could only be overcome using such exemptions.
Second, jurisdictions that do price carbon represent a small and/or shrinking share of world
GHG emissions.2 For instance, the GHG emissions of the European Union (EU), which repre-
sented 17% of world emissions in 1990, fell to 9% in 2016 (Gutschow, Jeffery, and Gieseke,
2019). Hence, even if the EU started pricing a significant share of its domestic CO2 emissions
in 2005, and in spite of a recent increase in the price of European Emission Allowances due to
the latest reform of the EU-ETS, its domestic contribution to the resolution of the global stock
externality might be limited.
Yet, one should not underestimate the value of early experiments. Not only did these policy
developments lead, in some cases, to significant emissions reductions but they also constitute
an invaluable source of institutional knowledge to build on when it comes to strengthening
the national and international climate change mitigation policy regime. It is precisely in this
knowledge and evidence that we tapped in order to build a further understanding of how to
tackle the political and technological inertia that have hindered emissions reduction so far.
1While a standardised assessment of at least some of the most important policies put forward by jurisdictions
would be welcome, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. The Climate Action Tracker, a consortium, currently tracks
the existing emissions reduction policies and pledges of 32 countries representing about 80% of world emissions. It
seeks to improve the cross-national comparability of action and highlight the emissions gap between these actions
and what is required to achieve the objective of the Paris Agreement.
2The introduction of a national cap-and-trade system by China may change this state of affairs. China’s GHG
emissions have come to represent a growing share of world emissions over time, from 11% in 1990 to 27% in 2016
(Gutschow, Jeffery, and Gieseke, 2019). The system is due to start operating in 2020.
5.2. Political and technological inertia 99
5.2 Political and technological inertia
5.2.1 Domestic hurdles
Equipped with this more robust assessment tool, we sought to uncover drivers of climate policy
ambition in a systematic manner.
We first developed an improved understanding of the domestic political economy of carbon
pricing policies. As was argued in chapter 2, limiting our focus to carbon pricing was justified
by (i) the fact that political economy dynamics are specific to the nature and design of the policy
tool at hand; (ii) carbon pricing policies have recently either been implemented in an increased
number of jurisdictions or considered for implementation.
It became clear through our research that the implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms
involved two distinct decisions, potentially affected by different dynamics: a decision as to
whether or not to introduce such a policy, i.e. a participation decision, and a decision as to its
stringency, i.e. price level and coverage. We therefore conducted our analysis by drawing a
distinction between the dynamics of policy adoption and stringency. As noted earlier, this had
non-trivial implications for our empirical strategy.
The results of the analysis in chapter 2 indicate that political economy constraints mostly
affected the implementation of carbon pricing policies, with little identified effect on the ac-
tual stringency. The stringency of these policies was, however, identified as a highly persis-
tent process. The analysis led us to two conclusions. First, the successful passage of carbon
pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-
intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if domestic political econ-
omy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple
instruments.
This chapter also offers a number of corollary insights, one of which being that a carbon
pricing initiative by a single significant emitter can get us a long way in raising the world’s
average price tag on carbon and levelling the policy playing field. For instance, when China’s
emissions trading scheme comes online, an additional 9% of world emissions will be subject to
a price (World Bank, 2019). Should these emissions be priced at, say, 5USD/tCO2e, the world
price would be raised by a third compared to its current level. This, however, would only
account for the direct effect; but one could expect that such a move would trigger spillovers
beyond China’s borders, potentially inducing other jurisdictions to introduce or increase their
own carbon price.
Another notable observation is that, until now, jurisdictions that did implement carbon
pricing policies either had limited trade relationships with large emitters or acted jointly within
the remit of relatively integrated trading blocks (e.g. the EU). This suggests that jurisdictions
that consider implementation or strengthening of carbon pricing mechanisms ought to pay due
attention to the nature and relative size of their trade relationships and consider carefully the
implementation of policies such as carbon border adjustment to enhance the effectiveness of
their domestic policy.
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5.2.2 International dynamics
There is much to bet that these domestic developments will have an impact on other jurisdic-
tions. This, in essence, is the motivation behind the approach taken in chapter 3. When devel-
oping climate change mitigation policies, jurisdictions should not only consider their domestic
impact but also the ways through which they could provide additional incentives for other
jurisdictions to follow suit. At a time where the world is looking for ways to raise collective
climate policy ambition, these considerations cannot be eluded.
The analysis in chapter 3 suggests that processes of policy learning as well as technology
deployment have been at play in the recent diffusion of climate policies. In particular, it sug-
gested that these effects were related to the strength of bilateral relationships. Any (renewed)
international effort aiming at strengthening climate policy regimes around the world should
therefore seek to leverage existing pools of policy experience and technology, both local and
global. Exactly how – and how quickly – this experience is shared among jurisdictions will
determine the speed at which new carbon pricing mechanisms – and indeed climate change
mitigation policies – will be adopted.
Yet, even though these mechanisms might be present for any jurisdiction, their strength
will never be as great as when a larger emitter with significant trade (and other) ties with other
jurisdictions takes the lead in providing credible policy or technological commitments.
5.2.3 Directed – and sustained – technological change
The role granted to technology (diffusion) in chapter 3 set the scene for the last chapter of
the present thesis. If it is to play such a crucial role in raising climate policy ambition across
jurisdictions, then gaining in depth understanding of technology development / innovation
dynamics in countries that are likely to have a significant impact on the world’s technological
trajectory is of the essence. Moreover, on the road to a less GHG-intensive future, it is unlikely
that restrictive emissions policies alone will provide a robust and politically viable insurance
policy. Sustained innovation in GHG-free and GHG-abating technologies is required. In fact,
breaking the fossil-fuel technological inertia might help to overcome domestic political dead-
locks.
But decades of development of fossil fuel technologies make the shift to GHG-free ones
difficult. It requires a resolute commitment to their development and deployment, not least
by public authorities, until they have benefitted from sufficiently large learning effects so as to
reduce their cost and face sufficiently large market demand to provide incentives for further
innovation.
The analysis in chapter 4 indicated that the recent increase in innovation activity in electric-
ity supply technologies originated overwhelmingly from small upstream Original Equipment
Manufacturers, which were new (technological) entrants but that after a temporary surge, in
part driven by policy intervention, UK-based innovation in GHG-abating electricity supply
technologies has decreased again.
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5.3 Raising collective climate policy ambition
Raising individual, and ultimately collective, climate policy ambition requires us to explore the
dynamics governing both institutional and technological changes. We started our analysis with
the intention to shed further light on these dynamics and each of the chapters in the present
thesis make a contribution toward that goal. The conclusions reached in these chapters allow
to draw some lessons about how to raise climate policy ambition.
In light of the insights gained from the analysis in chapters 2 to 4, we believe that any
attempt at raising individual and collective ambition should be guided by the following prin-
ciples. First, successful implementation of climate change mitigation policies requires an in-
depth knowledge of the local political economy context. This is in order to design policies that
circumvent potential opposition from incumbents whose income derives from GHG-emitting
technologies.
In this regard, a salient observation made through the analysis is that jurisdictions that suc-
cessfully introduced carbon pricing schemes directly addressed the economic loss that targeted
sectors would suffer from, be it by supporting the development of new, less CO2-intensive,
technologies – and thereby de facto weakening opposition to more stringent policy prior to their
attempted introduction – or by institutionalising the (financial) compensation of key actors in
the affected sectors.
An instance of this approach is the strategy adopted in the European Union, which initiated
support for renewable electricity generation technologies in 2001 and subsequently introduced
its Emissions Trading System, with due compensation of covered incumbents through the ini-
tial grandfathering of emissions allowances.
Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail and/or manifest themselves
more strongly with respect to policies putting an explicit price on GHG emissions, weakening
them in ways incompatible with emissions reduction targets, climate change mitigation strate-
gies will require multiple instruments, both price and non-price based ones. For example, in
the power sector, support schemes for the deployment of renewable electricity generation tech-
nologies such as feed-in-tariffs or renewable portfolio standards contribute to the reduction of
emissions, yet present the political advantage of having a cost less visible to electricity con-
sumers.
In an extreme case, one could think of carbon pricing mechanisms, especially quantity-
based systems, as backstops to the rest of a jurisdiction’s climate change mitigation policy port-
folio. In such a case, emissions reduction is mostly triggered by other sectoral or economy-wide
policies, while the quantity system ensures the creation of the appropriate price signal so that
it stays within the carbon budget in case the other policies do not deliver as expected.
Third, in the quest to increase collective climate policy ambition, jurisdictions, especially
the larger ones, should pay more attention to the external effects of their domestic policy de-
cisions. Earlier literature and new evidence presented in this thesis suggests that (unilateral)
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domestic developments, especially by large economies, can spill-over beyond domestic bor-
ders. In particular, chapter 3 suggests that there could be strong external benefits to technolog-
ical and institutional demonstration undertakings by (small groups of) countries. This is why
early policy developments in the EU and more recent developments in countries like China are
particularly important.
This last observation is aligned with a strand of literature exploring the role of club benefits
in the development of effective international strategies to reduce global emissions (Victor, 2011;
Victor, 2015). Indeed, a substantial body of work has argued that creating collective technolog-
ical benefits (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997; Buchner et al., 2005) or raising barriers (Nordhaus,
2015) could help overcome the international free-riding problem. Furthermore, recent discus-
sion has focused on how initially timid institutional and technological developments (Pahle
et al., 2018) or initiatives by initially small groups of countries (Falkner, 2015) can pave the way
for more ambitious objectives and enlarged participation.
5.4 Further research
While the present thesis contributed towards answering the questions we set out at the start, it
is by no means exhaustive and the present work could be extended in several ways.
First, for the sake of tractability, and because carbon pricing mechanisms constitute a key
market-based policy tool of some jurisdictions, the present thesis limited the creation of a stan-
dardised assessment methodology to them. But it is important to keep in mind that carbon
pricing mechanisms do not represent the only policy tool developed as part of jurisdictions’
strategy to mitigate climate change. These policies co-exist with a number of other mecha-
nisms aimed at incentivising the reduction of GHG emissions and/or the development of new
GHG-free technologies. In this regard, I note that, despite economists arguing in favour of a
carbon price as an efficient mechanism to achieve emissions reductions, most schemes have
been introduced in addition or in parallel to (pre-existing) technology support policies. Looking
forward, it is likely that climate policy making will continue to follow such pattern. This raises
a number of questions with regard to (i) the role and design of carbon pricing mechanisms
in policy environments where they play a “backstop role"; (ii) the role played by institutional
paths allowing for the emergence of (more stringent) carbon pricing schemes (Pahle et al., 2018);
(iii) the interaction between international and domestic climate policy environments. Further
research in these directions could advance the implementation of GHG-reducing strategies and
should constitute a priority for anyone with this objective.
In addition, as jurisdictions move forward with the decarbonisation of their economy, re-
view their NDCs through the framework of the Paris Agreement and propose new tools to
achieve them, it is of utmost importance that these be assessed according to commonly agreed
and standardised methodologies. The work undertaken by the Climate Action Tracker is a step
in that direction but further work is needed (Climate Action Tracker, 2019).
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Second, the ECP in the present thesis has been used to analyse policy implementation. But
it could also be used to analyse policy outcomes, i.e. the effect of carbon prices on actual
emissions. This is the focus of an ongoing research project (joint with Ryan Rafaty) which seeks
to uncover the effect of carbon prices on CO2 emissions in 25 OECD economies between 1990
and 2016. Besides this, the emissions-weighted carbon price series currently runs between 1990
and 2018 but, with appropriate update of the underlying data to track institutional changes in
covered schemes, could be extended as years go by.
Finally, policies sustaining innovation in GHG-free or GHG-abating technologies must be
part of our strategy too and should remain in place until they lead to self-sustained streams of
innovation in these technologies. The evidence available so far suggests that early policies aim-
ing at fostering such innovation did trigger additional activity but that they did not necessarily
lead to self-sustained innovation. This warrants a further investigation of factors and policy
designs that could lead to a (self-)sustained stream of innovation in some of these technologies.
5.5 Concluding remark
This thesis presented clear evidence that, plagued by political economy factors and institutional
inertia, the current international climate change mitigation regime falls short of the necessary
insurance policy required to safeguard the climate equilibrium that makes the Earth hospitable
to human life; but it also affirms that we have all the necessary tools and mechanisms to build





Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Carbon prices - data sources and details
For each jurisdiction and each year we collect carbon price data in nominal local currency. Most
jurisdictions quote the price of greenhouse gases (including CO2) per tonne of CO2e; others
(essentially those with carbon taxes) express the carbon price per natural unit of the fuel. In
the latter case, we convert the price to express it per tCO2e using conversion factors from the
World Resource Institute (World Resources Institute, 2015). All values are then converted into
2015 $US using the Official Exchange Rate (Local Currency Unit/$US) and inflation rate from
the World Bank, 2016a.
A.1.1 Emissions Trading Schemes
TABLE A.1.1: ETSs prices – sources
Jurisdiction Price information
EU-ETS European Union emissions Allowances (EUA) futures price. Annual average of dailyprices. Source: Bloomberg
Korea, Rep.
The market for Korean Allowance Units (KAUs) has been characterised by high il-
liquidity due to the absence of sellers amid concerns that the market is under-
allocated. The last trade took place on March 15, 2016 at a price of $15.53.
Source: South Korea Exchange
New Zealand Annual average of daily spot prices of New Zealand Allowances (NZU).Source: Bloomberg.
Switzerland
As of 2015, no transaction of Swiss emissions allowances (CHU) had taken place
over a centralised platform. Consequently, the price quoted in this study is the
volume-weighted average price at auction. Source: Swiss Emissions Registry
California(-Quebec) Annual average of daily California Carbon Allowances (CCA) futures contractprice. Source: California Carbon Dashboard
RGGI Volume-weighted annual average of spot transactions.Source: RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System (COATS).
A.1.2 CO2 taxes
Information on sectoral fuel tax rates has been retrieved from a wide range of sources. A full
list of sources is available upon request. These sources include (but are not limited to): OECD
Database on Instruments used for Environmental Policy (OECD, 2016a), International Energy
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Agency Energy Price and Taxes publication (IEA, 2016a), jurisdictions’ budget proposals (as
in the case of, e.g., Norway or Denmark), customs’ agencies documentation, academic journal
articles, policy assessment reports.
A.1.3 Total CO2 price (oil, natural gas)
FIGURE A.1.1: Total carbon price over time – oil
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FIGURE A.1.2: Total carbon price over time – natural gas
A.2 Scheme’s coverage
This methodological appendix further details the steps involved in the computation of the cov-
erage figures. Computing coverage figures requires defining a sectoral disaggregation of the
economy. For the sake of consistency with CAIT, 2015 and IEA, 2016b data, we adopt the
sectoral disaggregation recommended by the IPCC, 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse
Gases Inventories, which is itself based on the United Nations International Standards Indus-
trial Classification (ISIC), Revision 4. Table A.2.1 summarises the sectoral disaggregation.
The scope of an emissions trading scheme is defined at the sectoral level regardless of the
fuel from which CO2 – and other GHG – emissions originate. Therefore, an emissions trading
scheme requires the measurement of GHG emissions at the point of emission. The design of
carbon (or any other GHG)-taxes is different in that they can applied to specific fuel(s) within
particular sectors. The sectors subject to it are determined independently. The relevant physical
unit to be measured in the case of a carbon tax is therefore the fuel consumption (and associated
CO2 emissions) at the user-fuel level. The fuel categories used in this study are: Coal/peat, Oil,
Natural Gas.
The coverage information is recorded, for each jurisdiction and year, at the sector-fuel level
as a binary variable (0 if the sector-fuel is not covered, 1 if it is). This coding is based on various
sources, which vary from one country to the other. As for the carbon prices, a complete list of
sources used to create the data points is available upon request. Table A.2.2 summarises the
information recorded.
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TABLE A.2.1: IPCC 2006 Sectoral disaggregation
IPCC sector name IPCC sector label
Electricity Generation⇤ 1.A.1.a.i
Combined heat and Power Generation⇤ 1.A.1.a.ii
Manufacturing industries and construction⇤ 1.A.2
Domestic Aviation 1.A.3.a.i
Road Transportation 1.A.3.b
Commercial and public services 1.A.4.a
Residential 1.A.4.b
Agriculture/forestry 1.A.4.c
Industrial Processes – cement 2.A.1
Waste 5
*In some countries and in some years, these sectors are covered by a tax and an
emissions trading system. Sometimes, however, the tax schemes are designed to
exempt those installations that are covered by the relevant ETS. Since CO2 emis-
sions data is disaggregated at the sector-fuel level and does not, within it, distin-
guish between those covered by the ETS and those that are not, it is not possible
to account for this unless one makes an assumption about the proportion of emis-
sions represented by the installations covered by the ETS.
TABLE A.2.2: Institutional design
Carbon Tax Emissions Trading System
Price signal Tax rate (Spot/Futures) Allowance price
(nominal - local currency) (nominal - local currency)
Sectoral coverage X X
Fuel coverage X n.a.
GHG-gas coverage * X
Sector-fuel exemptions X n.a.
*The only GHG covered by carbon taxes is obviously CO2.
Note: For each jurisdiction and year, except price, all information is coded as a binary entry.
Calculating total coverage (as a share of total GHG emissions) of carbon pricing schemes at
the level of a jurisdiction is then performed according to the following formula
Coveragei,t =
Âj Âk qi,t,j,k ⇥ i,t,j,k
qGHGi,t
(A.21)
where qi,t,j,k represents jurisdiction i’s CO2 emissions from sector j arising from the combustion
of fuel k in year t; i,t,j,k is an indicator variable taking value 1 if fuel k in sector j of country i
in year t is covered by the scheme, 0 otherwise; qGHGi,t is the total greenhouse gases emissions in
jurisdiction i in year t. Note that in the case of ETSs, the aggregation starts at the sector level,
since all fuels are, by definition, covered.
The calculations make use of sector and sector-fuel CO2 emissions data. National jurisdic-
tions: IEA, 2016b; US States: CAIT, 2015; Canadian Provinces and Territories: Statistics Canada,
2018. Total GHG emissions (excluding land use change) are taken from the CAIT, 2015 of the
World Resources Institute.
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A.3 Emissions-weighted Carbon Price methodology
Equipped with this information, the emissions-weighted price (ECP) can be computed at the
sectoral or economy-wide level. In the former case, the weights are the emissions as a share
of a sector’s total GHG emissions; in the latter, the weights are the emissions as a share of
the jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions. Formally, the ECP of sector j of country i in year t is
expressed as
ECPi,t,j =
Âk[ti,t,j,k ⇥ (qtaxi,t,j,k + q
ets,tax





where ti,t,j,k is the carbon tax rate applicable to fuel k in sector j of country i at time t, qtaxi,t,j,k
is the amount of CO2 emissions covered by a tax only, pi,t,j is the price of an emission permit,
qetsi,t,j,k is the amount of CO2 emissions covered by an ETS, q
ets,tax
i,t,j,k is the amount of CO2 emissions
covered by both an ETS and a tax and qGHGi,t,j is the quantity of GHG emitted by sector j of
country i in year t.
An economy-wide ECP is then computed as a weighted average of the carbon rates across







where gi,t represents the GHG emissions of sector i as a share of the economy’s (jurisdiction’s)
total GHG emissions, i.e.
qGHGi,t,j
qGHGi,t
. For the purpose of the present study, only the economy-wide
ECP is computed and both a time-varying and fixed weights version of the ECP are calculated.
The fixed-weights ECP uses 2013 emissions data.
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A.4 Jurisdictions with carbon pricing policies
TABLE A.4.1: Jurisdictions with implemented carbon pricing schemes as of
2018
Jurisdiction Emissions Carbon tax ECP - 2015 ECP-2018
Trading (2015 $US) (2015 $US)
Austria 2005 - 4.04 7.9
Belgium 2005 - 3.15 6.18
Bulgaria 2007 - 5.64 11.12
Cyprus 2005 - 4.7 9.8
Czech Republic 2005 - 6.06 11.89
Denmark 2005 1992 16.07 8.09
Estonia 2005 2000 8.48 13.34
Finland 2005 1990 35.53 43.95
France 2005 2014 6.49 17.32
Germany 2005 - 5.07 9.96
Greece 2005 - 5.51 11.04
Hungary 2005 - 3.28 6.45
Iceland 2008 2010 6.68 19
Ireland 2005 2010 10.29 12.81
Italy 2005 - 3.89 7.66
Japan - 2012 1.24 1.87
Kazakhstan 2013 - 0.01 †
Korea, Rep. 2015 6.78 14.11
Latvia 2005 1995 2.34 4.61
Liechtenstein 2008 -
Lithuania 2005 - 2.73 5.42
Luxembourg 2005 - 1.44 2.81
Malta 2005 - 5.73 11.15
Mexico - 2014 1.42 1.42
Netherlands 2005 - 4.61 9.02
New Zealand 2008 - 1.91 6.32
Norway 2007 1991 40.85 39.39
Poland 2005 1990 5.4 10.73
Portugal 2005 2015 7.36 12.59
Romania 2007 - 4.15 8.23
Slovak Republic 2005 - 4.86 9.61
Slovenia 2005 1996 12.87 16.93
Spain 2005 - 4.21 8.32
Sweden 2005 1991 87.86 91.3
Switzerland 2008 2008 17.3
United Kingdom 2005 2013 12.16 16.32
Alberta* 2007 -
Beijing 2013 - n.a.
British Columbia - 2008 16.85 19.66
California 2009 - 9.66 11.54
Chongqing 2014 - n.a.
Connecticut 2009 - 1.09 0.75
Delaware 2009 - 1.74 1.20
Guangdong 2013 - n.a.
Hubei 2013 - n.a.
Kyoto 2011 - †
Maine 2009 - 0.5 0.35
Maryland 2009 - 1.57 1.08
Massachusetts 2009 - 1.09 0.75
New Hampshire 2009 - 1.4 0.97
New York 2009 - 0.99 0.68
Quebec 2013 - 6.7 7.93
Rhode Island 2009 - 1.62 1.12
Saitama 2011 - †
Shanghai 2013 - n.a.
Shenzhen 2013 - n.a.
Tianjin 2013 - n.a.
Tokyo 2010 - †
Vermont 2009 - 0.02 0.01
†: missing information at the time of writing – Chile: 2017; South Africa: 2016; New Jersey’s scheme was
discontinued in 2011, Australia’s in 2012.
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B.1 Abatement function
Define the abatement technology as A(eP, vA) where eP is the potential amount of pollution
produced and vA is the (absolute) amount of resources allocated to abatement. A(.) is a CRS
activity. Then, e = eP   A(eP, vA) , e = eP(1   A(1, vA/eP)). Now, recall that without
abatement activity, eP = x = WB(.) and that vA/B(.) = f. Hence e = WB(.)(1   A(1, f))
where we have defined (1   A(1, f)) as c(f).
B.2 Pollution as input
We start by rearranging equation 3.3 to obtain an explicit analytical expression of abatement









This clearly shows that net production of the dirty good depends on (i) potential production,
which in turn depends on how much resources the economy allocates to the dirty sector; (ii)
the number of emission units available to the sector. Importantly, the effect of both factors on
net production depends on their effect on abatement effort.
Hence, we next show that ∂c 1(.)/∂e < 0 and ∂c 1(.)/∂B(.) > 0, which implies that an
increase in available emission units lowers abatement effort and raises net production. In-
deed, define C ⌘ e/B(Kx, Lx). By the inverse function theorem, we know that c 1(.) satisfies
∂c 1(.)/∂C < 0. By definition of C, we have ∂C/∂e > 0 and ∂C/∂B(.) < 0. Hence we must
have ∂c 1(.)/∂e < 0, ∂c 1(.)/∂B(.) > 0.1
1This leads to two interesting observations: first, an increase in emissions allowance raises net output of good
x; second, an increase in potential output B(.) affects net output via a production channel and an abatement chan-
nel. The first one straightforwardly tends to raise production, higher potential production leads to higher actual
production. The second tends to lower actual production and is more indirect: c(f) gives the abatement efforts as
a function of the ratio of unabated to total potential emissions. Hence when potential production (and emissions)
increases, that ratio decreases, for a given level of actual emissions. This requires an increase in abatement efforts
which, in turn depresses net output. Whether one or the other effect dominates is eventually an empirical question
but it seems plausible to assume that the former outweighs the latter.
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Finally, equation B.2.1 is simplified if we define the abatement function as c(f) = (1  
f)1/a. This expression satisfies the properties imposed earlier on the abatement technology










B.3 Firm’s profit maximisation
The firm in the Y sector does not pollute and the profit function is thus
py = pF(Ky, Ly)  wLy   rKy (B.3.1)
In the X (dirty) sector,
px = pX(Kx, Lx)  wLx   rKx   de
= p(1   aW)| {z }
net producer price
X(Kx, Lx)  wLx   rKx (B.3.2)
We derive the second equality by substituting e for its value, given by equation 3.5, and




and that 0 < a < 1 and 0 < W  1 it is easy to see that aW represents the share of pollution
payments in total value added. We note two observations. First, assuming constant a, a de-
crease in the share of pollution payments can be interpreted as reflecting a decrease in W, i.e. an
improvement in abatement technology. Second, as W decreases, the net revenue (i.e. revenue
net of pollution permit payment) increases.
This, together with the relative price of the good, determines the allocation of resources
between sectors. Indeed, recalling our perfect competition assumption, Euler’s theorem, and
the fact that labour and capital are inelastically supplied, we have
FK = p(1   aW)XK = r ; FL = p(1   aW)XL = w
where XK, XL and FK, FL denote the marginal productivity of factors in sectors X and Y, respec-
tively. That is, factors of production are remunerated at the value of their marginal product
which, since both sectors trade inputs in the same markets, is equalised across sectors. Rear-






= p(1   aW) ⌘ S (B.3.4)
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This is the equilibrium resource allocation condition.
Based on that condition, we note that when W decreases (i.e. abatement technology im-
proves), “payments to pollution" per unit of dirty good produced decrease, making the dirty
good sector relatively more attractive, and inducing a reallocation of the economy’s resources
from the clean to the dirty good sector. In other words, an improvement in the abatement
technology induces a change in the composition of the economy.
Finally, equation B.3.4 provides an interesting result: the effect of a change in relative price
on resource allocation varies with the abatement technology W. That is, define Whigh and Wlow,











When a jurisdiction has good abatement technology, a change in the relative price of the dirty
good will induce a larger reallocation of resources from the clean to the dirty sector.
B.4 Prices, emission intensity and abatement efforts
It now becomes possible to derive an expression of f in terms of prices. Using equation 3.5 to







Yet, we also know that x = (1   f)B(Kx, Lx). Hence
i = (1   f)(1 a)/aW (B.4.1)
which suggests that the emission intensity of the economy decreases in two cases: when more
resources are devoted to abatement and when the abatement technology improves. Now, sub-
stituting i for its expression in equation (3.5) yields
aWp
d
= (1   f)(1 a)/aW
and we can therefore write





As it turns out, abatement effort is independent from W, the abatement technology quality.
However, an improvement in abatement technology might affect equilibrium abatement effort
through its effect on equilibrium emissions price.
In a general equilibrium context, the total effect of a (positive) technological change in abate-
ment comes in two ways. First, for a given (equilibrium) price of emissions, pollution payments
per unit of dirty good decreases, inducing a shift of inputs from the clean to the dirty sector
and hence stimulating production in the latter – this is the composition effect identified in B.2,
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which tends to raise pollution demand. Second, the technological improvement also induces a
reduction in the emission intensity of the dirty sector – a technique effect, which tends to reduce
pollution demand.
If the technique effect is stronger than the composition effect, then an improvement in abate-
ment technology will lead to a decrease in pollution demand. The ensuing downward adjust-
ment in equilibrium emissions price d will induce a decrease in abatement effort.
B.5 Regulatory threshold
The present discussion is based on Copeland and Taylor, 2003. We adopt a constant relative
risk aversion utility function for the consumption component of utility and a constant marginal
disutility of emissions. Therefore, the indirect utility function becomes
V(p, I, E) =
[I/w(p)]1 h
1   h   lE, with h 6= 1
where E = E i + ei. For simplicity, it is assumed that the economy produces only one (dirty)







































Substituting B.5.3 in the utility function leads to
VR(p, I, E) =

1
1   h   a
 
R1 h   lE i (B.5.4)
At this stage, we can note that if the economy incurs a fixed cost of regulation, income will
be reduced. Indeed, suppose that regulation is expected to require (K̄, L̄) of resources (i.e.
E(K̄, L̄) ⌘ F), then the expected resources available for production are (K   K̄, L   L̄), the
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If the expected cost of regulation decreases, then income increases following an increase in
potential output. As a result, utility under regulation is now higher at any level of initial en-
dowment in (K, L) of the economy. Formally, we have ∂VR/∂F < 0.
In the no regulation case, no abatement takes place so that real income is equal to (potential)
output and emissions are directly proportional to it. Utility is then defined as
VNR(p, I, E) =
R1 h
(1   h)   lR   lE i (B.5.5)
It can be shown that B.5.5 first rises and then declines with real income. VNR increases over
[0, h
p





 h   l is positive over [0, h
p
1/l[,
equals 0 in R = h
p
1/l and is negative over ] h
p
1/l,+•. Since VR is monotonically increasing
over the interval [0,+•, there exists a unique level of income such that VR = VNR and beyond
which VR > VNR. That is, we can write Ī ⌘ VR = VNR. Given ∂VR/∂F < 0, we have




Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Patent data (and patents search)
Our main proxy for patenting activity in the UK is the number of patent applications contained
in the EPO Worldwide Statistical Patents Database, version of Autumn 2018 (European Patent
Office, 2018). We downloaded patents which had at least one IPC code starting with ‘B’,‘F’,‘G’,









FIGURE C.1.1: Patent sets
ML search To use the classifier on the said set, we need to create a training sample based on
the text of patents related to electricity supply technologies and those related to other technolo-
gies. The approach taken to construct the sample and train the classifier builds on Kreuchauff
and Korzinov, 2017 and involves the following steps:
1As mentioned earlier, we downloaded filings up to 2017 but truncated our sample to 2016 to account for a
lag between filing and actual recording in the database. This covers all the IPC codes pertaining to fossil fuel
and renewable electricity generation technologies, as identified in Lanzi, 2010 and Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp,
2010 respectively, with the exception of the following codes: B01J8/20-22, C10J;C10L 5/40-48,C10L 1,C10L 3,C10L
5,E04D 13/18
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1. The classifier is trained on a sample of 240 patents, which includes 126 patents pertaining
to electricity supply technologies and 116 patents pertaining to other technologies. This
sample is constructed as follows. First, we randomly select 200 patents from the patent
ensemble comprising all patents with at least one IPC code in the list of those associated
with the patents identified by the keywords-based search and 130 patents from the sam-
ple identified by the keywords search.2 The titles and abstracts of all 330 patents were
read so as to manually classify the them between (i) electricity supply technologies and
(ii) other technologies. In the sample of patents drawn from the keywords-based ensem-
ble, we identified 14 patents that were “false positives" whereas in the IPC ensemble we
identified 22 “false negatives", which left us with 138 patents identified as belonging to
the former category and 192 identified as belonging to the latter. In our training sample,
we included all “false positives" of the keywords-based ensemble and 100 non electric-
ity supply related patents of the IPC ensemble, as well as all “false negatives" of the
IPC ensemble and all electricity supply related patents of the keywords-based ensemble.
This, removing duplicates, left us with 114 patents pertaining to technologies unrelated
to electricity supply and 126 patents pertaining to electricity supply technologies. These
240 patents constitute our training sample.
2. The text of the 240 patents titles and abstracts is prepared for classification
(a) Structure the text data (application title and abstract). That is, for for each patent ap-
plication: (i) merge patent title and abstract in one element and split into a single list
of words; (ii) transform all string characters into lowercase characters; (iii) remove
blank entries, stop words, empty spaces and numbers; (iv) extract the stem of each
word; (v) Generate n-grams;
(b) Derive normalised word and n-gram frequencies (across all patent applications)
(c) Select features for classification. Not all features identified are carry meaningful
information from a classification perspective. In other words, they add noise. Fol-
lowing Kreuchauff and Korzinov, 2017, we kept only the features that appeared in
at least 2% of the patent applications.
3. Train our random forest classifier on a (training) sample. This comprised three itera-
tive steps (common to almost any machine learning approach): training of the model, its
evaluation, and optimisation. Finally, the classifier with the best model fit was applied to
some test data;
4. Apply trained classifier to full sample.
2The sample size is determined by the selection algorithm. We aimed for a sample size as close to 100 as possible,
representative of the keyword search queries performed in proportion of the patents identified by each of them in
the keywords ensemble, and under the constraint that at least one patent from each query.
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TABLE C.1.1: Classification report
Precision Recall f1 score No of patents in test set(support)
Non ESI 0.77 1 0.87 23
ESI 1 0.81 0.9 37
Avg./total 0.91 0.88 0.88 60
All steps describe above were performed using the python programming language and the
following libraries: pandas (for data handling), nltk (for natural language processing), scikit-
learn (for machine learning). Note that as a by-product of our “augmented" keywords-based
search we also get a sample of patents selected only based on keywords.
Other List of actors for which at least one patent filing entry was returned by our search
TABLE C.1.2: List of actors
BRITISH GAS TRADING
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING BOARD
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING BOARD MARTIN R E






ELECTRICITY COUNCIL HODGETT D L FUNG H

















SOUTH OF SCOTLAND ELECTRICITY BOARD
UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY
120 Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 4
FIGURE C.1.2: UK ESI patent applications, by main NACE2 class
This figure excludes filings by individuals. Including these filings changes the count of patents in each NACE category but does not change the proportional distribution
across them. Within each class, counts are based on the weighted-average count, i.e. 1 over the number of classes with which each patent is associated.
C.2 Database queries
C.2.1 PATSTAT online
Below are the SQL queries used to query the PATSTAT database via the online platform PAT-
STAT online. PATSTAT contains bibliographical and legal status data originating from 90
patent issuing authorities, including regional patent offices like the EPO.
The first query is designed to retrieve all PATSTAT tables (except table
tls203_appln_abstr containing the patent abstracts) pertaining to patent applications filed be-
tween 1955 and 2017 and with at least one technology code starting with H, G, F or B . In
practice, the query is executed separately for five different time periods: 1955-1964, 1965-1973,
1974-1985, 1986-1996, 1997-2017. The start and end years of these periods are substituted for
YEAR_START and YEAR_END in the code below.
The second query is designed to retrieve the abstracts of all patents identified by the first
query.










,dbo.GROUP_CONCAT_DS(DISTINCT ipc_class_Symbol ,N’ ,’ ,1) IPC */
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FROM [patstat2018a].[dbo].[tls201_appln] app
join tls203_appln_abstr on app.appln_id = tls203_appln_abstr.appln_id
join tls209_appln_ipc on app.appln_id = tls209_appln_ipc.appln_id
and left(ipc_class_symbol, 1) in (’H’,’G’,’F’,’B’)
where app.appln_auth = ’GB’ and app.appln_filing_year between YEAR_START and YEAR_END
and (app.earliest_filing_id = app.appln_id or app.appln_id in
(select tls204_appln_prior.appln_id from tls204_appln_prior join tls201_appln
as prior on tls204_appln_prior.prior_appln_id = prior.appln_id
where appln_auth = ’GB’))
and app.appln_id < 900000000
order by app.appln_id desc
-------------Retrieving Patent Abstracts----------------------









,dbo.GROUP_CONCAT_DS(DISTINCT ipc_class_Symbol ,N’ ,’ ,1) IPC */
FROM [patstat2018a].[dbo].[tls203_appln_abstr] app_abstr
join tls201_appln on app_abstr.appln_id = tls201_appln.appln_id
join tls209_appln_ipc on app_abstr.appln_id = tls209_appln_ipc.appln_id
and left(ipc_class_symbol, 1) in (’H’,’G’,’F’,’B’)
where tls201_appln.appln_auth = ’GB’
and tls201_appln.appln_filing_year between 1955 and 2017
and (tls201_appln.earliest_filing_id = tls201_appln.appln_id
or tls201_appln.appln_id in
(select tls204_appln_prior.appln_id from tls204_appln_prior
join tls201_appln as prior on tls204_appln_prior.prior_appln_id = prior.appln_id
where appln_auth = ’GB’))
and app_abstr.appln_id < 900000000
order by app_abstr.appln_id desc
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C.2.2 FAME
The FAME database interface allows to perform company searches based on their Company
Registration Number (CRN). In particular, it allows to upload a list of CRN on the interface and
retrieve information on the associated companies. The extracted information includes: Global
Ultimate Owner information (name, address, NACE Industrial classification code), number of
employees, turnover, R-D expenditures, primary and secondary NACE code, date of incorpo-
ration.
C.3 Technology codes
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TABLE C.3.3: IPC/CPC Technology codes














































Renewables Y02E 10 European Patent Office, 2013
F03D1-F03D11 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F03G6 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F24J2 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
H01L27/42 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
H01L31/04/78 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
H02N6 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
E04D13/18 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F24J3 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F03G4 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F03G7/04 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
E02B9/08 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F03B13/10-26 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
F03G7/05 Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp, 2010
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TABLE C.3.4: IPC/CPC Technology codes (cont.)







Energy storage H02J Authors
H01M Authors
Pollution control B01D Authors




Other general engineering F01D1 Authors
F01D9 Authors
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